Why So Much Elite Enthusiasm For The Odyssey?

I haven’t seen the film. Nothing I’ve heard about it moves me to see the film.

The reviews came in around 98 percent on Rotten Tomatoes and an 88 on Metacritic, with the film opening to $124 million, Nolan’s best debut since The Dark Knight Rises.

Why the elite ecstasy over this movei? First, Homer flatters the reviewer. A critic who writes about The Odyssey gets to display his classical education, weigh fidelity to the poem, and quote Emily Wilson or Fagles. The assignment confers status. A Marvel movie makes the critic a consumer guide. A Homer adaptation makes him a humanist. Reviewers have an interest in treating the film as an event because the event elevates them.

Second, Nolan occupies a rare position: the one director who makes original-feeling, adult-scaled films that also gross a billion dollars. The critical class has spent a decade mourning the death of theatrical cinema and mid-budget seriousness. Nolan is their counterevidence. Praising him is coalition work for the institution of moviegoing. When Deadline’s critic calls it “a return home to the robustly entertaining action movies that cinema was invented to tell,” that sentence defends an industry, not just a film. The film was also the first shot entirely in Imax, and critics saw it in Imax theaters, which stacks the sensory deck. You review the format along with the film.

Third, momentum. Oppenheimer grossed nearly a billion dollars and swept the Oscars, including Best Picture and Best Director. Awards pundits started calling this one the Best Picture front-runner, with predictions that Damon could win his first acting Oscar, before most critics had seen it. Once the trade press frames a film as the season’s front-runner, dissent carries a cost. A critic who pans the consensus masterpiece looks contrarian; a critic who joins the chorus looks perceptive. The incentives run one way.

Fourth, Universal managed the rollout. The studio let only professional press see it early, cutting out influencers, which flattered the critics with restored gatekeeper status and made their verdict feel authoritative rather than one voice among fan reactions.

Fifth, it gives elites the opportunity to scold regular Americans about their lack of appreciation for diversity. Lupita Nyong’o plays Helen of Troy, Elliot Page plays Sinon, the Greek soldier behind the Trojan horse ruse, and Travis Scott took a role as well. The backlash was large: the final trailer reportedly drew over 542,000 dislikes, and Musk declared Nolan had “lost his integrity” over the Helen casting.

The reviews praised the film; the think pieces disciplined its critics. TheWrap ran a piece arguing that anger about race and gender in the film says more about the angry viewer than the film, and asking why some people only care about historical inaccuracy when it invalidates their preconceptions. Slate deployed a military historian to argue the woke-agenda accusations collapse because the ancient Mediterranean was diverse anyway. Forbes filed the objections under culture war grievances placing politics above art. The casting functions as a boundary marker. Objecting sorts you into the out-group, and the columns writing up the objectors let the writers perform membership in the in-group. The scold is the payoff. A critic who spends 800 words on Musk’s tweet gets to demonstrate sophistication without doing criticism.

There’s also an asymmetry in the standard applied. The same publications treat armor anachronisms and Tom Holland saying “dad” as trivia for pedants, then treat objections to the casting as a moral failing rather than trivia. If nothing in the film is meant to be accurate, both complaints should get the same shrug. They don’t, because one complaint is useful.

Homer is myth, not history; the poem has been recast in every medium for centuries; stage productions of Greek drama have used colorblind casting for decades without controversy. Helen’s beauty in the poem is a force, not a phenotype. The defense of the casting becomes dishonest only when it pretends the casting carries no contemporary political meaning, that Universal made these choices in a vacuum and only the objectors are political. Everyone in the transaction knows the casting signals something. The critics know, the studio knows, the objectors know. The only forbidden move is saying so plainly.

The reception owes as much to what Nolan represents to the people writing about him as to what plays on screen. He lets an anxious cultural class believe that spectacle and seriousness can still share a theater, and they reward him for it.

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Is There Any Realistic Way Of Unifying America?

John Mearsheimer (b. 1947) holds that humans are survival-driven social animals who live in groups, that groups need thick shared cultures to function, and that nationalism beats liberal universalism because the nation is the best survival vehicle on offer. David Pinsof holds that beliefs are alliance signals, that people adopt positions to advertise loyalty to their coalitions and to derogate rivals, and that persuasion runs downstream of alliance structure. Put them together and you get a diagnosis: America is disunited because its national identity has thinned while its internal coalitions have thickened, and every public question has become a badge in a two-coalition war. The prescription follows from the diagnosis.

First, lower the stakes of national politics. Pinsof implies that when Washington decides everything, every belief becomes a national loyalty test. If abortion, schooling, guns, and speech codes are settled state by state, a Texan and a Vermonter no longer need to treat each other as existential threats. Federalism reduces the signaling value of national positions. A leader who wants unity might push decisions down rather than win them at the top, even when his coalition holds the top.

Second, scramble the coalitions. Pinsof’s account says beliefs follow alliances, so the lever is alliance structure. The current sorting stacks race, religion, education, geography, and party into two megatribes, and stacked cleavages produce total war. Cross-cutting cleavages produce moderation because your ally on taxes is your opponent on schools and you cannot afford to hate him. Leaders can build cross-cutting alliances around material interests: an economic program that recruits Black church ladies and White factory workers into one coalition does more for unity than a thousand speeches about coming together. The speeches are coalition signaling in disguise; the payroll is real.

Third, thicken the national identity. Mearsheimer’s anthropology says a country held together only by proposition and procedure will lose to countries held together by story, ritual, and blood-adjacent loyalty. Leaders might invest in the machinery that manufactures Americans: a common civic calendar, national holidays celebrated rather than litigated, a canonical account of the country taught in schools that includes the crimes without making the crimes the whole story, English as the working language, and an immigration system calibrated to the country’s capacity to assimilate rather than to the labor market’s appetite. Mearsheimer might add that assimilation worked before because institutions demanded it. The demand can return.

Fourth, give the coalitions a common scoreboard. Nations unify around external competition and shared projects. A race with China over semiconductors, energy, and biotech gives both parties a reason to want the same numbers to go up. The risk runs the other direction too: leaders who inflate threats to harvest unity tend to buy wars with the proceeds. The project has to be real.

Fifth, stop feeding the signaling economy. Both frames imply that a president who spends his term on symbolic fights, on flags and statues and pronouns, is running a coalition-maintenance operation, whatever he says about healing. Material politics unifies more than symbolic politics because a bridge serves both tribes and a symbol can only serve one. Pick fights that end in concrete.

Pinsof says you cannot argue a country into unity, because argument is what coalitions do to each other. National conversations, fact-checking initiatives, and civility campaigns read as enemy maneuvers to whichever side did not launch them. Mearsheimer says that creedal patriotism alone cannot carry the load, which cuts against the favorite unity program of the American establishment. And both frames suggest the deepest constraint: leaders rose through the coalition war and owe their positions to it. Asking them to demobilize their own armies asks them to disarm first. The leaders most able to unify the country are the ones the current system is least likely to produce, which might be why the last several presidents each promised unity and each left the country more sorted than he found it.

What about realistic ways of maximizing what we have in common? How can we rejigger incentives to produce a more pro-social behavior and outlook? I don’t believe in much, but I believe in the power of incentives to increase good behavior and to decrease bad behavior.

Where does anti-social behavior currently pay, and how do you change the payout table?

Start with the attention economy, because that is where the worst incentives live. A politician, pundit, or professor earns more attention by attacking the outgroup than by any other act. Outrage travels farther than agreement on every platform, and attention converts to money and status. I’m not interested in throttling this.

Second, change what politicians need to win. Closed primaries reward the candidate who best signals hatred of the other tribe to the most committed ten percent of his own. Alaska’s system, a single open primary plus ranked-choice general, changed who won there: Lisa Murkowski (b. 1957) survived a censure from her own party because she could assemble votes across the line. Louisiana’s jungle primary has produced similar effects for decades. Multi-member districts with proportional allocation, which the Constitution permits and a statute currently forbids, might break the two-megatribe structure at the root, since a five-party system makes permanent total war arithmetically harder than a two-party system.

Third, pay for contact. The contact hypothesis holds up best under specific conditions: equal status, shared goals, cooperation, institutional support. Those conditions describe a job site, a military unit, a volunteer fire department, and a rec-league team, and they do not describe a comment section. Policy can subsidize the first list. National service scores again here, but smaller versions exist: AmeriCorps stipends large enough to compete with entry-level wages, employer tax credits for apprenticeships that pull the college-bound and the trade-bound into the same shops, zoning reform that lets the young cop and the young teacher live in the same neighborhood as the young analyst. Bowling leagues died partly because the economy stopped leaving room for them. Leave room.

Fourth, restore thick local institutions, because pro-social behavior gets learned in bodies, in rooms, among people who will see you again. The repeat-player condition does most of the work: a man behaves better toward people he will face next week. Churches, shuls, unions, Rotary, school boards. Government cannot manufacture these, but it can stop taxing and regulating them into the ground, and it can route services through them. Disaster relief through churches and civic groups, job training through unions and employer associations. When the state delivers everything through its own apparatus, it starves the middle layer where citizens practice cooperation on people unlike their cousins.

Fifth, make defection from your own coalition survivable. Pinsof’s frame says people hold tribal positions because the cost of breaking ranks exceeds the benefit of honesty. Lower the cost. Secret ballots did this for voting. Institutions can do the analogue: universities and firms that adopt real neutrality on contested public questions, in the style of the Kalven Report, give their members cover to think. A professor at a committed institution must signal; a professor at a neutral one may reason. The incentive design point: honesty is a supply curve, and it slopes. More people tell the truth when the price drops.

Sixth, use the tax code and the honors system. The state already shapes behavior through deductions and medals. It could weight both toward bridging rather than bonding. Charitable status might favor organizations whose membership crosses the party line over organizations that exist to fight the culture war under a 501(c)(3) flag. Presidential medals, national endowments, and public commissions could go to people whose work serves both tribes, and the selection would itself be a signal from the top about what the country pays status for.

Seventh, end immigration and incentives for American to not put America first.

Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) attacked “hyphenated Americanism” and made the hyphen a mark against a man in public life. German Americans dropped their language, renamed their clubs, and buried a culture inside a decade. The machine worked through elite gatekeeping: newspapers, party bosses, university admissions, officer commissions. It should be publicly unacceptable to put any identity ahead of your American identity (with the exception of your religion).

Make the top of every ladder model the ranking. When the general, the CEO, the university president, and the senator each speak as Americans first and their tribes second, ambitious people below them copy the style, because ambitious people copy up. This costs nothing and requires no law. It requires elites who want to do it, which is the actual scarcity. The current elite incentive runs the other way: a corporate officer gains status in his professional class by foregrounding subgroup identity, and the awards, panels, and profiles reward it. Flip what the prestige economy pays. The Presidential Medal of Freedom, honorary degrees, magazine covers, keynote slots. These are the currency. Spend them on people who publicly rank America first, and withhold them from people who publicly rank it lower, and within a decade the style changes, because the style always follows the money and the honors.

Build institutions where the ranking is the price of entry. The military does this now and is the last institution majorities of both tribes trust. The oath, the uniform, the flag on the shoulder: a Marine may be Mexican, Mormon, or Sikh, and the Corps does not care, and it will destroy him for placing any of it above the unit. Expand the model. A large national service program extends the oath culture to millions who will never enlist. Naturalization already requires renouncing prior allegiances; the ceremony could become a bigger public event, celebrated the way college football is celebrated, so the country regularly watches people choose it over their origins.

Pinsof notes that secure status permits understatement. The men most able to mock identity ranking are members in good standing of the subgroups. When a Black comedian ridicules a White progressive for racial ventriloquism, or a Jewish writer needles a colleague for treating Israel as his home team in American debates, the shame lands without triggering the persecution alarm, because the shot came from inside. No government program produces this, but media gatekeepers decide whom to platform, and they could platform the counter-signalers instead of the identity entrepreneurs.

Mearsheimer would say some identity rankings are load limits you cannot shame away. Religious believers place God above the state, and a country that demands otherwise turns faith into an enemy and loses the believers, who are its most pro-social citizens by most measures. The workable demand is narrower: rank America above every earthly alternative, above the old country, the race, the party, and the diaspora, while leaving the vertical relationship alone.

Pinsof would say a shame campaign run by one coalition becomes a loyalty test administered by that coalition, and “America first in your identity stack” becomes a club for beating whichever minorities the administering tribe dislikes.

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I Hate Microsoft

I fight an unending war to prevent MS from forcing me to use its Edge browser and other lousy products. I do everything I can to avoid MS. I don’t hate much in life, but I hate how MS treats me.
Microsoft treats your default browser choice as a suggestion. Windows resets file associations after updates, buries the switch behind extra clicks, ignores your default when you click links from the Start menu, widgets, or Outlook, and pops up “recommendations” to give Edge another chance. Each individual nag is small. The accumulation wears you down, which is the strategy.
A few things that cut most of it off:
Set your default browser in Settings > Apps > Default apps, then set it again for individual file types (.html, .pdf, HTTP, HTTPS), because Windows treats these as separate decisions. Edge often keeps PDFs even after you switch the browser default.
Turn off the suggestion machinery: Settings > System > Notifications > scroll down to “Additional settings” and uncheck the options about tips, suggestions, and finishing device setup. Also Settings > Privacy & security > General, turn off all four toggles there.
For links that force-open in Edge (from Start menu search, widgets, Copilot), a small free utility called MSEdgeRedirect intercepts those calls and sends them to your default browser. It’s on GitHub, widely used, and it closes the loophole Microsoft built to bypass your choice.
Disable Edge from launching at startup: Task Manager > Startup apps, disable anything Edge-related, and in Edge’s own settings turn off “Startup boost” and “Continue running background extensions when Edge is closed.”
After major Windows updates, expect some of this to revert and budget two minutes to check. It’s annoying that you have to maintain a defensive posture against your own operating system, but the maintenance load drops a lot once MSEdgeRedirect is in place.
I hate how Adobe, even when you pay for it, keep throwing pop ups and other crap at me when I have work to do!
Adobe treats paying customers as a marketing audience. You bought Acrobat and it still pushes AI Assistant buttons, upsell banners, “what’s new” tours, and Creative Cloud notifications while you’re mid-task. The subscription gets you the software plus the ads.
In Acrobat, go to Preferences (Ctrl+K) > General and uncheck “Show me messages when I launch Adobe Acrobat” and anything about in-app messages. Under the same preferences, look for “Email Accounts” and notification options and kill those too. If the new AI Assistant panel bothers you, Preferences > Generative AI, disable it. That removes the sparkle buttons crowding your toolbar.
Creative Cloud desktop app is its own nag source. Open it, click your profile icon > Preferences > Notifications, and turn everything off. Under General, you can also stop it from launching at startup, though some Adobe apps complain if it isn’t running.
For the popups that survive settings, there’s a registry-level option for Acrobat: Adobe documents a key called bUsageMeasurement and IT admins use a set of keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Adobe to suppress upsell messaging. Searching “Acrobat disable in-app messages registry” gets you the current keys for your version. This is the approach corporate IT departments use because Adobe’s consumer-facing toggles don’t cover everything, which tells you what Adobe thinks of the consumer-facing toggles.
If your work is mostly PDF reading, commenting, and light editing, consider whether you need Acrobat at all. Foxit and PDF-XChange Editor handle most PDF work, cost less, and nag less.
Like Windows, expect some settings to revert after major updates. The vendors have learned that most people give up re-disabling things, and the ones who don’t are a rounding error.
Who are the other most abusive software companies?
Oracle sits at the top of most lists. Its business model runs on audits. It sells you licenses with terms vague enough that almost any customer can be found out of compliance, then sends auditors to find the violations and converts the findings into settlements, which usually means buying more Oracle. Java licensing changes in 2023 moved to per-employee pricing, so a company with 5,000 employees pays for all 5,000 even if twelve developers touch Java. Lawyers who work software contracts describe Oracle audits as a revenue division.
Intuit lobbied for years to keep the IRS from offering free tax filing, then buried its own Free File option so people who qualified paid anyway. The FTC ruled its “free” advertising deceptive in 2024. TurboTax exists to charge you for what the tax code already requires you to do, and the company spends millions keeping it that way.
Salesforce and SAP practice hostage pricing: the cost of leaving exceeds the pain of staying. Your data lives in their formats, your workflows bend around their structures, and renewal negotiations start from the premise that migration would cost you two years and millions. SAP charges “indirect access” fees when your other software talks to your SAP system, meaning you pay them because your own systems communicate.
Broadcom bought VMware in 2023 and became the fastest case study. It killed perpetual licenses, forced subscription bundles, and raised prices on some customers by 300 to 1,000 percent, betting that virtualized infrastructure is too painful to migrate. The bet has mostly paid.
Epson and HP turned printers into subscription traps. HP ships firmware updates that brick third-party ink cartridges. Its Instant Ink program keeps charging you monthly whether you print or not, and if you cancel, the cartridges already in your printer stop working, ink you paid for, disabled remotely.
Ancestry and 23andMe hold your genetic data under terms of service they can change. Ring built a partnership network giving police access to doorbell footage. Meta’s abuses are their own category.
The common thread: each company found a point where switching costs, network effects, or legal complexity let it stop competing on quality. Microsoft nags you because it can. Oracle audits you because it can. The abuse scales with the lock-in.
Facebook/Meta leads by scale of harm. Internal research showed Instagram damages teenage girls’ mental health and the company shipped growth features anyway. It ran psychological experiments on users without consent, manipulating news feeds to test emotional contagion. Its engagement algorithms learned that anger and fear hold attention, so anger and fear got amplified across two billion people. The Cambridge Analytica episode was less an aberration than the platform working as designed: user data was the product from the start.
Amazon abuses both sides of its marketplace. It uses sales data from third-party sellers to clone their products, then buries the originals in search results below its own versions. It packs results with ads that look like results. Prime cancellation was engineered as a maze; the FTC sued over the design, which Amazon internally called “Iliad” after an epic about a long grueling ordeal. Its review system drowns in fakes it profits from and polices half-heartedly.
Google turned search into an ad auction wearing a search costume. The top of most commercial queries is paid placement styled to look organic. It tracked location data after users turned location tracking off. YouTube’s recommendation engine spent years radicalizing viewers toward extreme content because extreme content kept them watching, and the company adjusted only after journalists documented it.
Ticketmaster operates a tollbooth on live music. Fees run 20 to 30 percent of face value, itemized as service charges, facility charges, and processing charges for a transaction that costs it pennies. Its merger with Live Nation gave it the venues, the promotion, and the ticketing, so artists and fans have nowhere else to go.
Airbnb and DoorDash mastered drip pricing: the price you see first bears little relation to what you pay at checkout after cleaning fees, service fees, and regulatory recovery charges appear. Both companies also lobbied to keep their workers classified as contractors while controlling their work like employees.
LinkedIn sends emails engineered to look like personal messages from colleagues. Dating apps like Tinder and Hinge, both owned by Match Group, face lawsuits alleging their algorithms withhold likely matches from paying users because a matched user stops paying. The product succeeds when it fails.
PayPal freezes accounts and holds sellers’ money for 180 days with minimal explanation and no meaningful appeal. For small merchants, that hold can be fatal.
The pattern from the software companies repeats here: every one of these services found a chokepoint. Meta owns social connection, Google owns discovery, Amazon owns distribution, Ticketmaster owns venues. Once the chokepoint is secure, the customer experience becomes a cost center to be mined rather than a product to be improved. Cory Doctorow (b. 1971) named the process “enshittification”: platforms are good to users until users are locked in, then good to business customers until they are locked in, then extract value from both. The coinage stuck because the sequence keeps repeating.
Are there any good guys?
Yes, and they cluster into recognizable types.
The nonprofit and foundation model produces the most reliable good behavior. Wikipedia runs on donations, carries no ads, sells no data, and remains one of the most visited sites on earth. Mozilla’s Firefox survives as the browser that answers to a foundation rather than an ad business, though its dependence on Google search payments compromises the independence. Signal offers encrypted messaging funded by donations and a foundation endowment; it cannot sell your data because it designed its systems so it never has your data. The Internet Archive preserves the web and lends books, and gets sued by publishers for its trouble. Craigslist stayed ugly, cheap, and functional for thirty years while a hundred better-funded competitors tried to enshittify the classified ad and failed.
The paid-product model works when the customer and the revenue source are the same person. Kagi charges for search, so it has no advertiser to serve; results answer to you. Fastmail and Proton charge for email and in exchange do not read it. 1Password, Bear, and Things charge money for software and then behave like companies that want you to renew. Apple belongs partly in this camp: because hardware margins fund the business, it can market privacy as a feature, though its App Store practices and repair hostility disqualify it from full membership.
The open-source world runs on a different economy. VLC plays every video format ever devised, takes no money, shows no ads, and has turned down offers reportedly in the tens of millions to bundle adware. LibreOffice, Linux, Blender, and OBS give away tools that commercial vendors charge rent for. Home Assistant lets you run a smart home without shipping your daily routines to a cloud.
Some commercial companies simply behave well within a for-profit frame. Valve’s Steam earned dominance in PC games with three-decade-old purchases that still download, generous refunds, and no forced subscriptions. Backblaze publishes its hard drive failure data for the industry’s benefit and prices backup honestly. Bandcamp, before and mostly after its ownership changes, passed most revenue to musicians. DuckDuckGo built a search business on the promise of not tracking you and has kept it.
The common thread inverts the abuse pattern. Every abusive company we walked through found a chokepoint and mined it. Every company on this list either refused the chokepoint (open source, nonprofits), or aligned payment with service so the user is the customer rather than the inventory (Kagi, Fastmail, 1Password), or held market power and declined to fully exploit it, which is rarest (Valve, Craigslist). The lesson is structural: goodness in software correlates less with founder virtue than with a business model where mistreating you costs the company money. When you can find a service where you are the paying customer and leaving is easy, the incentives do most of the moral work.

I’m happy with Google because its core products work. Search still answers most questions faster than anything except maybe an AI chat. Gmail has been reliable for two decades and its spam filtering remains the best in the business. Maps is one of the great engineering achievements of the century, and it’s free. Docs, Drive, Photos, Calendar, YouTube: each one leads or nearly leads its category, they cooperate with each other, and the price to you is zero dollars.
The criticisms I listed are true and the products are excellent. Both hold. Google’s bargain differs from Oracle’s or Ticketmaster’s: those companies take your money and give you a bad experience. Google gives you a good experience and takes your data. For many people that trade is rational. You get world-class infrastructure for free, and the cost, being profiled for ads, lands lightly on you if you were going to see ads somewhere anyway and would rather they be relevant.
The bargain has two weak points. First, lock-in accumulates quietly. Twenty years of email, photos, and documents in one company’s hands means the exit gets harder every year, and Google has a habit of killing products people depend on (Reader, Inbox, Podcasts, the graveyard is long). Google Takeout does let you export everything, which puts Google ahead of most rivals on this score. Second, account suspension is the catastrophic tail risk. Google’s automated systems sometimes lock accounts with no human appeal, and people have lost email, photos, and documents in one stroke. The fix costs little: keep a periodic Takeout backup and register your own domain for email forwarding so your address survives any provider.
Do those two things and you’ve kept the upside of the bargain while capping the downside. Happiness with Google is a reasonable position; unhedged happiness is the only version I’d talk you out of.

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Robert Putnam: The Man Who Counted What America Lost

Port Clinton, Ohio, sits on Lake Erie between Toledo and Cleveland, a town of factory workers, farmers, shopkeepers, and professionals. In the 1950s the fathers of its children punched clocks at auto plants and carried United Auto Workers cards, or ran hardware stores, or practiced law, and their sons and daughters met in the same public schools, the same church basements, the same bowling alleys. The junior-high bowling team included Black kids and White kids. Nobody called it a program. It was Tuesday.

One of the boys on that team was Robert David Putnam (b. January 9, 1941), born in Rochester, New York, and raised in Port Clinton. He was shy, bookish, and nearsighted. His mother, Ruth, chronically ill for much of her life, worried her son would disappear into his books, so she pushed him out the door. He joined the debate team, the band, the chorus, the science club, the bowling league, and the football team, where his eyesight and coordination made him a liability. His classmates elected him class president anyway. Sixty years later he would build a scholarly career on the proposition buried in that election: people learn citizenship the way they learn bowling, by showing up and doing it with others.

His father, Frank Putnam, went to the Second World War with two legs and came home with one. After a long hospitalization he earned a graduate business degree, founded a construction company in Port Clinton, and threw himself into the town's civic life. The company failed in the housing recession of 1962. He died of a heart attack soon after, and his son, then a college student, took on responsibility for helping support his mother. Port Clinton gave Putnam his lifelong question and his emotional capital. He would spend it for the rest of his career.

Putnam never romanticized the town. He knew the 1950s ran on racial exclusion and a domestic order that assigned unpaid labor to women. What struck him was that Port Clinton had institutions through which a factory worker's son and a lawyer's son kept meeting each other, year after year, in settings where each owed the other something. Those repeated encounters carried information, reputations, mentors, and second chances across class lines. When he returned to the town half a century later, the institutions were gone and the crossings had stopped.

He arrived at Swarthmore College in 1959 a Methodist, a moderate Republican, and, by his own account, a science nerd from small-town Ohio. In the fall of 1960 he volunteered for Richard Nixon (1913-1994). Then he met Rosemary, a Jewish student from Chicago whose family had voted New Deal since before she was born. Their courtship ran through the 1960 campaign as a competition: she took him to a rally for John F. Kennedy (1917-1963), he took her to a rally for Nixon. By November the Republican had lost the argument at his own dinner table. In January 1961 the couple stood in the Washington cold and heard Kennedy tell them to ask what they could do for their country. Putnam took it as a personal summons. He married Rosemary in 1963, later converted to Judaism, and raised two children with her. They have seven grandchildren. The marriage placed him inside American religious pluralism decades before he studied it.

At Swarthmore he studied under the social psychologist Solomon Asch (1907-1996), whose conformity experiments demonstrated how far individuals bend to group pressure, and the political philosopher Roland Pennock (1906-1995). The combination left a mark. Putnam's first published research, written in graduate school, examined how local communities form political attitudes. He did not know it yet, but he had already found his only subject: how communities make individuals, and how individuals sustain communities.

After Swarthmore came a Fulbright year at Balliol College, Oxford, then Yale, where he took an M.A. in 1965 and a Ph.D. in 1970 under a faculty that included Robert Dahl (1915-2014), Karl Deutsch (1912-1992), and Robert E. Lane (1917-2017). Yale gave him democratic theory and the behavioral revolution. Michigan, where he joined the faculty in the late 1960s, gave him numbers. He chose Michigan on purpose, he later said, because it was the country's center of quantitative survey research and he wanted an environment that would force him to master methods he found difficult. His early books studied elites rather than neighborhoods: The Beliefs of Politicians (1973), The Comparative Study of Political Elites (1976), and, with Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (1981). The books combined interviews, comparative analysis, and measurement, and they established his working method: follow institutions over long periods and ask why the same formal structures perform differently in different social soil.

In 1978 he went to Washington to serve on President Jimmy Carter's (1924-2024) National Security Council staff, working under Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017) and Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) on arms control, the Soviet relationship, European alliances, and Iran. The tour taught him something the textbooks omitted. Negotiators at the table in Geneva were negotiating at a second table at home, with Congress, the bureaucracy, the party, and public opinion. Neither table could be understood without the other.

He formalized the insight in “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” published in International Organization in 1988, one of the founding texts of modern negotiation theory. At Level I, governments bargain with each other. At Level II, each negotiator must get the deal ratified at home. The set of agreements that can survive both levels Putnam called the win-set. A large domestic win-set makes international agreement easier. A small one makes it harder, and can make a negotiator stronger: a leader can tell a foreign counterpart, with credibility, that further concessions will die in the legislature. Domestic weakness becomes international leverage. Shrink the win-set far enough and no deal survives at all. Scholars have applied the framework to trade rounds, climate talks, debt settlements, European integration, and peace processes. Putnam later said the two-level game, and the work on Italy that followed, did more to earn his election to the National Academy of Sciences than anything he wrote about bowling. The public never noticed. The profession did.

Huntington recruited him to Harvard in 1979. He would serve as dean of the Kennedy School from 1989 to 1991, direct the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and hold the Peter and Isabel Malkin chair in public policy until his retirement from teaching in 2018. But his decisive project had begun years earlier, in 1970, in Italy.

That year the Italian state created twenty regional governments with broadly identical formal powers, planted in soils that ranged from the civic north to the clientelist south. Putnam saw what few others saw: a natural experiment. Hold the institutions constant, vary the society, wait, and measure. With Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti he followed the twenty regions for more than two decades, scoring them on budget promptness, policy innovation, responsiveness to citizen mail, cabinet stability, and citizen satisfaction, while interviewing politicians and digging through regional history back to the medieval communes.

The results appeared in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993). Regions performed well where citizens had inherited dense horizontal networks: choral societies, cooperatives, mutual-aid societies, soccer clubs, unions, newspapers. Regions organized around vertical patronage, personal dependency, and distrust performed badly, whatever their formal charters said. Associations, Putnam argued, teach the habits of cooperation. They circulate information, build reputations, and lower the cost of collective action. Citizens who know how to organize a chorus know how to punish a corrupt assessor.

The book gave a name to the resource that made the difference: social capital. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) had used the term to describe how elites convert connections into advantage, and James Coleman (1926-1995) had used it to explain how family and community networks support children's education. Putnam's contribution was to move the concept from theory into measurement and from seminar rooms into presidential speeches. Physical capital is tools. Human capital is skills. Social capital is the networks, norms, and trust that let people accomplish together what they cannot accomplish alone.

The criticism started at once, and much of it was good. Sidney Tarrow (b. 1938) attacked the book's medieval history and its determinism, asking whether a research design that traced regional fate to the twelfth century left any room for politics at all. Carles Boix and Daniel Posner pressed on the causal chain: does association produce good government, or does good government make association safe and useful? Others charged that the book slighted landholding patterns, class conflict, organized crime, and the Italian state. The debate did what productive academic debate does. It generated twenty years of work across many countries on what social capital is, how to measure it, and when it delivers.

In the early 1990s Putnam noticed something in American membership data. PTA rolls were falling. So were the Elks, the League of Women Voters, the Red Cross volunteers, the union locals. In January 1995 he published “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital” in the Journal of Democracy, a small academic quarterly. The title came from a detail in the numbers: Americans were bowling as much as ever, and league bowling had collapsed. The activity survived. The institution died.

The article detonated. The Clinton White House called. Putnam was invited to Camp David, profiled in People magazine, and quoted by politicians of both parties. An obscure comparativist who had spent twenty years on Italian regional budgets became, in a season, the country's best-known social scientist. He understood the irony and took the platform anyway.

Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000) turned the article into five hundred pages of evidence: membership records, surveys, election data, time diaries, organizational archives, card-game frequencies, dinner-party counts. The story was a rise and a fall. Civic participation had climbed through the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, peaked in the generation formed by the Depression and the Second World War, and then fallen across nearly every measure from the 1960s onward. Putnam apportioned blame with a statistician's caution. Generational replacement carried the most weight: the long civic generation was dying, and its grandchildren joined nothing. Television privatized leisure. Suburban sprawl stretched the day with commuting and separated home from work from store from church. Pressures of money and time did the rest. The movement of women into paid work removed the unpaid labor that had run the PTA and the auxiliary, and the country built no institutions fitted to the new division of labor to replace the ones that quietly starved. Putnam drew the conclusion carefully: the problem was the missing replacement, and no one proposed to reverse the change that exposed it.

The book's most durable analytic tool was the distinction between bonding and bridging. Bonding capital connects the similar: the family, the ethnic lodge, the congregation. It delivers solidarity and mutual aid. Bridging capital connects across social distance, and it delivers information, opportunity, and tolerance. The distinction let Putnam answer the obvious objection before it arrived. The Mafia is rich in trust. So is a militia. Dense networks serve whatever purpose their members hold, and a society needs the crossing ties, which are harder to build and the first to decay.

Two criticisms of Bowling Alone. Theda Skocpol (b. 1947) argued that the decay ran from the top down. The old federations, the Elks and the American Legion and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, had been cross-class chapter organizations run by their members. What replaced them were professionally managed advocacy groups headquartered in Washington, whose members participate by writing a check. Civic decline, in her account, was a story about elites abandoning organizing, and Putnam's tale of individual disengagement let the organizers off the hook. Claude Fischer (b. 1948) and others attacked the concept: a term that covers networks, trust, participation, reciprocity, and their benefits cannot separate cause from effect. Putnam absorbed both criticisms without ever fully answering them.

A third criticism he answered. The civic golden age was also the age of segregation, restricted clubs, and closed professions. The associations he mourned built solidarity for insiders while enforcing subordination on everyone else. Putnam's considered position: the country expanded rights and freedom after the 1960s and failed to build inclusive institutions capable of carrying shared obligation, and the second failure does not indict the first achievement. Whether the two changes can be separated in practice remains the question.

He refused to let the book remain a diagnosis. He co-founded the Saguaro Seminar at Harvard, gathering researchers, mayors, pastors, organizers, and executives to work on civic repair, and with Lewis Feldstein and Don Cohen published Better Together: Restoring the American Community (2003), case studies of schools, congregations, workplaces, and neighborhood projects that had built cooperation. The lesson of the cases resisted policy translation. Social capital cannot be ordered into existence. It grows when people work on concrete problems together, repeatedly, and discover through experience that the others show up.

In 2006 he accepted the Johan Skytte Prize, the discipline's highest award, and used the lecture to publish the finding he had been sitting on for five years because he did not like it. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century" (2007) reported results from a survey of roughly thirty thousand Americans in forty-one communities. In the short run, greater ethnic diversity predicted lower trust, and the effect did not run only between groups. Residents of the most diverse neighborhoods trusted their own group less, had fewer friends, volunteered less, and expected less of local institutions. They pulled in like turtles. Putnam called it hunkering down.

Subsequent research scattered. Some studies replicated the trust effect under some conditions; others found that poverty, segregation, and institutional quality explained more than diversity did.

American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (2010), written with David E. Campbell, mapped the religious landscape with the same survey ambition. The book documented the fusion of religiosity with partisan politics from the 1980s onward, and traced the growth of the religiously unaffiliated to that fusion: many young Americans rejected the institutions, having come to associate the churches with a party, without rejecting God. Against the prediction that religious diversity breeds sectarian conflict, Putnam and Campbell offered what they called the Aunt Susan principle. Nearly every American has an Aunt Susan, a relative or friend of another faith whose goodness is beyond argument. Whatever your theology says about her category, you know where Aunt Susan is going. Enough Aunt Susans and the theology bends. Intermarriage and cross-faith friendship, they showed, run so deep in American life that abstract hostility keeps dissolving into personal exception. The book extended the bonding-bridging distinction into the pews: congregations deliver solidarity, and their democratic value depends on whether members also maintain ties beyond the walls.

Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis (2015) brought him home. He compared the life chances of his Port Clinton class of 1959 with the children growing up in the town, and in towns like it, two generations later. The class of 1959 had risen: most did better than their parents, and the gap between the doctor's kids and the millworker's kids, while real, was crossable, partly because adults treated the town's children as a common responsibility. The phrase "our kids," in the old usage, meant every kid in town. By 2015 it meant one's own. The book paired national data with reported portraits of teenagers on both sides of the class line, and its central finding concerned relationships rather than income. The affluent teenager has adults everywhere: the parent who edits the essay, the family friend with the internship, the coach who makes the call. The poor teenager of equal talent may know no adult who can connect ability to opportunity, and one mistake, unbuffered by institutions, compounds. Networks had become the transmission belt of class.

The strongest criticism of Our Kids identified the persistent limit of Putnam's enterprise. Factory closures, union collapse, wage stagnation, housing segregation, and disinvestment were decisions, made by identifiable actors who profited from them. A framework that describes the wreckage as declining social capital keeps the discussion in the register of morals and mentoring, where everyone can agree, and out of the register of power, where someone has to lose. Putnam has a response: reform movements need organized social bases, equality does not survive without solidarity, and a distrustful, disconnected public cannot mount the politics that redistribution requires.

The Upswing: How America Came Together a Century Ago and How We Can Do It Again (2020), written with Shaylyn Romney Garrett, assembled a century and a quarter of data on economic equality, political cooperation, social cohesion, and cultural solidarity into a single arc, the I-We-I curve. The Gilded Age was unequal, polarized, fragmented, and individualistic. From the Progressive Era to the 1960s, every curve bent toward "we." Then all four reversed together, and the country descended back toward the conditions of the 1890s. The historical claim is that the first upswing began as moral and civic reorientation, in churches and clubs and reform associations, before it became legislation.

Then the professor became a movie. Join or Die, directed by Rebecca Davis and Pete Davis, premiered in 2023: part biography, part argument that joining a club is a matter of life and death for the joiner and the republic. The film reached Netflix and mutated into an organizing project, with community screenings, joining fairs, and club directories. By July 2026 its site counted more than 560 screenings. The documentary's afterlife enacts its thesis. Agreement with the idea of community builds nothing. Attendance builds it.

In a February 2025 PBS interview with Judy Woodruff (b. 1946), and on stages through the year, Putnam pressed one argument. On March 12, 2025, at Harvard's Kennedy Forum, the 84-year-old emeritus sat with former dean David Ellwood (b. 1953) and put up the four curves from The Upswing. His audience wanted to talk about Donald Trump (b. 1946). Critics blame the president for the country's condition, Putnam said. "He's a symptom." Remove everyone in Washington and the causes remain: deepening isolation, concentrated among Americans without college degrees, two-thirds of the country, who read the other third's contempt accurately. The best predictor of Trump support in his data was social disconnection. A disconnected society, he warned, will keep producing such figures until the underlying condition changes. He noted, with the dry amusement of a man watching his book travel, that Steve Bannon (b. 1953) had read Bowling Alone, drawn the operational conclusion that isolated people are open to authoritarian populist appeals, and told David Brooks (b. 1961) in 2024 that the book captured the atomization of American society.

In May 2025 he traveled to Israel to receive the inaugural award of the Jonathan Sacks Institute at Bar-Ilan University, honoring a friendship with the late British chief rabbi Jonathan Sacks (1948-2020), who had built his own account of covenant and community on the same conceptual ground. Putnam deflected the prophet's mantle. "If I knew how to fix the problem, I would have preached it." In August 2025 he and Richard V. Reeves (b. 1969) published a guest essay on the front page of the New York Times opinion section comparing the disconnection of today's boys and young men, rising suicide, falling college shares, one in ten doing nothing at all, to the "boy problem" of the 1900s, which Progressive Era civil society answered by inventing the Boy Scouts, Big Brothers, and the Boys Clubs within a single decade. The essay called for men to rebuild institutions that turn boys into grown men, and it read as Putnam's argument in miniature: a social crisis, a historical precedent, a civic remedy. He repeated to young audiences through 2025 a sentence that functions as both apology and assignment: his generation caused the problem, and an earlier generation proved the decline can be reversed.

The honors of a career's end arrived on schedule. He was president of the American Political Science Association, is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the British Academy, and holds the 2006 Skytte Prize. Barack Obama (b. 1961) hung the 2012 National Humanities Medal on him in 2013. He joined the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 2025. In April 2026 the American Philosophical Society, meeting during the 250th anniversary year of the Declaration, awarded him the Thomas Jefferson Medal, its highest honor in the humanities and social sciences, placing him in a line that includes Toni Morrison (1931-2019), George Kennan (1904-2005), and Albert O. Hirschman (1915-2012). On May 18, 2026, Yale gave him an honorary Doctor of Social Science, his third Yale degree and, by his count, his twenty-second honorary degree, in a class that included the swimmer Katie Ledecky (b. 1997) and the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (b. 1954). "Getting an honorary degree from my own university is a special one," he told the student paper. The shy boy from Port Clinton has spent a lifetime collecting memberships.

What does the work amount to? Three contributions and one weakness.

First, the two-level game, which changed how scholars and practitioners analyze international negotiation. Second, the demonstration, in Italy and after, that formal institutions run on informal social fuel, that constitutions and administrative codes perform differently in different associational environments, and that the difference can be measured. Third, the documentation of the American case: the most complete empirical record ever assembled of a society's civic contraction, organized by concepts that crossed from the journals into common speech. Win-set, bowling alone, bonding and bridging, hunkering down, our kids, the I-We-I curve. Few social scientists coin one phrase that survives. Putnam coined six.

The weakness runs through everything after 1993. Social capital expands until it absorbs every beneficial form of connection, trust, and competence, which makes it hard to falsify and easy to preach. The causal arrows run both ways in nearly every finding: trust builds institutions and institutions build trust, health enables joining and joining predicts health, prosperity funds associations and associations may feed prosperity. And the civic frame keeps translating questions of power into questions of character. Deindustrialization becomes disengagement. The employer who broke the union and the developer who built the sprawl exit the story, and the remedy on offer is a club.

Putnam knows all this. His answer, delivered for thirty years with the patience of a man who has heard the objection before, is that the critique and the project need each other. Rights and rules are indispensable and inert. They operate through relationships. A society of disconnected individuals cannot sustain self-government, cannot transmit opportunity, cannot even keep its members alive at normal rates, and no reform program will pass or hold without organized citizens to carry it. Freedom requires institutions. Institutions require trust. Trust is made one meeting, one league night, one choir practice at a time, by people who keep showing up. He learned that in Port Clinton, from a mother who pushed a shy boy out the door, and he has spent sixty years checking whether it is true. The evidence, with all its tangles, says it is.

Notes

Skocpol‘s top-down critique (chapter federations replaced by checkbook advocacy) comes from her book Diminished Democracy (2003) and her “Unravelling From Above” essay. Safe, well-known, but not in your source.

Claude Fischer‘s conceptual critique of social capital: his 2005 Social Networks article “Bowling Alone: What’s the Score?”

The Aunt Susan principle is from American Grace.

“Pulling in like turtles” is Putnam‘s phrase from the 2007 E Pluribus Unum article (Scandinavian Political Studies 30:2). Survey n of roughly 30,000 is from that article.

“He’s a symptom,” the class-gap argument, the two-thirds without degrees, and the BannonBrooks material: https://iop.harvard.edu/news/want-less-divisive-american-just-matter-trust and https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2025/3/13/IOP-forum-Putnam-Democracy/ and https://fortune.com/2025/11/06/robert-putnam-gen-z-trump-social-capital-respect-economy/

Bar-Ilan Sacks Institute award and the “preached it” quote: https://www.timesofisrael.com/we-need-a-moral-revolution-social-scientist-robert-putnam-on-fixing-a-fractured-society/

PutnamReeves boy essay, published online August 15, 2025, Sunday print August 17: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/15/opinion/men-boys-crisis-progressive-era.html

Jefferson Medal, prior recipients, and the Declaration’s 250th framing: https://www.amphilsoc.org/news/robert-d-putnam-awarded-2026-thomas-jefferson-medal and https://www.hks.harvard.edu/announcements/robert-putnam-author-bowling-alone-and-hks-professor-receives-american-philosophicals

Yale honorary degree, third Yale degree, the citation, and his quote to the Yale Daily News: https://yale2026.yale.edu/hd-recipients/robert-d-putnam/ and https://news.yale.edu/2026/05/18/yale-awards-eight-honorary-degrees and https://yaledailynews.com/articles/katie-ledecky-the-ethicist-columnist-among-honorary-degree-awardees

“Twenty-second honorary degree” is my arithmetic: HKS lists twenty-one as of 2018 (https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/robert-d-putnam), and Yale 2026 would make at least twenty-two.

PBS Woodruff interview, February 2025: https://www.pbs.org/video/robert-putnam-on-how-u-s-became-polarized-and-how-to-fix-it-1740010796/

Roland Pennock‘s dates (1906-1995) and the “class of 1959 mostly rose past their parents” claim are from Our Kids.

The Church Under the Choir: Joseph Henrich and the Superseding of Putnam’s Italy

In 1970 Robert Putnam began following twenty new Italian regional governments, identical on paper, planted in different societies. Twenty years later, in Making Democracy Work, he reported the result: the governments performed well in the north, where citizens had inherited dense horizontal networks of choral societies, cooperatives, and clubs, and badly in the south, where social life ran through patrons, clients, and kin. Then he asked the question that made the book famous and did the thing that made it vulnerable. He traced the difference back nine hundred years, to the communal republics of the medieval north and the Norman autocracy of the medieval south, and stopped. The north was civic in 1993 because it had been civic in 1100. Why it was civic in 1100 the book could not say. Civic traditions explained civic traditions. It was turtles all the way down, and the bottom turtle was missing.

Putnam’s critics saw the gap at once. Sidney Tarrow asked what kind of history assigns a region’s fate in the twentieth century to its constitution in the twelfth and leaves eight intervening centuries of war, land tenure, and state-building as transmission wire. Economists asked the harder version: something made the communes possible in Milan and Bologna and impossible in Palermo, and until that something was named, the civic-traditions story was a description wearing the clothes of an explanation. Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (b. 1963) showed in 2016 that within the north, cities with a free-commune past have more nonprofit associations, more organ donation, and less cheating on national exams today than cities without one. Persistence was proven. Origin was still missing.

The bottom turtle arrived in 2019, in a paper in Science by Jonathan F. Schulz, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Jonathan P. Beauchamp, and Joseph Henrich (b. 1968), and in Henrich’s book The WEIRDest People in the World (2020). The deep variable behind Putnam’s map of Italy is the medieval Catholic Church’s war on cousin marriage. Where the Church enforced its marriage rules long and hard, it dissolved the extended kin group, and people deprived of clans built voluntary associations with strangers. Where the Church arrived late or governed lightly, the clan survived, and the clan crowded out everything Putnam later measured. The choral society has a cause, and the cause is canon law.

The lineage of the idea runs through anthropology. Jack Goody (1919-2015) argued in The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe (1983) that the Church’s prohibitions on cousin marriage, adoption, remarriage, and concubinage followed its material interest: every rule made heirs scarcer, and the heirless left their land to the Church, which by the ninth century held vast portions of western Europe. Goody supplied the motive and the causal chain as narrative. Henrich’s team supplied the measurement.

The policy they measure, which Henrich calls the Marriage and Family Program, has a documented history. Beginning in the fourth century and hardening from the sixth, Church councils banned marriage between kin, and the bans grew. By the eleventh century the prohibition reached the sixth and seventh degree, which in practice barred a villager from marrying almost anyone whose family he knew. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 pulled the line back to the fourth degree, third cousins, because the wider ban had become unenforceable. Synods proclaimed the prohibition eighty-eight times across the centuries. No other religion did anything comparable. Islam permits and in practice often favors cousin marriage. Zoroastrian Persia promoted marriage within the family. The Eastern Church adopted milder rules later and enforced them with less appetite. The Western Church stood alone, and it stood there for a thousand years.

Schulz and his coauthors built two instruments. The first counts centuries of exposure to the Western Church, bishopric by bishopric, region by region. The second, the Kinship Intensity Index, scores societies on cousin marriage, polygamy, co-residence of extended families, clan organization, and lineage rules, using the ethnographic atlas. Then they laid the instruments against twenty-four psychological measures drawn from surveys, experiments, and behavior: individualism, conformity, impersonal trust, fairness toward strangers, nepotism. The gradient runs the same direction at every scale. Across countries, across regions within European countries, and across the adult children of immigrants living side by side in the same European cities, longer Church exposure predicts weaker kinship, and weaker kinship predicts the psychology that makes strangers cooperative. Each additional five hundred years under the Western Church is associated with a reduction in cousin marriage of roughly ninety percent. Even the parking behavior of United Nations diplomats obeys the gradient: envoys from high-kinship-intensity countries accumulated more unpaid New York tickets in the years before enforcement, when only internalized norms restrained them.

Italy is the pivot of the argument, and the authors chose it deliberately, because Italy is where Putnam planted the flag. The peninsula offers what a researcher wants: one modern state, one nominal religion, and a medieval history that split it. The north sat inside the Carolingian world, thick with bishoprics aligned to Rome, marinating in the marriage rules from the sixth century onward. Sicily spent the ninth through eleventh centuries under Islamic rule, with cousin marriage lawful and ordinary; the mainland south passed through Byzantine and Lombard hands into a Norman kingdom that ran the Church as a department of state. The Marriage and Family Program reached the south late, thin, and negotiable.

The trace survives in the parish registers. Because the Church required dispensations for marriages within the prohibited degrees, it accidentally created a data set, and Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza (1922-2018) and his collaborators compiled it: consanguineous marriage rates for Italian provinces from 1910 to 1964. The southern provinces run several times the northern rates; parts of Sicily ran orders of magnitude above the Alpine valleys. Schulz and Henrich put those rates against modern civic behavior. Provinces where cousin marriage was twice as common donate about eight fewer sixteen-ounce units of blood per thousand people per year, against a national mean of twenty-eight. Residents of high-consanguinity provinces borrow from relatives and friends rather than banks, hold their savings in cash, pay in cash, and report less trust in strangers and less willingness to move for work. Blood donated anonymously to people one will never meet is Putnam’s generalized reciprocity made liquid and countable, and it tracks the marriage registers.

Then Schulz closed the loop on Putnam. In a 2022 paper on kin networks and institutional development, he showed that across Europe the duration of Church exposure predicts where communes formed in the first place. Cities inside the old Carolingian-ecclesiastical zone produced self-governing communal institutions in the Middle Ages at far higher rates than cities outside it. Putnam’s independent variable, the civic traditions of the medieval north, turns out to be a dependent variable. The communes arose where the clans had already been broken, because a man without a clan needs a guild, a confraternity, a commune, a monastery, a university, some corporate body of unrelated men bound by oath rather than blood. Medieval Europe invented those bodies in profusion, and it invented them where the Church had cleared the ground. The voluntary association is what people build when marriage rules have taken the clan away.

The psychology completes the chain. In a society of intensive kinship, morality is loyalty. The circle of obligation ends at the edge of the lineage, and behavior toward outsiders is strategy. Nepotism is duty. Office is patrimony. Testimony follows blood. Edward Banfield (1916-1999) sat in a village in Lucania in 1954 and 1955 and described exactly this equilibrium in The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958): maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family, and assume all others do the same. He called it amoral familism and could not explain where it came from. Putnam measured its aggregate consequences forty years later and could not explain where it came from. Henrich’s model generates it. Marry within the lineage for enough generations and the lineage is the social world; every institution that requires trusting a stranger, credit, contract, blood bank, regional government, runs against the grain of the moral instincts the marriage system trained. Banfield described the psychology, Putnam counted its fruits, and Henrich supplied the cause, three books across sixty years converging on the same hill towns.

An honest account must now give the critics the floor.

The Roman problem comes first. Roman law restricted close-kin marriage centuries before Constantine, and ancient DNA suggests the practice was rare in antiquity: in one large sample of ancient genomes, almost no individuals show the genetic signature of close-kin unions. If cousin marriage was already uncommon in the Roman Mediterranean, the Church cannot have demolished a fortress that was half-empty, and the historian Charles Freeman has pressed the further point that the Roman world already displayed individual property, individual rights at law, and other traits Henrich codes as products of the Program. The team’s answer is that kinship intensity is broader than cousin marriage, that clans can be strong where cousin marriage is rare, and that the post-Roman centuries saw kin groups thicken again before the Church went to work. The answer is coherent. It also concedes that the headline variable, cousin marriage, carries less of the load than the headlines suggested.

Emmanuel Todd (b. 1951) supplies the second objection: family structures are ancient and stubborn, the nuclear household was already common in parts of northwestern Europe, and the Church’s rules may have codified an existing pattern rather than created one. This is the reverse-causality problem in historical dress. Perhaps the Program stuck where kin groups were already weak and failed where they were strong, in which case Church exposure is a marker of prior social structure, and the arrow runs backward. The within-country gradients and the immigrant-children results cut against a purely backward arrow, but they cannot kill it.

Third, enforcement. Medieval historians note that dispensations flowed freely to nobles cementing alliances, that the seventh-degree rule was beyond any parish priest’s genealogical competence, and that the 1215 retreat to the fourth degree was an admission of failure. A program honored in dispensation is a weaker instrument than the model assumes. Fourth, measurement. The Italian consanguinity data cover 1910 to 1964, a window eight centuries after the treatment, and record only unions the Church sanctioned. Fifth, scale. The Italian results are province-level correlations, and inferring individual psychology from provincial aggregates is the ecological fallacy’s home terrain. The authors know all five objections and address each with robustness checks, and a fair reader concludes that the thesis is the best-supported account now on the table and that its error bars are wider than its fame.

One further caution belongs in any public treatment. The thesis has been conscripted online into arguments about the permanent character of peoples, and the conscription reverses what the research says. Henrich’s claims are cultural and institutional, and his own evidence shows the psychology moving: the children of immigrants shift toward the norms of the receiving society within a generation or two, and southern Italians who moved north, and across the Atlantic, built mutual-aid societies, credit unions, and civic associations at scale once the surrounding institutions rewarded it. The model’s point is that family structure trains psychology and institutions retrain it. Anyone citing the paper as a doctrine of fixed national essence has not read the paper.

What, then, remains of Putnam’s Italy? More than the supersession language implies, and less than the book claimed. The performance measurements stand untouched; no one has challenged the twenty-year record of which regional governments answered their mail. The proximate claim stands: associational density and government performance travel together, and the traditions persist across centuries, which the free-cities research confirmed. What falls is the causal floor. Making Democracy Work treated civic tradition as the uncaused cause of Italian divergence. The Henrich program demotes it to a middle link in a longer chain that begins in the marriage canons, and a middle link is a different thing for policy. If civic tradition were self-generating, transplanting associations might transplant civic life. If association is downstream of family structure and the psychology it trains, then the choral society is a symptom of the cure, and founding choirs in a clan society yields choirs full of cousins.

The frame also marks its own boundary, and the boundary protects the rest of Putnam’s work. The Church thesis explains variation across places in the capacity for impersonal cooperation. It says nothing about the American decline after 1960, because the treatment did not change: cousin marriage did not return to Ohio, kinship did not re-intensify in the suburbs, and the psychology Henrich measures remained as WEIRD as ever while the leagues died. Bowling Alone describes a society with full civic capacity choosing, or drifting, not to use it, which is a different disease from the one afflicting Putnam’s Italian south, where the capacity had never been built. The two books turn out to rest on different questions. Henrich answered the one Putnam asked in 1993 and left standing the one he asked in 2000.

The ledger, then. Putnam found the pattern, measured it for twenty years, and traced it to the communes. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales proved the communes still mark their cities. Schulz and Henrich explained the communes, and behind them the marriage registers, and behind the registers a thousand years of synods legislating who may lie with whom. It is a strange resolution to a famous problem in political science: the deepest cause of good regional government in twentieth-century Italy, on the best current evidence, is that the medieval Church, pursuing land and souls, forbade a man his cousin, and the man, needing someone to trust, went out and found a stranger.

Notes

Schulz, Bahrami-Rad, Beauchamp, Henrich, “The Church, Intensive Kinship, and Global Psychological Variation,” Science 366 (November 8, 2019): https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aau5141 — full PDF at https://historicalpsychology.fas.harvard.edu/assets/files/schulz-et-al.-2019-the-church-intensive-kinship-and-global-psychological-variation.pdf

Italy numbers (eight fewer units of blood per 1,000 per doubling of cousin marriage, mean 28; cash holding; kin borrowing; ~91% cousin-marriage reduction per 500 years of Church exposure) are from the paper’s Italy section; a readable summary confirming the figures: https://www.psychohistoria.org/church-and-kinship-ties/ — I wrote “sixteen-ounce units” from the paper’s blood-bag measure.

Diplomat parking tickets and the Zoroastrian/Eastern Church comparisons: Harvard Gazette, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/11/roman-catholic-church-ban-in-the-middle-ages-loosened-family-ties/

Schulz’s commune paper: “Kin Networks and Institutional Development,” Economic Journal (2022): https://historicalpsychology.fas.harvard.edu/assets/files/schulz-2022-kin-networks-and-institutional-development.pdf — this is the supersession hinge; the claim that Church exposure predicts where communes formed is his.

Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, “Long-Term Persistence,” Journal of the European Economic Association (2016) — free cities, nonprofits, organ donation, exam cheating.

The eighty-eight synod proclamations and the Goody/Ubl material: EH.net review of WEIRDest People, https://eh.net/book_reviews/the-weirdest-people-in-the-world-how-the-west-became-psychologically-peculiar-and-particularly-prosperous/

Roman-priority and aDNA objection (roughly 1 in 1,785 ancient genomes showing close-kin unions) plus Freeman‘s argument: https://www.anthro1.net/p/reply-to-joseph-henrich and https://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2025/03/10/good-be-weird-joseph-henrichs-weirdest-people-world-five-years — the anthro1 piece is a running debate with Henrich’s replies included.

Todd-style objection that nuclear families predate the Church: https://policytensor.substack.com/p/the-churchs-crusade-against-cousin — a secondary treatment of Todd; the primary is Todd’s L’Origine des systèmes familiaux (2011).

Cavalli-Sforza consanguinity data (1910-1964 dispensations): Cavalli-Sforza, Moroni, Zei, Consanguinity, Inbreeding, and Genetic Drift in Italy (Princeton, 2004).

Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958); fieldwork in Chiaromonte, Basilicata (called Lucania then, “Montegrano” in the book), 1954-55. Self-evident from the book.

Fourth Lateran 1215 retreat from seventh to fourth degree: standard medieval history (Ubl, d’Avray), safe.

The Cartel in the Choir Loft: Mancur Olson Reads Bowling Alone

Consider a Rotary lunch in a midwestern county seat in 1955. Forty men, one from each line of business, because Rotary’s classification principle admits a single representative per trade. The insurance man refers clients to the realtor, the realtor to the banker, the banker to the contractor, and no one at the table competes with anyone else, by rule. Across town the union hall is full; the local has thirty-five percent of the country’s private workforce behind it and a contract that sets the wage for every plant in the industry. The airfare to Chicago is fixed by the Civil Aeronautics Board, the trucking rate by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the price of the whiskey at the lodge by a state fair-trade law, the stockbroker’s commission by the New York Stock Exchange, and the number of doctors in the county, indirectly, by the American Medical Association, which has kept medical school places scarce for decades.

Robert Putnam looks at this town and sees the civic paradise whose passing he will spend a career mourning: dense membership, cross-class contact, generalized trust, the social capital that makes democracy work. Mancur Olson (1932-1998) looks at the same town and sees a thicket of distributional coalitions, each one organized to move wealth toward its members rather than to create any, the price of everything rigged by somebody’s association. Same lunch. Same ledger book. Opposite morals.

Olson came out of the same America Putnam did, one ring further west and one class notch down: born in Grand Forks, North Dakota, raised on a farm, surrounded by the cooperatives, the Farm Bureau, and the farm bloc, the most successful distributional coalition in American history, which taught him early what organized interests are for. He went to North Dakota Agricultural College, then Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, then Harvard, then the Air Force, then a long career at the University of Maryland, and he died in 1998 of a heart attack at sixty-six, outside his office, mid-argument with the field.

His first book, The Logic of Collective Action (1965), began as a dissertation attacking an assumption so universal that almost no one had noticed it was an assumption: that people who share an interest will act on it. They will not, Olson showed, and the reason is arithmetic. In any large group, my contribution to the common effort is invisible and the benefit flows to me whether I contribute or, better, whether I don’t. Rational members free-ride, and the group does nothing. Large diffuse interests, consumers, taxpayers, the unemployed, stay unorganized. Small concentrated interests organize easily, because each member’s share of the spoils is large and shirkers can be watched. And large groups that do organize succeed only through what Olson called selective incentives: private goods reserved for members. The insurance policy that comes with the lodge. The closed shop that comes with the union card. The journal, the malpractice discount, and the hospital privileges that come with the medical association. Nobody joins for the cause. People join for the incentives, and the cause rides along.

The second book drew the consequence across history. The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982) argued that in any society with stable borders and stable institutions, distributional coalitions accumulate. Each one is small relative to the nation, so each rationally prefers a bigger slice to a bigger pie: a coalition representing one percent of the country bears one percent of the cost of the damage it does and keeps one hundred percent of what it captures. Coalitions multiply, prices and entry lock up, resources flow to lobbying rather than production, decisions slow, and the economy hardens like an artery. Olson called it institutional sclerosis, and he offered a grim natural experiment as proof. Britain, undefeated and institutionally continuous for centuries, had accumulated the densest coalitional thicket on earth, craft unions that struck over which trade might screw which nut, and grew slowest of the major economies. Germany and Japan, whose coalitions had been annihilated by defeat and occupation, grew fastest. Within the United States, the settled Northeast and Midwest crawled while the South, its old order broken by the Civil War and again by the civil rights revolution, boomed. Stability breeds interests, interests breed stagnation, and the fastest cure known to history is catastrophe.

Olson left himself one escape hatch. A coalition encompassing enough of society internalizes the costs of its own predation. A union federation covering half the workforce cannot inflate wages without inflating away its members’ own purchasing power, so it bargains for restraint and growth; a craft local covering one trade in one shop can plunder freely. Narrow coalitions are parasites. Encompassing ones are, at worst, stationary bandits with an interest in the health of the host.

Putnam knew the challenge and answered it twice. In Making Democracy Work he distinguished his horizontal civic networks from Olson’s rent-seekers and played his trump: the associational Italian north is richer than the disorganized south, the reverse of what sclerosis predicts. In Bowling Alone he granted that social capital has a dark side and insisted that choral societies, bowling leagues, and PTAs are not the AMA. Olson never answered at length, but he left his answer on file. In “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk” (1996) he rejected cultural and social-capital explanations of national wealth root and branch: poor countries are poor because of their institutions and policies, and the borders where incomes jump tenfold are borders between governments, never between cultures. The choir explains nothing, he was saying. Look at who sets the prices.

So take Olson seriously and reread 1955. The associational golden age was, in cold description, a cartel economy. Union density peaked at roughly a third of private employment in 1954. Airlines, trucking, railroads, banking, broadcasting, and securities operated under entry restriction and price control, each regulatory regime the trophy of an organized industry. Fair-trade laws let manufacturers fix retail prices in most states. The professions ran guilds with state enforcement. And the fraternal and service organizations that anchor Putnam’s nostalgia carried cartel logic in their bylaws: Rotary’s one-man-per-trade rule is a market-division agreement with a bell and a flag salute. The joiners of 1955 were not only building trust. They were dividing territory.

Yet the cartel economy grew nearly three percent a year in productivity, the best sustained run in American records, which is the awkward fact Olson’s own escape hatch must absorb. The coalitions of 1955 were unusually encompassing. The big industrial unions bargained for entire industries and tied their members’ fate to output, the Treaty of Detroit trading labor peace for a share of productivity. The lodges and service federations were cross-class chapter organizations whose members met face to face and bore, in their own towns, the costs of whatever they extracted. An encompassing coalition is Olson’s best case, and mid-century America was stocked with them. On his own terms, the town at the Rotary lunch was a cartel economy of the least damaging kind: the bandits were stationary, numerous enough to see each other, and invested in the host.

Putnam explains the post-1960 collapse with generations, television, sprawl, and time pressure, treating membership as an expression of civic character that character ceased to supply. Olson would strike the psychology and audit the incentives. The fraternal lodges were, before the New Deal, the working man’s insurance industry: sickness benefits, burial benefits, lodge doctors, orphan care, selective incentives of the purest kind. Social Security, employer plans, and commercial insurers took that business, and the lodges kept the ritual, which is to say they kept nothing Olson’s member would pay dues for; membership fell on schedule. The union shop compelled membership where it was legal, and the spread of right-to-work invited the free ride the Logic promises; density fell on schedule. The small town monitored participation with the cheapest enforcement technology ever devised, everyone knowing everyone, and the suburb dissolved it. On this reading the civic generation was never a generation of saints. It was a generation facing a price schedule that made joining pay, and its grandchildren face one that does not. Nothing declined except the incentives, and Bowling Alone is five hundred pages of effect in search of a cause the Logic had published thirty-five years before the fact.

The coalitions thinned after 1970: unions to six percent of private labor, the lodges emptied, the regulated industries deregulated in a single astonishing decade, brokerage commissions freed in 1975, airlines in 1978, trucking and rail in 1980, fair-trade laws repealed. Did the sclerosis clear? Did the economy gain what the society lost?

America traded encompassing distributional coalitions for narrow ones. While the chapters died, the lobbies multiplied: political action committees grew from about six hundred in 1974 to several thousand by the late 1980s, and the associations that thrived were exactly the mailing-list and Washington-office organizations, staff, letterhead, and a lobbyist, that Putnam’s own data distinguish from the face-to-face chapter world. Occupational licensing, the guild in modern dress, covered roughly one worker in twenty in the 1950s and covers roughly one in four now; the century of civic decline was a golden age of guild formation. And the most consequential narrow coalition of the era wears Putnam’s own colors: the neighborhood association. A few hundred homeowners organized against new housing are Olson’s small group in its purest laboratory form, concentrated benefits, diffuse victims, low monitoring costs, and the towns richest in measured social capital, the college towns and coastal suburbs that Putnam’s indexes rank highest, became the nation’s most effective housing-blockers, converting civic energy into land rents at continental scale. Social capital did not disappear after 1970. It was privatized into the narrowest coalitions available, where the Logic says it always pays best.

The growth record renders a matching split verdict. Deregulation delivered: real airfares and freight rates fell for decades, entry opened, and the sectors Olson would have pointed to as sclerotic in 1975 became case studies in released efficiency. But aggregate productivity slowed after 1973, just as the encompassing coalitions weakened, and did not durably recover until the mid-1990s, timing that fits neither a simple Olson story, in which shedding coalitions should quicken growth, nor a simple Putnam story, in which shedding associations should sicken it. The honest reading is that the composition of coalitions moved the numbers more than their quantity. An economy of encompassing bargains grew fast. An economy of narrow lobbies, licensing boards, and homeowner vetoes grows slower and distributes worse, whatever its association count.

Each thinker, in the end, is blind in one eye, and the blindnesses face opposite directions. Olson’s ledger has no column for what Putnam counts best: the mortality gradient of the disconnected, the suicides, the children with no adult to call, the finding that joining predicts survival. A theory in which membership is a dues calculation cannot say why the man who quits everything starts dying, and Olson never tried. Putnam’s ledger has no column for incidence: he counts the association’s members and their trust and never asks who outside the association pays for what the members obtain. His Italian trump card does not settle the matter, since the civic north’s wealth is consistent with encompassing coalitions outperforming clientelist ones, an Olsonian sentence. And the sharpest fact against Putnam’s valence sits in his own book: the Washington interest-group explosion he documents as a symptom of civic decay is, in Olson’s terms, the era’s principal growth industry of collective action, thriving for the exact reason the leagues died. Organization followed the returns. It always had.

So: was the America of 1955 a civic paradise or a cartel economy? It was a cartel economy whose cartels were broad enough to behave, and the breadth was the paradise. Did the decline free the economy and starve the society? It freed a few industries, starved the society, and left the coalitional stock narrower and hungrier than before, sclerosis without solidarity, the lobbying of 1980 with the loneliness of 2020. Putnam and Olson stared at one dataset and wrote two morals, and the dataset, read to the end, endorses neither and needs both: associations are neither schools of virtue nor nests of thieves by nature, and the only question with money on it is how much of the society each one has to swallow before it starts to care what the society digests.

Notes

Olson biography: Grand Forks birth, North Dakota farm, NDAC, Rhodes Scholarship, Air Force, Maryland, death by heart attack in February 1998 at 66. Standard obituary material (NYT and Economist obituaries, February 1998). The “outside his office” detail appears in accounts of his death.

The Logic of Collective Action (1965); The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982); “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:2 (1996). The border argument (incomes jump at government borders, never at cultural ones) is from Big Bills.

British craft-union demarcation disputes (“who screws the nut”) are a stock example in Rise and Decline‘s Britain chapter and the surrounding literature.

Union density peak: about 35 percent of private nonfarm employment in 1954, down to roughly 6 percent of private employment now. BLS and Hirsch-Macpherson (unionstats.com) series.

Rotary‘s classification principle (one member per business classification): Rotary International’s own membership rules; the cartel reading of it is mine, but the rule is factual and self-evident from any club roster.

Fraternal lodges as pre-New Deal insurers: David Beito, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890-1967 (2000). The Olsonian selective-incentive reading of Beito is the essay’s move; Beito’s facts support it.

Treaty of Detroit: the 1950 GMUAW contract, standard label from Daniel Bell‘s coinage.

Deregulation dates: Securities commission deregulation May 1, 1975; Airline Deregulation Act 1978; Motor Carrier Act and Staggers Rail Act 1980; Consumer Goods Pricing Act 1975 (ended fair trade).

PAC counts: 608 registered PACs in 1974, over 4,000 by the late 1980s. FEC historical data.

Occupational licensing: under 5 percent of the workforce in the early 1950s to roughly 25 percent now. Morris Kleiner and Alan Krueger, “Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market,” Journal of Labor Economics (2013), and Kleiner’s subsequent work.

The chapter-versus-mailing-list contrast and the Washington interest-group explosion are in Bowling Alone (the chapters on organizational change).

The cross-country empirics I left out of the text but you may want in a footnote: Knack and Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?” QJE 112 (1997), which found trust predicts growth while associational membership does not; and Knack, “Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses,” Public Choice 117 (2003), which tests the two group types.

Productivity: roughly 2.8 percent annual labor productivity growth 1948-1973, slowdown 1973-1995, revival mid-1990s. BLS multifactor series, uncontested.

The Curve and the Engine: Peter Turchin Reads The Upswing

In February 2010, the editors of Nature asked a group of scientists what the coming decade would bring. Most offered the standard futurology. One letter, four paragraphs long, from an ecologist at the University of Connecticut, said something checkable: quantitative indicators of political instability in the United States and western Europe, he wrote, point to a peak around 2020. The letter cited immiseration, elite overproduction, and state fiscal strain, terms almost no reader of Nature had encountered. Ten years later, with American cities under curfew and a mob inside the Capitol, journalists dug the letter out and started calling its author a prophet. He kept insisting he was a scientist, which was the more unsettling claim. A prophet has visions. A scientist has a model, and a model that worked once might work again.

The author was Peter Turchin (b. 1957), and his framework, applied to American history in Ages of Discord (2016) and popularized in End Times (2023), produces something Robert Putnam’s readers will recognize with a start. Turchin assembles a composite well-being curve for the United States from 1780 to the present: relative wages, life expectancy, physical stature, age at first marriage, measures of social optimism. The curve falls through the nineteenth century to a trough around 1900, climbs to a peak around 1960, and falls again to the present. Lay it over the I-We-I curve that Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett built in The Upswing from measures of equality, cooperation, cohesion, and solidarity, and the two trace each other decade for decade, trough for trough, peak for peak. Two research programs, starting from different disciplines, different data, and different politics, drew the same picture of the American century and a half.

Then they part company. Putnam and Garrett describe the curve, credit the upswing to a moral and civic awakening, and close with an exhortation: we did it before, we can do it again. Turchin claims to generate the curve. He has a model with named variables, feedback loops, and a track record, and in his model the moral awakening is an output, a symptom of forces that Putnam’s books never measure. Putting the two side by side shows what each purchase costs.

Turchin’s route to the problem explains the method. He was born in Obninsk, a Soviet science city, the son of Valentin Turchin (1931-2010), a computer scientist and dissident who co-founded a Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and paid for it with his career. In 1977 the KGB gave the family the standard choice, and they left; Peter was twenty. He finished his degree at NYU, took a Duke doctorate in zoology, and spent two decades as a mathematical ecologist, modeling the population cycles of pine bark beetles, voles, and lemmings, systems where numbers rise, overshoot, and crash on schedules that equations can capture. In the late 1990s he announced that he had done what he could in ecology and moved his tools to history, on the wager that human societies, like rodent populations, cycle for reasons that can be written down. He named the field cliodynamics, built the Seshat databank of historical societies, and absorbed the structural-demographic theory that Jack Goldstone (b. 1953) had developed to explain the English and French revolutions. Beetles to Bourbons, one modeling problem.

The model has three moving parts. The first is popular immiseration, tracked by the relative wage: what a typical worker earns as a share of national output per person. When labor is oversupplied, by immigration waves, by a baby boom entering the workforce, by any surge of hands, the relative wage falls, and everything downstream of it falls too, marriage, health, heights, hope. The second is elite overproduction. The money that stops flowing to wages flows upward, minting new wealth and, more dangerously, new aspirants: more lawyers than practices, more doctorates than chairs, more fortunes than Senate seats, more credentialed young people than positions of the kind they were promised. Elites compete for fixed slots, the losers multiply, and frustrated aspirants become counter-elites, the organizers and financiers of anti-establishment politics, because revolutions are run by disappointed insiders rather than by peasants. The third part is state capacity: debt, revenue, and the trust that lets a government act. Multiply immiseration by elite competition by fiscal strain and you get Turchin’s Political Stress Indicator, the pressure gauge whose American reading in 2010 generated the letter to Nature.

Ages of Discord runs the machine over the American record. The young republic begins with high wages, cheap land, and a small elite; well-being climbs into the 1820s. Then labor supply surges, the relative wage turns down around 1830, no dramatic event required, and the antebellum decades manufacture immiserated workers and surplus elites together. Turchin counts the lawyers and the political aspirants of the 1850s and finds a generation of ambitious men, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) among them, chasing too few places; the political class fragments, and Senator James Henry Hammond (1807-1864) observes that the only members of Congress without a revolver and a knife are those carrying two revolvers. The pressure discharges as civil war, and the discharge resolves nothing structural: wages stay low, elites keep multiplying, and instability rolls through 1877, Haymarket, Homestead, and Pullman to a second peak around 1920, red scares and bombs on Wall Street.

Then comes the part of the story that The Upswing tells as moral awakening and Ages of Discord tells as pressure release. Elites frightened by 1917 and by their own strike waves accepted a new compact. Immigration restriction in 1921 and 1924 shut off the labor surplus; the relative wage turned up for the first time in decades. Depression burned off elite fortunes; war taxed the rest and employed everyone; the Treaty of Detroit priced labor into the gains. Well-being climbed for two generations, the Great Compression in wages compressing everything else along with it, including, in Putnam’s ledgers, the memberships, the marriages, and the trust. On Turchin’s reading, the “we” of mid-century America was manufactured by fear, restriction, and war, and the era’s moral self-description was the sound the compact made, downstream of the wage ratio.

After the 1960s the compact lapsed, and Turchin’s account of why is the coldest thing in the book: the elites stopped being afraid. The wealth pump, his name for the arrangement that decants wage growth into elite incomes, switched back on around 1978. Wages decoupled from productivity, the relative wage fell, and the immiseration series turned down together: real wages, heights, life expectancy for the noncollege majority, marriage, and, he notes, citing Putnam’s own connectedness data as an input, social embeddedness. At the top, overproduction resumed on cue: law graduates outrunning legal jobs, doctorates outrunning faculties, the count of large fortunes multiplying severalfold, and a swelling class of expensively credentialed young people discovering that the ladder they climbed ends short of the floor they were promised. His fifty-year rhythm of violence, peaks near 1870, 1920, and 1970, put the next crest around 2020. He published that projection in 2010, defended it in a retrospective with Andrey Korotayev (b. 1961) in August 2020 as the streets confirmed it, and sat for a December 2020 Atlantic profile by Graeme Wood (b. 1979) whose headline promised the next decade could be even worse.

Set beside this, The Upswing reads differently than it reads alone. Putnam and Garrett assembled four families of indicators, found them moving together across 125 years, conceded that no single driver could be identified, and leaned toward a cultural interpretation: the Progressive-era turn began in pulpits, presses, and associations before it reached statute books, so the moral reorientation led. Turchin’s model inverts the arrow and, more painfully, absorbs the book. The I-We-I curve is, in structural-demographic terms, an output series, one more trace of the underlying state variables, and its cultural reading mistakes the dashboard for the engine. Where Putnam ends with an appeal to choose solidarity, Turchin’s machinery asks who chose it last time, and answers: elites under duress, after a restriction of labor supply that The Upswing barely discusses and a world war nobody would prescribe. The model even explains the books’ shared villain better than the books do. Putnam calls Trump a symptom of disconnection. Turchin agrees on symptom and specifies the disease: a counter-elite entrepreneur, personally wealthy and personally aggrieved, recruiting immiserated voters against incumbent elites, the standard product of overproduction, with precedents in every secular cycle in the databank.

That is what Turchin buys: generation instead of description, a falsifiable projection made in print a decade ahead, a causal ordering, and comparative scope, since the same three-variable engine runs on Rome, medieval France, the Ottoman lands, and Qing China in Secular Cycles (2009). Now the costs, which are real and documented.

The curve-fitting objection comes first. A composite index assembled from chosen proxies with chosen weights has many degrees of freedom, and a builder who knows the story can, without fraud, tune the assembly until the curve tells it. This objection cuts Turchin exactly as deep as it cuts The Upswing, which is built the same way; the two books are methodological twins, and neither can use the objection against the other. Second, the mainstream disciplines remain unpersuaded on key links. Most historians reject cyclical laws on principle and cliodynamics in particular; economists dispute the claim that the 1920s immigration restrictions raised native wages, with recent work finding small or even negative local effects as employers substituted machines and internal migrants. Third, the fifty-year rhythm skirts numerology, and the 2020 prediction, though genuine and dated, was directional rather than specific: growing instability with a peak near 2020, which the George Floyd summer and January 6 satisfied, but which a different pair of shocks would also have satisfied. Fourth, the years since 2021 have been quieter than the model’s darker readings implied, and a theory that survives both outcomes, eruption and calm, starts to look unfalsifiable at the margin. Turchin’s answer is that structural pressure is a probability field rather than an appointment calendar, which is true of earthquakes too, and which limits the model to exactly the kind of statement critics say is too easy to make.

The deepest limit is the one Putnam’s work exposes. Turchin’s immiseration is material: wages, heights, mortality. He borrows Putnam’s connectedness series as one more indicator, but the model has no independent account of the relational collapse, no reason within the equations why prosperous, credentialed Americans, the winners of the wage ratio, should also be lonely, childless, and clubless, and they are. Bowling Alone documented disconnection rising among exactly the classes the wealth pump enriched. A theory in which well-being is the relative wage cannot explain the misery of the well-paid, and Putnam’s forty years of micro-data sit there as a standing anomaly. Nor does the model contain a citizen. Its actors are aggregates, populations and elite fractions, and its remedy, shut off the wealth pump, is addressed to a state and an elite, with nothing for a person to do on a Tuesday night. Putnam’s exhortation may be causally naive, and it is at least addressed to someone. Turchin, pressed for hope in End Times, points to one historical case of a society exiting a crisis phase without mass violence, Britain in the Chartist decades, reforming under pressure, and the example concedes the point: the pressure did the reforming.

So the trade stands as follows. Putnam gives the curve, the finest micro-level documentation of its social surface ever assembled, and a moral appeal with no engine under it; asked why the upswing happened, The Upswing gestures at awakening, and asked why the awakening happened, it stops, exactly where Making Democracy Work stopped at the communes. Turchin gives an engine with three named variables, a dated prediction that landed, and a cause for the awakening, elite fear plus a closed labor tap, at the price of coarse aggregates, contested links, and a theory with no room in it for the choir Putnam can hear and Turchin can only count. Each man has half of a complete social science. Putnam measured what it feels like. Turchin modeled what makes it move. The reconciliation neither has written would treat connection the way Turchin treats wages, as a state variable with its own feedbacks, and would test whether the relational economy runs on the same pump as the monetary one or on a pump of its own. Until someone builds that, the two curves lie one atop the other on the light table, agreeing about everything except what a curve is: for one man a portrait, for the other a readout, and the American reader below them left to decide whether he is being described or predicted.

Notes

The 2010 Nature letter: Turchin, “Political instability may be a contributor in the coming decade,” Nature 463, p. 608 (February 2010).

The retrospective defense: Turchin and Korotayev, “The 2010 structural-demographic forecast for the 2010-2020 decade: A retrospective assessment,” PLOS ONE, August 17, 2020: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7430736/ — this also documents the PSI as the product of immiseration, elite mobilization potential, and state fiscal distress, and the Goldstone lineage.

Ages of Discord (Beresta Books, 2016): well-being index components (relative wage, stature, life expectancy, marriage age), the 1830 turn with no dramatic event, and the 1850s elite-aspirant material including Lincoln, and the Hammond revolver line. A detailed secondary walkthrough confirming these: https://theworthyhouse.com/2020/01/10/ages-of-discord-a-structural-demographic-analysis-of-american-history-peter-turchin/ — note this reviewer also documents that Turchin cites Putnam‘s bridging/bonding work inside Ages of Discord, which strengthens the nesting claim.

Turchin using Putnam’s connectedness data as an immiseration indicator: his post “Population Immiseration in America,” August 21, 2018: https://peterturchin.com/population-immiseration-in-america/

The Atlantic profile: Graeme Wood, “The Next Decade Could Be Even Worse,” December 2020 issue.

Biography: Obninsk birth, Valentin Turchin‘s dissidence and 1977 emigration, NYU degree, Duke zoology PhD 1985, the beetle-and-vole ecology career, the late-1990s switch, “cliodynamics” coined circa 2003, Seshat databank, Complexity Science Hub Vienna. Standard profile material (the Wood piece covers most of it). The Amnesty International co-founding detail for Valentin is reported in accounts of his life; verify.

Immigration restriction and wages dispute: the negative-to-null findings are from work by Abramitzky, Boustan, and coauthors on the 1920s quota acts (employers substituted capital and internal migrants). I stated it as “recent work finds”; the primary is Abramitzky, Ager, Boustan, Cohen, Hansen, “The Effect of Immigration Restrictions on Local Labor Markets” (AEJ: Applied, 2023).

Secular Cycles (Turchin and Nefedov, Princeton, 2009) for Rome, France, and the comparative claim; End Times (Penguin, 2023) for “wealth pump” and the Chartist-Britain escape case.

The Upswing‘s causal lean (cultural change leading) is in its later chapters.

Nothing Left to Do: Robert Nisbet’s Forty-Year Head Start on Bowling Alone

In 1953, at the high noon of American joining, with the lodges full, the pews packed, the union rolls at their peak, and the PTA enrolling a generation of mothers, a forty-year-old Berkeley sociologist published a book announcing that American community was dying. The book was The Quest for Community, the author was Robert Nisbet (1913-1996), and by every measure Robert Putnam would later assemble, the timing looks absurd. Putnam’s curves show 1953 near the summit. Membership, trust, church attendance, and civic participation were still climbing and would climb for another decade. Nisbet stood in the middle of the greatest associational boom in the country’s history and wrote its obituary, and the boom rolled on as if to embarrass him.

Then, beginning around 1965, every curve turned down and kept falling for fifty years, until a Harvard political scientist with membership records and time diaries measured the collapse and became famous for discovering it. The question this essay adjudicates is a priority dispute of the kind academic life pretends not to care about and runs on: who found the wound, the man who described it four decades early without data, or the man who counted it four decades late without a cause? And behind the priority question stands a practical one with money and policy on it. Nisbet named a killer that Putnam’s books walk past, and if Nisbet’s killer did it, then everything Putnam prescribes, the joining fairs, the civic seminars, the exhortation to found choirs, is treatment for the wrong disease.

Nisbet came out of Maricopa, California, an oil town in the San Joaquin dust, and took his doctorate at Berkeley under Frederick Teggart (1870-1946), a historian of ideas hostile to the century’s faith in progress. The Quest for Community was written in the shadow of the two regimes that had just organized the murder of millions, and its starting question was the one that haunted every social scientist of that generation: how did the most advanced societies in Europe produce totalitarianism? The standard answers pointed at ideology, economics, or national character. Nisbet’s answer was structural, and it ran through loneliness. Totalitarian movements recruited the atomized. The men who marched were men who belonged to nothing, and they belonged to nothing because something had spent two centuries stripping the memberships out of European life. Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) reached the same corner of the field at the same moment from the refugee’s side; Nisbet arrived from the sociologist’s.

The stripping agent, in Nisbet’s account, was the centralized state, and the tool was function. His causal chain has three links and can be stated in a breath. Institutions hold authority because they perform functions: the family that educates, feeds, employs, and buries; the parish that relieves the poor and records the town’s existence; the guild that trains, licenses, insures, and disciplines; the township that judges small disputes and raises the school. Authority earns allegiance: people are loyal to what they need. And when the state absorbs the function, the chain runs backward. The institution still stands, the sign is still on the door, but it no longer does anything, and an institution that does nothing first loses authority, then loses allegiance, then loses members, in that order, with a lag while habit carries the older generation through doors their children will see no reason to enter. Function precedes allegiance. Remove the first and the second follows at the speed of generational replacement.

Nisbet traced the absorption to a partnership the modern mind resists seeing: the state and the individual against the middle. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) had set the program in Leviathan, describing corporations and associations as lesser commonwealths in the bowels of the greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) refined it: partial associations distort the general will, so the citizen should face the state alone. And in June 1791 the French Revolution enacted it. Isaac Le Chapelier (1754-1794) rose in the Assembly to abolish the guilds and every intermediate body with them, declaring that henceforth there existed only the particular interest of each individual and the general interest of the state, with nothing permitted between. The law passed in the name of liberty. Le Chapelier went to the guillotine three years later, an individual facing the state alone, and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries executed his statute across the West at varying speeds: emancipation of the individual from family, parish, guild, and town, each function transferred upward to the one association that claims all of us, each transfer applauded as freedom, each leaving the intermediate body a little more ornamental. The lonely crowd at the end of the process, Nisbet argued, does not stop wanting community. The quest for community will not be denied. Stripped of the small memberships, people seek belonging in the largest one available, the political community, and the totalitarian state is the quest for community turned predator: Party as family, Movement as church, Leader as father, the ersatz Gemeinschaft of the atomized.

Now set the American record against the model, and watch the absurd timing turn into the model’s best evidence. The associations whose death Putnam measured were, by 1953, already functionally dead, and had been dying since the Progressive Era. The fraternal lodges had been the working man’s insurance system, sickness pay, burial money, lodge doctors, orphanages; workmen’s compensation, commercial carriers, and then Social Security took the business between 1910 and 1940, and after that the Odd Fellows offered ritual, which is to say nothing. The parish and the congregation had run poor relief, schooling, and hospitals; the welfare state and the school district took them. The township’s roads, courts, and charity went to county, state, and federal agencies. The family, the oldest functional institution on earth, was relieved in sequence of production, education, health care, and the keeping of its old people. By mid-century the intermediate institutions of America were pageants: full of members, empty of tasks. And here is the point Putnam’s own data deliver to Nisbet’s door. The generation that packed the lodges in 1953 had been formed before the absorption completed, when joining still purchased something; habit and loyalty carried them through the postwar decades, and Putnam’s famous finding that the collapse is generational, that the civic cohort kept attending while its children declined to start, is exactly the lag the function-first chain predicts. Bowling Alone treats generational replacement as its leading explanation and cannot say what the replacement replaced. Nisbet can: the children were the first generation raised entirely inside institutions with nothing left to do, and they responded rationally to pageants. The mystery variable in Putnam’s regressions, cohort, is carrying Nisbet’s cause.

The darker half of the prophecy has also filed its confirmation, under Putnam’s signature. Bowling Alone’s late-career sequel finding, that social disconnection was the best predictor of support for authoritarian populism, that the movement recruited where the memberships had died, is The Quest for Community’s central claim wearing survey weights. Putnam announced it in 2025 as a warning. Nisbet had printed it as a theorem in 1953: politics becomes the community of the communityless, and the leader arrives offering belonging to men who have nowhere else to get it. Priority, on both the diagnosis and the sequel, belongs to the dead man. Bowling Alone’s five hundred pages give him no sustained engagement; the mass-society theorists of the 1950s appear there mostly as unfalsified pessimists whom the data would sort out. The data sorted them in.

If the essay ended here it would be a monument, and monuments violate the record, because the case against Nisbet is serious and comes in three exhibits.

First, Scandinavia. The function-absorption thesis predicts that the biggest welfare states should have the deadest civil societies, and the prediction fails on its face. Sweden and Denmark absorbed more family and parish function than any polity in history and sit at the top of every league table of associational membership and generalized trust; the crowding-out literature that tested Nisbet’s logic across countries found crowding-in as often as crowding-out, with state funding sustaining the nonprofit sector it was supposed to strangle. Bo Rothstein (b. 1954) and others built a counter-account where universal, non-humiliating state services and civic trust feed each other. Nisbet’s chain may describe one path; it is not a law.

Second, the cage. The functional community Nisbet mourned had members because they could not leave. The guild that trained and insured also fixed prices, barred entry, and policed belief; the parish that relieved the poor also surveilled them; the family that performed everything performed it with the unpaid labor of women who were not asked. The state did not only seize functions. People handed functions over, gladly, one emancipation at a time, and called it freedom because it was. Nisbet knew this and half-admitted it; his program, a new laissez-faire whose units would be groups rather than individuals, never explains how to restore an institution’s functions without restoring its power to coerce the people inside it.

Third, the poker game, and this exhibit is Putnam’s property. The state absorbed the lodge’s insurance business; no agency ever absorbed the dinner party. Yet Putnam’s data show informal sociability, card games, picnics, having friends over, collapsing on the same schedule as the formal memberships. Function-stripping cannot explain why Americans stopped eating together, because eating together never had a function to strip. Whatever killed the schmooze, television, sprawl, screens, exhaustion, is a cause outside Nisbet’s model, and it may reach the lodges too. The honest division of the corpse: Nisbet’s chain covers the institutional half of Putnam’s dataset, the chapters and congregations that once did things, and stands silent before the informal half, which is the half that measures friendship.

The associations that kept functions kept members. Putnam’s own maps show the pattern: the American communities with the highest measured social capital are disproportionately the ones where a religious body still runs a welfare system, assigns its members jobs, feeds them, schools them, and buries them, the Latter-day Saint ward being the textbook case, with the Amish settlement and the Orthodox Jewish neighborhood as the other standing demonstrations. American Grace found religious Americans better joiners, better givers, and better neighbors across the board, and the congregation is simply the last intermediate institution in America that does anything. The correlation Putnam reports as a finding is the one Nisbet would have called a control group.

Putnam’s practical program, from the Saguaro Seminar to Better Together to the joining fairs that followed Join or Die, treats the association as the unit to revive: gather people, form groups, meet. Nisbet’s chain says the program is running backward. Groups formed around no function are clubs about clubbing; they will hold the already-communal for a season and evaporate, because allegiance cannot be exhorted into existence, only earned by an institution people need. On this account civic renewal has one lever, devolution: move real functions, schooling, welfare, care of the old, dispute resolution, back down into bodies small enough to know their members, and the members will appear, because they will have to, and then, being there, will become what Putnam wants them to be. Whether the lever can be pulled without rebuilding the cage, and whether any modern electorate would vote to need its neighbors again, are the questions Nisbet left open at his death. But the priority dispute has a verdict. Putnam counted the corpse and proved there was one, which prophecy can never do. Nisbet, writing in the crowded lodge hall of 1953, named the cause of death before the patient felt sick, and the cause he named is the only one on the table that explains why the patient’s children never came to visit: there was nothing left to do there, and everyone under forty knew it.

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W. Bradford Wilcox: The Sociologist Who Tells America to Get Married

On a spring morning in Charlottesville, students file into a lecture hall at the University of Virginia for a class on the sociology of the family. They are twenty years old. Most come from married parents. Most plan to marry, though few plan to marry soon. The professor at the front, a trim man in his fifties with the enthusiasm of a coach, puts a chart on the screen showing that children raised by their married parents finish college at higher rates, and then he does something professors at elite universities almost never do. He tells them the data has a message for their own lives. He tells them to get married.

W. Bradford Wilcox (b. August 21, 1970) has spent a quarter century turning that advice into a research program, a policy agenda, and a public identity. He holds one of the University of Virginia's highest faculty ranks, the Melville Foundation Jefferson Scholars Foundation University Professorship of Sociology, directs the university's National Marriage Project, and holds positions at the Institute for Family Studies and the American Enterprise Institute. He publishes in The American Sociological Review and The Journal of Marriage and Family, and he writes for The Atlantic, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times. His governing claim runs through everything: marriage is a social institution that organizes childrearing, connects men to children, pools resources, and places intimate life inside durable obligations. When the institution weakens, the costs fall hardest on people with the least money.

He wants Americans to marry and have children. That candor gives his work force and gives his critics their opening. The recurring charge against Wilcox is that he moves too fast from correlation to cause, and from cause to sermon. The recurring answer is that his numbers keep holding up in embarrassing places, including the family lives of the people who dismiss him.

The story starts with an absence. Wilcox grew up in Connecticut, raised by a single mother. Several of his childhood friends watched their parents divorce during the 1970s and 1980s, the years when American divorce rates climbed to their historic peak. The boy who grew up without a father in the house became the man who studies what keeps fathers in houses. He has never hidden the connection. “I was raised by a single mom,” he told an interviewer in 2024, and while in college he came to see marriage as the institution that connected men to their children, a recognition that set the course of his research from his undergraduate years through his doctorate.

He arrived at the University of Virginia as a Jefferson Scholar, the university's most prestigious undergraduate award, and graduated in 1992 with high honors in government. He then spent two years as an assistant editor at The Responsive Community, the journal of the communitarian movement led by Amitai Etzioni (1929-2023). The communitarians argued that rights and markets cannot sustain a free society by themselves. Families, congregations, and neighborhoods produce the habits freedom requires, and liberal individualism spends down that inheritance without replacing it. Wilcox took the general argument and applied it to one institution for the rest of his life.

At Princeton he earned an M.A. with distinction in 1997 and a Ph.D. in sociology in 2001. His dissertation committee tells you what kind of sociologist he became. Robert Wuthnow (b. 1946) studies American religion. Paul DiMaggio (b. 1951) studies culture and institutions. Sara McLanahan (1940-2022) built the modern quantitative case that children of single parents face worse odds, and she built it as a scholar who had herself raised children as a divorced mother, which inoculated her work against the charge that it was a stranger's judgment. Wilcox absorbed all three influences: religion as lived practice, institutions as shapers of conduct, family structure as a driver of inequality. After fellowships at Princeton, Yale, and Brookings, he joined the Virginia faculty in 2002 and never left. He became associate professor in 2008, full professor in 2016, and University Professor in an appointment the university announced in late 2024.

His first book, Soft Patriarchs, New Men: How Christianity Shapes Fathers and Husbands (2004), delivered a finding that annoyed both sides of the culture war. Conservative Protestant men endorsed traditional male authority at high rates. Those same men, when active in their churches, hugged their kids more, praised them more, and spent more time with them than the average American father. Mainline Protestant men held egalitarian views and did more dishes. Unaffiliated men often had neither the egalitarian pressure nor the paternal one. The lesson Wilcox drew became a signature of his work: what people say about family life and what institutions get them to do are different things. A man's stated ideology predicts his conduct less than his social world does. Churches took male authority and attached it to sacrifice, fidelity, and provision, which softened it in practice while hardening it in speech.

The distinction between institutional marriage and soulmate marriage organizes his thought. Institutional marriage sits inside law, kinship, children, property, religion, and public expectation. Soulmate marriage exists to deliver emotional fulfillment to two individuals, and it dissolves when the fulfillment stops. Wilcox learned part of this framework from his Virginia colleague Steven Nock (1950-2008), whose research on marriage in men's lives argued that the institution changes men by changing what others expect of them. Wilcox's research with Jeffrey Dew found that couples who combined intimacy with norms of permanence did better than couples who treated the relationship as a vehicle for personal growth. He compresses his ideal into three Cs: commitment, community, communion. A promise, a village, a shared life. The constraints reduce freedom in the moment. Wilcox argues they make trust possible over decades, and that trust is the asset everything else in family life draws on.

The National Marriage Project gave him a platform. Founded at Rutgers in 1997 by David Popenoe (1932-2023) and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead (b. 1944), the project moved to Virginia, and Wilcox has directed it since 2009. Its reports occupy the space between journal articles and pamphlets: The State of Our Unions, When Marriage Disappears, Knot Yet, The Millennial Success Sequence. They use standard national datasets and speak to journalists, pastors, and congressional staffers rather than to referees. Wilcox believes family sociologists should identify which arrangements help people flourish and then say so in language that moves institutions. Many of his colleagues believe that is where sociology stops and advocacy begins. He has never accepted the border.

His central empirical contribution is the marriage divide. Marriage did not decline evenly in America. It retreated by class. College-educated Americans still marry, still have their children after the wedding, still divorce at falling rates. Working-class and poor Americans experience cohabitation, nonmarital births, partner churn, and lengthening singleness. The institution's benefits concentrated among people who already had advantages, and the retreat concentrated among people who could least afford it. A stable couple pools two incomes, two schedules, two sets of grandparents, and mutual insurance against a lost job or a diagnosis. Their children inherit the stability along with the money. Family structure became one of the engines of inequality, and Wilcox made it hard for scholars of inequality to leave it out of the model.

His explanation for the divide mixes economics and culture, which separates him from both flanks. The collapse of stable industrial work, weak wages for non-college men, incarceration, and housing costs gutted the material basis of working-class marriage. At the same time, the fading of church attendance, normalized cohabitation, easy divorce, and the ideal of the self-made autonomous adult dismantled the cultural scaffolding that once held modest-income marriages up. Conservatives who blame morals alone and progressives who blame wages alone each get half the story.

Men occupy the center of his analysis. A mother's tie to her child survives almost anything. A father's tie runs through his relationship with the mother, and when that relationship has no public definition, the tie frays. Marriage gives a man a named role, a recognized place, people whose dependence on him is public. Married men work more, drink less, and hold more assets. Part of that is selection, since steady men marry at higher rates. Wilcox argues the institution also treats: it rearranges a man's routines, incentives, and self-understanding. This is why he fights a two-front war, against progressive indifference to family structure and against the online male subculture that describes marriage as a trap. He opens his recent work quoting Andrew Tate (b. 1986), who told millions of young male viewers in a viral 2022 video that there is “zero statistical advantage” to marriage for men. Wilcox has spent two decades assembling the statistical advantages.

With Nicholas H. Wolfinger he wrote Soul Mates: Religion, Sex, Love, and Marriage Among African Americans and Latinos (2016), which studied strong Black and Latino relationships using national data and fieldwork. The book found that shared religious practice, and above all male participation in congregational life, predicted better relationship quality. It refused the two standard postures toward minority family life, pathology-hunting and polite silence, and asked instead which institutions helped. The answer was not that religion fixes everything. Churches can shelter hypocrisy and male privilege. The answer was that couples who worship together acquire friends, rituals, and help that secular individualism struggles to supply at scale.

Wilcox also became the leading academic voice for the success sequence: finish school, work full time, marry, then have children, in that order. Young adults who follow it rarely end up poor. Critics answer that the sequence redescribes privilege, since young people from stable homes with good schools find every step easier, and the sequence may be an effect of advantage wearing the costume of a cause. Wilcox concedes the structural point and holds his ground on the arithmetic. Two adults, two potential earners, and two caregivers before the first baby arrives reduces the risk of poverty by direct means, whatever else is true. The fight is over how much of the correlation is causal and whether the message helps or scolds.

His policy agenda has drifted toward economics. He argues that a country cannot preach marriage while its welfare rules tax it. Means-tested programs can cut benefits when a low-income couple marries and combines incomes, and Wilcox has pushed to double the relevant thresholds for married parents of young children. He backs vocational education, apprenticeships, and anything that improves the wages of men without degrees, on the sociological ground that a man with steady work is more likely to be seen, and to see himself, as marriageable. Exhortation without jobs fails. Jobs without expectations fail. He wants both levers pulled.

His sharpest rhetorical weapon is the charge he levels at his own class. Educated professionals marry, stay married, and pour resources into their children, while declining to say in public that any of this is better than the alternatives. Wilcox calls it talking left and walking right. The old hypocrite preached fidelity and cheated. The new one preaches that all choices are equal and then lives like a Victorian. The gap has a distributional cost. Affluent adults can buy their way out of family instability with money, flexible jobs, and therapists. Poor adults cannot. A culture that distributes permission equally while distributing protection by income is, in his account, an engine for reproducing the elite. His critics reply that elite stability rests on elite money, and that no amount of honest messaging gives a home health aide the security of a tenured couple. Both things can be true, which is why the argument has run for fifteen years without resolution.

Get Married: Why Americans Must Defy the Elites, Forge Strong Families, and Save Civilization (2024) gathered all of it into a manifesto. The book attacks three rivals to institutional marriage: the solo life of career, travel, and self-development; soulmatism, which loads the spouse with impossible emotional freight; and a family-diversity ideology that refuses to rank arrangements by their average outcomes. It draws on the General Social Survey, where married men aged eighteen to fifty-five were about twice as likely as their unmarried peers to call themselves very happy, and married mothers outscored both unmarried mothers and unmarried childless women. It cites large wealth gaps between stably married men and divorced or never-married men near retirement. Wilcox acknowledges selection in these numbers and argues it cannot absorb the entire association. His critics agree marriage can confer benefits and accuse him of stating uncertain causal estimates with the confidence of a man selling something. That is the honest center of the dispute. Nobody serious claims the correlations are fake. The fight is over how much weight marriage bears once you subtract the traits that get people married.

His most persistent scholarly opponent is Philip N. Cohen (b. 1967) of the University of Maryland, who has spent years pressing three objections. Selection: healthy, employed, emotionally stable people both marry and thrive, and no regression removes every unmeasured difference. Programs: federal marriage-promotion efforts have thin results at the population level, and Cohen has argued that studies claiming success leaned on discretionary modeling choices. Gender: advice to marry sounds different to a woman weighing an unreliable or violent man than it does in a regression table, and falling marriage rates partly record women declining bad bargains, a judgment Wilcox sometimes files under elite ideology when it may be realism. Cohen adds the stigma cost of ranking family forms, and Wilcox answers that compassion for people in hard circumstances does not require lying about average risks. The exchange has been running for a decade and has sharpened both men.

Then, in the mid-2020s, Wilcox changed his emphasis, because the data changed. In an Atlantic essay titled “Why Marriage Survives,” published July 29, 2025, he argued that the institution had adapted and was showing new resilience. The divorce rate has fallen almost 40 percent from its early-1980s peak. Nonmarital childbearing stopped rising around 2009. The share of children living with married parents ticked up. Marriages that form now are more selective and more stable. The crisis migrated upstream. Fewer people reach the altar at all, and the country is splitting into a class that marries and compounds its advantages and a class that never enters. Leah Libresco Sargeant answered him from the right flank of his own coalition, pointing out that the share of unpartnered prime-age adults rose from 29 percent in 1990 to 38 percent in 2019, so the divorce decline may be less a triumph than a symptom of people never pairing at all. Wilcox largely agrees, which is why his recent work moved to the entry ramp.

In February 2026, the National Marriage Project, the Institute for Family Studies, and BYU's Wheatley Institute released State of Our Unions 2026: The Dating Recession, built on the 2025 National Dating Landscape Survey of 5,275 unmarried adults aged twenty-two to thirty-five. Only about one in three young adults reported active dating. Seventy-four percent of women and 64 percent of men had gone on no dates or only a few in the past year, and 52 percent named lack of money as the biggest barrier. Large majorities of both sexes said they wanted dating to lead to serious relationships and emotional connection. The picture is of a generation that wants what its grandparents had and cannot execute the first step: low confidence approaching strangers, low skill discussing feelings, low resilience after rejection, thin wallets. Wilcox reads it as institutional failure. Schools, churches, workplaces, and extended families once did the matchmaking as a byproduct of ordinary life. Those institutions thinned, the phone arrived, and each young adult was left to run a courtship market alone from a couch. The phone's causal share is hard to isolate from the pandemic, the economy, and everything else, and Wilcox's confidence on this point outruns the evidence somewhat, but the behavioral decline is not in dispute.

In a June 2026 Free Press essay, “America's Great Dad Divide,” he described the other end of the funnel: American fathers who live with their children have never invested more in them, with married fathers spending thirteen times more caregiving time than nonresident fathers, while a growing population of men never enters family life at all. The distant breadwinner father of 1960 is disappearing in both directions at once, replaced by the devoted resident dad and the unattached man with no children, no partner, and, in Wilcox's telling, no institutional reason to become better than he is. The men on the outside cluster among the unemployed, the unchurched, and the unconnected. This is the mature form of the question he has asked since Connecticut: what binds a man to a family, and what happens to the men nothing binds.

His own answer is on display at home. He met Danielle at the University of Virginia. They married, he converted to Catholicism, and they have nine children in Charlottesville. He consults for Nestlé, Procter & Gamble, and Kimberly-Clark, companies that pay for demographic foresight because babies and households are their business. Admirers see a man whose life and research rhyme. Critics see a man who found what he went looking for.

Wilcox’s achievement: he made family structure impossible to ignore in the study of American inequality, he documented the class divide in marriage before it was fashionable, and he kept attention on men and fathers when family policy treated them as wallets or threats. His numbers on the marriage divide, the divorce decline, and the dating collapse describe the country accurately, and the people angriest at his conclusions tend to raise their own children in exactly the households he recommends. The flaw: he asks marriage to carry more explanatory weight than any single institution can bear, his popular subtitles promise the salvation of civilization when his regressions show a wealth premium and a happiness gap. The narrow version of his claim is the strong one. Stable, cooperative marriage produces trust, mutual aid, and parental investment that neither markets nor governments have reproduced at scale, and a society that stops forming such marriages will discover what they were doing only after they are gone. Wilcox has spent his career trying to make America discover it beforehand. Whether the country listens is a different question from whether he is right, and on the second question his opponents have spent twenty years winning arguments and losing data.

Notes

Get Married profile and UVA position: https://sociology.as.virginia.edu/people/brad-wilcox and https://nationalmarriageproject.org/people/brad-wilcox (the NMP page gives the full chair title). Birth date August 21, 1970, Jefferson Scholar, Princeton degrees: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Bradford_Wilcox. “Raised by a single mom” quote and career origin: National Catholic Register interview, April 2024, https://www.ncregister.com/interview/brad-wilcox-get-married-book-value-of-marriage. Atlantic essay “Why Marriage Survives,” July 29, 2025 (September 2025 issue), with the Tate “zero statistical advantage” quote: https://www.aei.org/articles/why-marriage-survives/. Sargeant’s unpartnered-adults critique (29 to 38 percent, Pew): https://religionunplugged.com/news/2025/8/15/crossroads-podcast-marriage-isnt-dead-but-reporting-on-it-might-be. Dating Recession report and numbers: https://ifstudies.org/report-brief/state-of-our-unions-2026-the-dating-recession, full PDF at https://ifstudies.org/ifs-admin/resources/reports/the-dating-recession-state-of-our-unions-2026-wheatley-ifs.pdf, coverage at https://www.deseret.com/family/2026/02/12/the-dating-recession-wheatley-institute-survey-report-marriage/ and https://www.wfmd.com/2026/02/14/welcome-to-the-dating-recession-why-young-americans-are-giving-up-on-love/ (the 74/64 percent figures). Free Press Dad Divide essay with the thirteen-times caregiving figure: https://www.thefp.com/p/america-fatherhood-childless-men.

Reasonable extrapolations. The opening classroom scene is constructed: he teaches family and statistics courses at UVA and is known for telling students the marriage data applies to them, and Get Married describes surveying his own students, but the specific morning is mine. The Connecticut divorce-wave framing (his friends’ parents divorcing during the national peak) follows the facts.

Durkheim’s Bachelors: The Nineteenth-Century Frame Inside Brad Wilcox’s Marriage Data

In 1897 a professor at Bordeaux published a book built from death registries. Émile Durkheim had persuaded the French Ministry of Justice to let his nephew Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) and a small crew of assistants tabulate some 26,000 suicide dossiers by hand, sorting the dead by age, sex, religion, season, and marital status. The tables showed him something the moralists of his day had missed. Suicide, the most private act a person can commit, followed social laws. Protestants killed themselves more than Catholics, Catholics more than Jews. Soldiers more than civilians. And the unmarried more than the married, at rates so stable year after year that Durkheim treated them as constants of nature. A married man in France faced roughly a third the suicide risk of an unmarried man his age. Durkheim called the differential a coefficient of preservation, as if marriage were a preservative, something that keeps a man from spoiling.

One hundred and twenty-five years later, a professor at Virginia published tables from a different registry. The General Social Survey asks the living how happy they are. W. Bradford Wilcox found that married men aged eighteen to fifty-five were about twice as likely as unmarried men to call themselves very happy, that married men held several times the assets of their never-married peers at retirement, that they drank less, worked more, and reported more meaning. He packaged the findings in Get Married and took them on tour against an internet full of young men who had been told marriage offers a man nothing.

The two datasets have the same shape. One measures preservation from death, the other preservation from misery, and both find the unattached man at the bottom of the table. Wilcox’s argument is Durkheim’s argument, translated from mortality into wellbeing, and reading him through Suicide clarifies what he has found, what he is fighting, and where his case has a crack that Durkheim mapped before Wilcox’s great-grandparents met.

Durkheim’s explanation ran on two variables. Integration is the strength of a person’s attachments, the degree to which others claim him, depend on him, and would notice his absence. Too little integration produces what he called egoistic suicide, the death of the man who belongs to nobody. Regulation is the set of limits society places on appetite. Human desires, Durkheim argued, have no natural ceiling. Left alone, a man wants more money than he has, more status than he holds, more women than he knows, and the wanting is a treadmill that speeds up as he runs. Only an external authority, felt as legitimate, can set the ceiling that makes satisfaction possible. Too little regulation produces anomic suicide, the death of the man whose desires have no banks to run between. Durkheim described the anomic condition as a malady of the infinite. The deregulated man aspires to everything and enjoys nothing.

Marriage, in this scheme, works both levers at once. It integrates: a wife and children are people who claim a man, a household is a small society with him as a member, and the member of a society does not lightly abandon it. And it regulates: marriage assigns a definite object to the need for love, closes the horizon, and ends the search. Durkheim thought the closing of the horizon was the gift. The bachelor retains the right to keep looking, and the right to keep looking is a sentence to keep looking. The married man has lost a liberty and gained a floor.

Now set Wilcox’s career against that machinery.

The happiness premium is the coefficient of preservation with the sign reversed. Durkheim measured the harm that absence of marriage inflicts; Wilcox measures the good its presence confers; both are reading the same variable off different instruments. Wilcox’s standard reply to the selection critique, that happy and stable men are the ones who marry, echoes a fight Durkheim had with his own contemporaries, who claimed the sickly and unfit were left out of the marriage market and killed themselves for the same defects that kept them single. Durkheim answered with the widowers. Men who had married, and so had passed whatever selection the market imposes, lost most of their protection when their wives died. The protection traveled with the state, so the state was doing work. Wilcox’s equivalent evidence, the changes in men’s earnings, drinking, and time use that follow marriage and follow divorce in panel data, makes the same move. Neither settles the question. Both establish that selection cannot be the entire story.

The manosphere fight is a fight about anomie, and Durkheim supplies the diagnosis that Wilcox’s own vocabulary lacks. The influencers selling young men on the single life describe marriage as a cage and its absence as freedom. Durkheim spent a chapter on exactly this claim, because the libertines of 1890s Paris made it too. His tables answered them. The unmarried men enjoying their liberty were dying of it. The freedom to pursue any woman is the obligation to pursue women without end, and the pursuit without end is the treadmill, and the treadmill kills. What the manosphere markets as escape from regulation is, in Durkheim’s terms, anomie with a subscription model. The pornography, the apps with their infinite scroll of faces, the gym-and-grindset content promising that the next level of self-improvement will bring the satisfaction the last level did not: a nineteenth-century sociologist who never saw a screen described the psychological structure of all of it. Desire without a terminus. Aspiration to everything, satisfaction with nothing.

The unattached men of Wilcox’s Dad Divide essay are Durkheim’s bachelors returning at scale. Wilcox found American fatherhood splitting: resident fathers more devoted than any generation of fathers on record, alongside a growing population of men with no partner, no children, and thin attachments to work and church. Durkheim would recognize the second group instantly and would predict what the mortality data now shows. The American men dying midlife deaths from alcohol, opioids, and suicide, the epidemic that Anne Case (b. 1958) and Angus Deaton (b. 1945) named deaths of despair, are concentrated among men without college degrees, and men without college degrees are the men who stopped marrying. The correlation between the retreat from marriage and the rise of despair deaths does not prove Durkheim’s causal story. It is what his causal story predicts, published a century in advance, and no rival theory called it.

Even Wilcox’s first book runs on Durkheim’s engine. Soft Patriarchs, New Men found that conservative Protestant men preached male headship and practiced devoted fatherhood, while men outside congregations often practiced neither their stated ideals nor anyone else’s. The finding puzzled readers who assumed doctrine drives conduct. Durkheim never assumed it. His chapter on religion in Suicide found that Protestant theology, doctrinally gentler on the despairing than Catholic theology, protected worshippers less, because Protestantism integrated less. The creed was not the active ingredient. The congregation was. Belief matters as the banner of a group; the group does the work. Wilcox’s practice-over-ideology finding, the distinction he has drawn in every book since, restates the founding insight of Durkheimian sociology of religion: the rituals and the assembled bodies regulate conduct, whatever the assembled minds profess.

Durkheim ran his marriage tables by sex, and the results embarrassed the institution he was crediting. Marriage protected men far more than women. In some regions, married women without children showed no protection against suicide compared with unmarried women their age, and in parts of the French data the childless wife fared worse than the spinster. For women, the protection that existed came from children more than from the husband. The family shielded her; the marriage, taken alone, did little, and could harm. Durkheim stated the conclusion without flinching: the conjugal bond, as constituted in his time, was purchased at the wife’s expense more often than at the husband’s.

Comparing jurisdictions, he found that where divorce was easy, husbands lost protection and wives gained it, and where divorce was banned, husbands were safest and wives least so. Regulation calibrated for the male appetite could suffocate the person it bound tightest. In a footnote he even named the mirror image of anomie: fatalistic suicide, the death of those with futures pitilessly blocked, the slave’s death, the death of the wife who cannot leave. He gave it one footnote because he thought it rare in modern societies. The women’s histories written since suggest it was less rare than he supposed, and that the suicide registries were not the only ledger recording its costs.

This is Philip Cohen’s gender critique of Wilcox, stated 130 years early and from inside the pro-marriage camp. When Cohen argues that advice to marry lands differently on a woman weighing an unreliable or violent man, when he suggests the marriage decline partly records women declining bad bargains, he is restating Durkheim’s own tables. The founder of the discipline that produced Wilcox’s findings also produced the finding that the institution’s benefits skew male, and that the tighter the binding, the more the skew. A woman reading Get Married and hesitating is not necessarily in the grip of elite ideology. She may be doing folk Durkheim, sensing that the coefficient of preservation was never written for her at the same rate.

Wilcox has a partial answer. His GSS data shows married mothers happier than unmarried mothers and unmarried childless women, so the modern premium is not male-only. The marriage he recommends, companionate, involved, nested in community, is not the marriage of the Third Republic, and the easy-divorce regime he operates in has already conceded the exit rights whose absence Durkheim found lethal to wives. Today’s stable marriages persist inside a legal order where either spouse can leave, which means the regulation is renewed by consent rather than imposed by law, a form Durkheim never got to measure. But the asymmetry has not vanished from the record. Roughly two-thirds of American divorces are filed by wives. Whatever that number means, it is not the signature of an institution experienced identically from both sides, and a Durkheimian account of marriage owes the reader the whole table, both columns, his and hers.

Durkheim, having demonstrated marriage’s protective power more rigorously than anyone before him, declined to prescribe it as the remedy for modern anomie. He thought the conjugal family too small and too mortal to carry the weight. A household of two adults and their children is a society that death or departure can dissolve in an afternoon, and the wider kin structures that once buttressed it were thinning even in 1897. His prescription was the occupational group, the profession organized as a moral community, something durable enough to outlive any member and close enough to regulate daily conduct. History filed that proposal under noble failures. But the diagnosis behind it stands as a warning to any program with Wilcox’s title. If the surrounding structures are gone, the couple alone is asked to be church, guild, village, and lineage for each other, and the soulmate marriage Wilcox criticizes is what that impossible job description produces. Wilcox half-concedes the point every time he lists his three Cs and puts community between commitment and communion. The concession deserves its full weight. Durkheim’s tables say marriage preserves; Durkheim’s theory says marriage cannot preserve unaided; and the American data since 2000, in which marriage thrives inside religious and immigrant enclaves and evaporates outside them, says the theory was right about its own tables.

Durkheim was the son of the rabbi of Épinal, eighth in a rabbinic line, raised for the pulpit, who left the faith as a young man and then spent his career measuring what congregations do for the people inside them, protection he had walked away from and never stopped tabulating. Wilcox grew up in Connecticut without a father in the house and spent his career measuring what fathers do for the people around them. Each man made a science of his own missing structure. And Durkheim’s end tested his theory on its author. His son André, a brilliant linguist and his intellectual heir, died of wounds from the Serbian front in the First World War. Colleagues describe Durkheim afterward as a man performing his duties from inside a shroud. He was dead within two years, at fifty-nine. The sociologist who proved that attachments preserve life had his largest attachment torn out, and the preservation failed on schedule. His tables would have predicted it. That is the terrible integrity of the theory: it exempted no one, including him.

What does Wilcox gain and lose by the genealogy? He gains a pedigree that his critics cannot wave away. His central findings are not artifacts of conservative think tanks or Christian funding. They replicate, in a happiness survey, the most famous quantitative result of the discipline’s founding book, produced by a secular French republican with no brief for tradition, and the anomic bachelor Wilcox keeps meeting online is the oldest character in empirical sociology. Any sociologist who has taught the undergraduate theory sequence has taught Wilcox’s thesis without naming him.

He loses the comfort of a symmetrical sales pitch. The Durkheimian version of Get Married carries two clauses the trade version omits. First, the preservative has always worked better on men, the institution’s history includes a column of suffocated wives, and the modern narrowing of that gap depends on the exit rights and companionate norms that traditionalists sometimes talk of loosening. Second, marriage alone was never the cure. It is the visible moiety of a structure, and where the congregation, the kin network, and the stable occupation have died, the ring is asked to do the work of a civilization, which is how a wedding band ends up in a book subtitle next to the word civilization in the first place.

Durkheim appears, at most, in passing in Wilcox’s public writing. A rabbi’s son with 26,000 death files and a fatherless boy with the General Social Survey, a century and an ocean apart, ran the same variable and got the same answer. People attached to others and bounded by obligations live, and the unbound man, offered everything, satisfied with nothing, shows up at the bottom of whichever table the century keeps.

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Peter Moskos: The Cop Who Talks to People

The shift begins at 11:39 p.m. That number comes from a labor contract, and it tells you something about police work before you see any of it. Nothing in patrol runs on round numbers. The officer signs out a car, checks the shotgun, and drives into Baltimore's Eastern District, a few square miles of row houses east of downtown where, at the end of the 1990s, the drug corners run all night.

From the corner, the patrol car is weather. A lookout on a stoop calls out when it turns onto the block. The tout who steers customers goes quiet. The man holding the money keeps holding it, because money is legal. The slinger who hands over the vials has only a few on him; the stash sits in a rain spout or under the lip of a windowsill on a vacant house. The gun stays close but off the body, behind a loose brick, because a gun on the body is five years and a gun behind a brick belongs to no one. The car rolls past. The corner exhales and reopens. Total interruption of commerce: about ninety seconds.

The officer in the car during those years was sometimes a Harvard doctoral student named Peter Moskos (b. 1971). He wore the uniform, carried the gun, made the arrests, went to court, and depended on the men and women of his squad to come when he called for help. He served from 1999 to 2001, most of it on the permanent midnight shift, 11:39 p.m. to 8:12 a.m. He came out of the Eastern District with a dissertation, then a book, then a career built on a question he has been working for twenty-five years: under what conditions do police prevent crime, and under what conditions do they just generate activity?

He is now a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, director of its executive master's program for NYPD leadership, a faculty member in the CUNY Graduate Center's sociology program, a senior fellow of the Yale Urban Ethnography Project, and, since 2025, the official historian of the New York City Department of Environmental Protection Police. His fourth book, Back from the Brink: Inside the NYPD and New York City's Extraordinary 1990s Crime Drop (Oxford University Press, 2025), is an oral history of the largest crime decline in modern American urban history. His description of his own method, posted on his faculty page, runs against forty years of disciplinary fashion. He studies people by talking to them.

The method is inherited. Moskos grew up in Evanston, Illinois, the son of Charles Moskos (1934-2008), a Northwestern sociologist who became the country's leading student of military life. Charles Moskos did his research in mess halls and barracks and troop transports, interviewing enlisted men where they lived. He helped design the "don't ask, don't tell" compromise of the Clinton years, a policy that made him famous and, in time, notorious. Whatever one concludes about that policy, the research style behind it had a signature: go where the institution lives, learn its internal codes, take the members' own account of their work as data worth having. Peter's mother, Ilca, taught foreign languages in high school. Politics and institutions were dinner-table subjects. Peter has joked that the apple did not fall far from the tree. His father studied the men society sends to do its violence abroad. He studies the men and women society sends to manage its violence at home.

The route ran through Princeton, where he graduated magna cum laude in sociology in 1994 and won the Isadore Brown Thesis Award, and then Harvard, where he entered the doctoral program in 1995. He also spent 1997 and 1998 doing participant observation with police in Amsterdam, studying a Dutch program that put officers on foot and bicycles, and he worked restaurant and bar jobs and helped found a boat club that ran informal canal tours. This last item reads like a resume joke until you see the pattern. Moskos learns institutions from inside their service entrances.

The timing of his graduate education mattered. When he arrived at Harvard, crime in New York City was collapsing, and the discipline he had joined could not explain it. The reigning theories held that crime grew from root causes, poverty, inequality, family structure, demography, and that police were a response to crime, never a cause of its rise or fall. But New York's poverty had not vanished. Its inequality had widened. Its schools had not been transformed. And its murders were falling by half and then by half again. Either something was wrong with the theory or something was happening inside the institutions the theory ignored.

Moskos went to find out. His original plan was modest: observe recruits in the Baltimore Police Department's academy and study how civilians become cops. The department approved, then bureaucratic complications threatened his access, and officials made a counteroffer that no dissertation committee could have designed. If he wanted to study recruits, he could become one. The department expedited his hiring and waived the two-year commitment. In 1999 he entered the academy and told his classmates what he was: a Harvard researcher who would also be, for as long as he wore the uniform, a real police officer.

The academy taught him mostly what academies teach, which in his account was chain of command, shoe shining, staying awake, and forms of address, with street policing left to the street. Some of his classmates stayed with him as people. He opens Cop in the Hood with Crystal Sheffield, who sat next to him and refused the petty feuds of fifty people cooped up in one room. "I love everybody here," she would say, and she meant it. She was later killed in the line of duty. He dedicated the book to her and to the nine other Baltimore officers killed since his tenure. The dedication does the work that a chapter of methodology could not. He had classmates, and some of them died doing the job he wrote about.

After six months of training he was assigned to the Eastern District, a district about 97 percent Black, poor, and saturated with open-air drug markets. There he made the observations that became his dissertation, completed in 2004 under the title "Police in the 'Hood: Drug Laws, Police Discretion, and Arresting African-Americans," and then Cop in the Hood: My Year Policing Baltimore's Eastern District (Princeton University Press, 2008), which won the PROSE Award for the year's best scholarly book in sociology.

Two findings organize the book, and neither flatters anyone's politics.

The first concerns money. Moskos found that one of the strongest predictors of whether an officer made discretionary arrests was how that officer felt about court. An arrest generates court dates. Court dates on the midnight shift mean showing up at 9 a.m. after working until 8:12, and they pay overtime. Officers who wanted the money went looking for arrests. Officers who wanted their days off avoided arrests that a warning could handle. The same block, the same law, the same department, and two officers producing opposite enforcement patterns because of a payroll rule. Reformers write policies about race and force. The officers were also responding to time-and-a-half.

The second concerns race, and it cuts in a direction that satisfies neither side of the standard argument. Moskos argues that drug enforcement produces racial disparity even when individual officers act without racial prejudice, because the law itself is aimed at conduct that is visible in poor Black neighborhoods and invisible in rich White ones. The Eastern District's drug trade ran on corners because its customers had no living rooms to sell from and its economy had little else. A suburban dealer works by phone behind a front door. Police arrest what they can see. The disparity is built into the design of prohibition, which means it survives every sensitivity training and every bias audit, because the officers were never the main source of it.

From this second finding came the position that separated Moskos from law-and-order politics for good: he wants drugs legalized. His argument owes nothing to claims that drugs are harmless. It runs through violence. Prohibition hands a large industry to people who cannot call the police when they are robbed or sue when a contract is broken, so they enforce their contracts with guns. Arrest a slinger and the corner replaces him by morning; the demand is still there and the profit is still there. Moskos distinguishes decriminalizing possession, which spares users but leaves the market in criminal hands, from legalizing supply, which attacks the economics that make the trade violent. For years he spoke for Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, an organization of police and former police who reached the same conclusion from the same vantage: they had fought the drug war and watched it lose.

He joined John Jay College in 2004, made full professor in 2018, and chaired his department from 2018 to 2021. Since 2017 he has run the NYPD Executive Master's Leadership Program, which puts him in a seminar room with captains and inspectors and chiefs, the people who will run the largest police department in the country. The arrangement gives him something almost no academic critic of policing has: continuous access to how commanders think, and continuous exposure to their view of him.

In 2011 he published the book that made him briefly famous and permanently misquotable. In Defense of Flogging (Basic Books) proposed that anyone sentenced to prison be offered a choice: serve the term, or take two lashes per year of the sentence and go home. Five years or ten lashes. Reviewers reached for their smelling salts, then read the book and found the trap. Moskos expected nearly everyone to choose the lash, and the choice was the argument. If a rational person prefers being whipped to serving the sentence, then the sentence is worse than a whipping, and a society that recoils from the whip while imposing the sentence has confused squeamishness with humanity. Prison destroys years, families, employment, and minds, and does it out of sight, on an administrative schedule, in language borrowed from accounting. The lash is honest about being violence. Critics answered that a choice between two state punishments is no choice, that flogging in America could never escape the imagery of slavery, and that governments given a new instrument of violence keep it. The criticisms land against the proposal and slide off the diagnosis. Mother Jones put the book on its list of favorites for 2011. The Atlantic named him one of its "Brave Thinkers." The flogging proposal remains the best sorting device in his bibliography: readers who finish it angry at Moskos have usually skipped the chapters on what prison does.

Between the police books came a family obligation. Greek Americans: Struggle and Success, originally his father's book, appeared in a third edition in 2013 with Peter as co-author, updated and extended with his own account of later-generation Greek-American life. He has lived for years in Astoria, Queens, the historic center of Greek New York. The book treats ethnic persistence the way he treats everything: identity survives through institutions, churches, families, and repeated practice, or it does not survive.

His position on street policing is easiest to see through what he rejects on each side. He defends the broken-windows idea in its original form: visible disorder makes public space unusable, and the people most harmed are those who cannot buy their way out of public space, the people on the bus, in the park, on the stoop. A man screaming threats on the subway is depriving every other rider of something real. But he calls New York's stop-and-frisk era of the 2000s a debacle, and his explanation of how it happened is organizational rather than moral. The department began counting stops as proof of work. Once a stop became a recorded unit of productivity, officers produced stops the way factories produce parts, hundreds of thousands a year, most of them yielding nothing, falling on young Black and Hispanic men, and teaching a generation that a police encounter is something done to you for a supervisor's spreadsheet. In his account, the tactic did not fail because order maintenance is wrong. It failed because a measurement system detached the activity from any problem it was meant to solve. This is the same finding as the court-overtime finding, scaled up from one officer's paycheck to a department of 35,000: police do what the incentives pay for, and the incentives are set by people who rarely think about what they are buying.

That analysis is the spine of Back from the Brink. The book asks how New York City went from 2,245 murders in 1990 to under 300 in recent years, and it answers through the people who were in the room, more than a hundred interviews with cops, chiefs, transit officials, and city hands. Its central figures are William Bratton (b. 1947) and Jack Maple (1952-2001), the dandyish transit lieutenant in a homburg and bow tie who sketched the future of American policing on a napkin at Elaine's: accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, relentless follow-up. Out of that came CompStat, the weekly meetings at One Police Plaza where precinct commanders stood at a podium in front of maps of their own crime and answered for it. The meetings were brutal. Careers ended at that podium. But the message underneath the brutality was new: the department now believed crime could be reduced, and reducing it was every commander's job. The old NYPD had treated crime as weather and a commander's job as answering calls and avoiding scandal. The new one treated crime as a problem with locations, patterns, and names.

Moskos argues that this internal transformation, along with a wider civic one, the reclaimed subway, the redesigned Bryant Park, the remade Times Square, drove a decline that came earlier and fell steeper in New York than demographics, the economy, lead, or abortion can explain, since those forces operated everywhere and the New York drop stood out anyway. He does not claim single causation; he claims the institution mattered, against a scholarly tradition that had defined it out of the equation. And he is unsentimental about what happened next: CompStat, built to solve problems, decayed into the numbers machine that produced mass stop-and-frisk, its own corruption. The Wall Street Journal called the book a delight. David Simon (b. 1960), whose portrait of Baltimore policing is considerably darker, praised it. So did Bratton, which tells you the book's risk: an oral history of a victory, told by the victors, needs a skeptical editor, and Moskos serves as both advocate and editor. He lets the cops talk at length, treats their operational knowledge as knowledge, and accepts that some of them are polishing their own monuments. He would rather run that risk than the opposite one, the literature in which policing is analyzed for decades without anyone asking a police officer how anything works.

The events of 2020 hardened his public role. When murders rose nearly 30 percent nationwide, the largest one-year increase on record, Moskos said the quiet part in plain sentences: if you delegitimize police, pull them back from proactive work, and prosecute less, more people get shot, and the people who get shot are not the people writing the op-eds. He assembled the Violence Reduction Project, an edited collection of short proposals from cops, academics, and street outreach workers, organized around one premise: cities cannot wait for poverty and inequality to be solved before addressing the shootings happening this year. The proposals run from focused deterrence and foot patrol to violence interrupters, domestic-violence risk screening, and cold-case squads, and they share two empirical commitments. Violence concentrates, in small networks and on particular blocks, so intervention can be focused instead of falling on whole communities. And unsolved shootings are their own engine of violence, because a neighborhood where murders go uncleared learns that cooperation is pointless and retaliation is the only justice on offer.

He keeps returning to one number. In April 2026 he noted that 96 percent of New York City's shooting victims were Black or Hispanic. The criminal-justice debate measures racial inequality in stops, arrests, and prison terms, and he accepts those measures. He insists on adding the other one. A policy that reduces police contacts while more residents of Brownsville get shot is not, on his arithmetic, racially progressive. Whether that arithmetic is right is the live argument between Moskos and his structuralist critics, who answer that his account underweights what generations of enforcement did to those same neighborhoods, and that legitimacy lost is itself a cause of violence. It is a real argument, and unlike most arguments in this field, both sides of it are counting bodies.

His support for policing has never extended to every agency with a badge. In March 2026 he co-wrote a criticism of ICE and Border Patrol operations in Minneapolis, arguing that aggressive federal enforcement under poor leadership was manufacturing street confrontations that competent police work avoids. He has been skeptical of deploying the National Guard as theater, soldiers without local knowledge, investigative capacity, or community ties standing in for the municipal institution that should be doing the work. And in June 2026 he wrote about Baltimore's steep recent drop in murders, a development with private weight for him. He once expected to write about a Baltimore crime decline that never came. When it finally came, a quarter century after his midnight shifts, he credited institutional work, not tide.

Across the books and the blog and the podcast, one target stays constant, and it is distance. The academic who has never sat in a patrol car theorizes the officer. The chief on the fourteenth floor forgets the sergeant's math. The reformer who is safe at home discounts the woman who calls 911 about the corner because the corner is outside her door. The public supports prison sentences whose contents it has arranged never to see. Every Moskos project is an attempt to close one of those gaps by going where the institution lives and asking the people inside how it works, then checking their answers against what he can see. His father did it with soldiers. He does it with cops.

The result fits no coalition, which is why every coalition can quote him and none will claim him. Abolitionists reject his premise that policing is indispensable. Structural sociologists find his managerialism thin on political economy. Police unions have no use for a man who calls the drug war lost, prisons a moral evasion, and stop-and-frisk a self-inflicted wound. Prison reformers admire the indictment and cannot forgive the lash. His claim survives the crossfire because it is small and testable. Good policing saves lives. Bad policing manufactures illegitimacy at public expense. Less policing is not reform and more enforcement is not safety. The work is telling the difference, and you cannot tell the difference from a distance.

The Curtain and the Lash: Peter Moskos Through Norbert Elias

In 1939 a Jewish refugee from Breslau published a two-volume work in Basel arguing that Europeans had, over five centuries, tamed their impulses, pacified their societies, and pushed violence to the margins of everyday life. The timing buried the book. Europe was mobilizing for the largest organized killing in its history, the author’s mother would die at Auschwitz, and a theory of advancing self-restraint looked like a bad joke told at the worst moment. Norbert Elias spent the next thirty years in academic obscurity, teaching in Leicester, unknown in his own field. Then the book was reissued in 1969, translated into English through the 1970s, and The Civilizing Process became one of the works that sociology now argues with rather than about. Elias lived long enough to watch the rehabilitation. He died in Amsterdam in 1990, in the city where Peter Moskos would ride along with Dutch police seven years later.

The theory runs like this. Medieval Europeans lived amid casual violence and did not much mind. Knights fought for pleasure and profit. Meals came to the table as whole animals, carved before the diners. Bodily functions occurred in company. People wept, raged, and struck one another with a freedom that later centuries would find animal. What changed was structure before it was psychology. As kings broke the warrior nobility and established what Max Weber (1864-1920) would later call the monopoly of legitimate force, social spaces became pacified. A noble who could no longer fight his way to standing had to please, calculate, and wait. Court society rewarded foresight and self-command. Manners books, beginning with Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536) and his 1530 tract on boys’ conduct, taught each generation to be disgusted by what the previous one had done at table. The constraints worked their way inward and downward, from external compulsion to habit, from court to bourgeoisie to everyone. Elias tracked the change through the humblest evidence in the history of sociology: instructions about spitting, nose-blowing, and the fork.

Two of his findings do the work here. First, the civilizing process does not abolish the distasteful. It relocates it. The whole carved animal gives way to boneless cuts prepared out of sight; the slaughterhouse moves outside town; sex, death, and punishment retreat into private rooms and specialized institutions. Elias called this the movement of segregation, the hiding of the distasteful “behind the scenes of social life.” Second, what advances is the threshold of repugnance. Each generation recoils at sights the last one tolerated. And because the recoil tracks visibility rather than quantity, a society can grow more squeamish while paying for as much violence as before, or more, so long as the violence is administered somewhere else, by someone else, behind something.

Read Elias, then read Moskos, and the flogging book stops looking like a provocation and starts looking like an experiment, a measurement of exactly the threshold Elias described.

Begin where the curtain closed. On August 14, 1936, some twenty thousand people gathered in Owensboro, Kentucky, to watch the hanging of Rainey Bethea, a Black man in his twenties convicted of rape and murder. Vendors worked the crowd. The national press covered it as a carnival and a disgrace. It was the last public execution in the United States. The gallows moved inside prison walls, then execution moved to midnight, then to the electric chair, then to a gurney and a catheter and a procedure deliberately staged to resemble medicine, witnessed by a handful of people behind glass. Each step was announced as humanity. Each step was also, in Elias’s terms, segregation: the state kept killing, and arranged for refined people not to see it. The penal historians who applied Elias to this record, Pieter Spierenburg (1948-2019) in The Spectacle of Suffering (1984) and John Pratt in Punishment and Civilization (2002), found the same sequence everywhere in the West. The scaffold disappears from the square. The prison acquires clean uniforms, scheduled meals, sanitation reports, a bureaucratic vocabulary. Punishment becomes something civilized societies do without watching.

In Defense of Flogging (2011) is a probe inserted into this history. Moskos offers the convict a choice: the prison term, or two lashes per year of the sentence. He predicts nearly everyone takes the lash, and the prediction is the point. If a rational person prefers the whip to the sentence, the sentence contains more suffering than the whip. Yet the public that shudders at flogging accepts the sentence without a flicker. On Elias’s account this is no paradox and no hypocrisy in the shallow sense. It is the civilizing process operating as designed. Flogging violates the threshold of repugnance because it is visible, bodily, and immediate, blood on a stage. Ten years in a cell violates nothing because its violence arrives as duration, dispersed across paperwork and time, administered behind walls the public has arranged never to look over. The revulsion at the lash measures concealment, and concealment has been mistaken for mercy.

Moskos wrote the book, so far as the record shows, without Elias. His footnotes run to penal history and policy. That independence raises the value of the convergence. A former patrol officer, reasoning from what prisons do to the people he arrested, arrived at the thesis a Breslau sociologist derived from etiquette manuals: modern squeamishness is a fact about the audience, and tells you nothing about the quantity of violence being purchased. Where Moskos goes past Elias is the arithmetic. Elias described the curtain. Moskos priced what happens behind it. The American incarceration rate, one in a thousand for the half century before 1975, multiplied several times over during the drug war, until the United States confined a share of its population without peer among democracies. The civilizing process, in its American penal form, produced this: a society too refined to watch a whipping, warehousing two million people. Pratt and James Whitman (b. 1957), from different directions, treat American punishment as the anomaly that strains the civilized-punishment narrative. Moskos’s contribution is blunter. The narrative and the anomaly are the same fact. Concealment is the condition that lets the quantity grow. A public that had to watch what a ten-year sentence does to a man might not impose so many of them. The lash proposal is an attempt to tear the curtain, and the fury it provoked is the sound of the curtain being gripped.

The frame carries past the flogging book, because Elias’s theory has a second half that maps onto the first half of Moskos’s career.

The civilizing process depends on the monopoly of force. Pacified conduct is downstream of pacified space; the courtier learns patience because the king’s peace makes patience survivable. Where the monopoly fails, Elias’s sequence runs backward. And Baltimore’s Eastern District, as Moskos patrolled it from 1999 to 2001, was a zone where the monopoly had failed in a particular, legally manufactured way. Prohibition criminalized a large industry without extinguishing it, which meant the state refused to regulate the trade and could not suppress it. The corner filled the vacancy with the institutions of the unpacified world. Disputes settled by force. Reputation defended by violence because reputation was the only enforceable asset. A gunman on retainer, the private protector reborn, playing the role the armed retainer played before kings disarmed him. Short horizons, because foresight is a rational strategy where tomorrow is secure and a sucker’s strategy where it is not. Elias’s medieval warrior, transposed to a row-house corner, hoodie for hauberk. Cop in the Hood documents a decivilized enclave inside a civilized society, and locates the cause in law rather than in the residents: the state drew a boundary around one commerce, withdrew contract and court from it, and then sent Moskos and his squad to police the predictable result.

This is where the two halves of the frame lock together. The same society that sequesters its punishment also sequesters its unpacified zones. The violence of the Eastern District was as invisible to comfortable America as the inside of a prison, and for the same structural reason: the civilizing process concentrates what it cannot abolish among people the refined do not see. Moskos keeps producing the number that states this concentration: 96 percent of New York City’s shooting victims, he noted in April 2026, were Black or Hispanic. Elias would recognize the figuration. Pacification was never distributed evenly. The king’s peace reached the court before the countryside, the capital before the border, and its modern descendant reaches Park Slope before Brownsville. The op-ed writer’s neighborhood is the finished product of the civilizing process; the corner is its unfinished edge; and the writer’s threshold of repugnance, calibrated in the finished zone, recoils from the police force that patrols the unfinished one.

That recoil had its historical moment, and Elias supplies the least moralized account of it available. In the summer of 2020, video of a police killing put state violence on every screen in the country. The reaction was the threshold of repugnance colliding with the monopoly of force, the two components of Elias’s theory turned against each other. The body camera and the phone camera reversed the direction the curtain had moved for five centuries. Violence that had been administered behind the scenes, in the places refined people do not go, at the hours they are asleep, arrived in their hands at breakfast. Their revulsion was Elias’s civilized sensibility working correctly. What followed tested the other half of the theory. Cities pulled police back from proactive work, prosecution thinned, and the monopoly of force went slack at its unfinished edges. Murders rose nearly 30 percent nationwide in a year, the largest recorded increase, concentrated where the monopoly had always been thinnest. Elias’s students call such episodes decivilizing spurts. Moskos called it in advance and in plain words: withdraw the police and more people get shot, and the people shot will be the residents of the unpacified zones, whose deaths occur behind the same scenery that hid the policing. The refined classes saw the violence of enforcement because cameras carried it to them. The violence of the enforcement vacuum stayed off camera, arriving instead as statistics, which cross no one’s threshold of repugnance.

Here the frame illuminates the strangest feature of Moskos’s public position, the one that costs him every coalition. He wants the violence of the state made visible, and he wants the state to keep a firm monopoly of violence. He supported body cameras early, on the argument that recording would expose the officer who lies and vindicate the officer falsely accused. He wrote a book defending the lash on the argument that punishment should be seen for what it is. He built an oral history, Back from the Brink (2025), on the argument that the reassertion of the state’s monopoly in 1990s New York, precinct by precinct, subway car by subway car, saved thousands of lives, most of them Black and Hispanic. Within Elias, these are one position. The civilizing process went wrong in exactly one place: it hid the violence instead of merely reducing it, and concealment allowed the hidden quantity to grow, in the prisons, and allowed the abandoned zones to fester, on the corners. Moskos’s program, across four books, is civilization with the curtain open. Keep the monopoly, because the monopoly is what pacified space is made of. Show the public everything the monopoly does, the cell and the stop and the shooting and the cleared corner, because a public that sees what it purchases will purchase less cruelty and more protection. He trusts visibility to discipline the state the way Elias’s court disciplined the courtier: through the watching eyes.

Elias gives grounds for doubt, and the doubt belongs in any honest use of the frame. His theory offers no case of a society that reopened the curtain and liked what it saw. The direction of the process, in his evidence, runs one way, toward segregation, and reversals arrive as breakdowns rather than reforms. Hans Peter Duerr (b. 1943) spent five volumes arguing the whole civilizing narrative is a myth Europeans tell about their own refinement. Cas Wouters (b. 1943), Elias’s most faithful student, documented informalization, the twentieth-century loosening of manners, but loosened manners are a long way from a public willing to watch its punishments. The 2020 test cuts against Moskos here. The public saw one category of state violence and demanded less of the monopoly, and the result was more violence, unseen. Visibility disciplined the state and undefended the corner in the same motion. Moskos would answer that the public saw selectively, the enforcement and never the vacuum, and that his whole output is an attempt to put the vacuum on stage too, the shot teenagers, the uncleared murders, the neighborhoods that call 911 and get a forty-minute wait. The answer is coherent. Whether any audience can be made to watch both stages at once, Elias’s five centuries of evidence leave open, and lean against.

One more Eliasian reading suggests itself, of the man rather than the work. Elias insisted that thresholds of shame are acquired, class-marked, and mistaken by their bearers for human nature. The academic profession has such thresholds. Its members do not carry guns, do not put hands on strangers, do not, as a rule, spend a year taking orders from sergeants. Moskos crossed that threshold in 1999 and has spent his career reporting from the other side of it, telling his own class that its distaste for the people who do the state’s coercion is a fact about its refinement and no guide to policy. His father crossed the same line into the mess halls of another coercive institution. Both men made careers of a single Eliasian act: going behind the scenes of social life, where their society keeps its violence, and writing down what the scenery conceals.

The civilizing process, Elias wrote near the end of the book that 1939 buried, is unfinished. He meant that self-restraint remained brittle and the monopoly of force incomplete, and the decade that followed proved him right on a scale he did not live to describe until The Germans (1989), his late study of his own country’s decivilization. Moskos works the same unfinished ground at street level. The corner where the monopoly never arrived. The prison where the segregation succeeded too well. The screen that broke the segregation for one category of violence and left the other in the dark. His answer, keep the peace and open the curtain, asks his society to do something Elias never observed one doing. That is the measure of the program’s ambition, and of its odds.

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Julius Krein

On the night of Tuesday, February 21, 2017, one month after Donald Trump (b. 1946) took the oath of office, a crowd gathered at the Harvard Club of New York on West 44th Street for the launch of a new quarterly journal. The setting announced its own argument: dark paneling, crimson banners, the mounted trophies of a vanished Brahmin confidence. The guest list ran against type. Sam Tanenhaus, former editor of the New York Times Book Review, walked in ahead of a contributor to The American Conservative. William Kristol (b. 1952), founder of The Weekly Standard and by then the most visible anti-Trump conservative in America, stood to one side. Republican mega-donors Rebekah Mercer and Roger Hertog circulated. So did Mark Lilla (b. 1956) and Michael Lind (b. 1962), heterodox men of the center-left. The panel that evening paired Peter Thiel (b. 1967), the Silicon Valley investor who had spoken for Trump at the Republican convention, with Anne-Marie Slaughter (b. 1958), the former State Department official who ran the New America Foundation.

The host was thirty years old. Julius Krein (b. 1986) had spent the previous decade as an investment analyst at firms including Bank of America and Blackstone, and the previous year as the anonymous co-author of a blog that tried to construct a political theory for a candidate who had none. Politico had called him a whiz kid a few weeks earlier. He worked the room for an hour before taking the stage to introduce his journal, American Affairs, which proposed to treat the Trump insurgency as a serious event in American political thought. Kristol, his old mentor, could not endorse the project, but he came anyway and offered a blessing in the form of a joke: “The world needs more money-losing magazines.”

The distance between that room and Krein's origins measures the American class system he would spend the next decade analyzing. He grew up in Eureka, South Dakota, a farm town of under a thousand people in the north-central part of the state, the son of Gary and Nancy Krein. He graduated from Eureka High School in 2004. The local paper, the Aberdeen American News, covered his magazine launch in January 2017 as hometown news: Eureka native catches national attention. His childhood church was a congregation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America that remained conservative in doctrine and liturgy, less from conviction than from distance; the changes remaking mainline Protestantism arrived in rural South Dakota slowly. He has recalled Christianity there as an ordinary fact of communal life, embedded in habit, music, and mutual expectation, with no need to advertise as an oppositional identity. That memory later informed his suspicion of movements that try to rebuild community through political messaging.

He has also described a pattern that runs through his career: he was relatively liberal in conservative South Dakota and became more conservative at liberal Harvard. He notices the unexamined assumptions of whatever room he is in.

At Harvard College, from 2004 to 2008, Krein studied political philosophy with Harvey Mansfield (b. 1932), the scholar of Machiavelli and Tocqueville who trained generations of students in the Straussian tradition. Through Mansfield he entered the orbit of Kristol, another former Mansfield student. The education gave Krein a vocabulary of regimes, statesmanship, and civic purpose. It also gave him a contradiction to chew on. The conservative movement around him praised great statesmen while opposing the state through which statesmen act. It invoked national greatness while endorsing policies that dismantled national production. It defended tradition while celebrating the market forces that dissolved traditional life. Krein kept the Straussian interest in leadership and discarded the movement's economics. In a 2024 essay, “Statesmanship and Political Philosophy,” he argued that the American right wants Churchills without a government worth commanding, while the left, which built the administrative state, prefers experts and procedures to the language of rule. His alternative rejects both libertarian minimalism and neutral technocracy: leaders who can name national purposes, and institutions able to carry them out.

After graduation he went into finance. This period shaped his political economy more than any book. He learned from the inside how institutional investors evaluate companies, how stock-based compensation steers executive decisions, and how a chain of individually rational choices produces national outcomes nobody intends. During the 2016 campaign he worked at a Boston-area hedge fund. By then he had concluded that the United States suffered a capital-allocation crisis. The American financial system excelled at raising asset prices, distributing cash, and enriching intermediaries. It failed at financing capital-intensive manufacturing, infrastructure, and industrial projects with long horizons and uncertain returns. The failure was structural. Fund managers answer to quarterly benchmarks. Pension allocators face career ruin for unconventional bets that underperform. Activist investors profit by pressuring firms to shed assets, cut employment, and return cash through buybacks. Each actor behaves sensibly within his mandate. The sum is declining investment, lost productive capacity, and dependence on foreign supply chains.

The 2016 campaign gave this analysis a political vehicle, though an unlikely one. Early that year Krein helped create the anonymous Journal of American Greatness, writing under the pseudonym Plautus. Another contributor, writing as Publius Decius Mus, was later revealed as Michael Anton (b. 1969), who would serve on Trump's National Security Council. The blog began as something between an intellectual exercise and an inside joke. Trump was erratic, unsystematic, and often offensive. He also attacked positions that both parties' establishments held sacred: free-trade agreements, democracy-promotion wars, mass immigration, the treatment of China as a partner rather than a rival. The blog's writers asked whether these heresies could cohere into a program, and whether Trump's support revealed an elite that had detached from the nation and forgotten that political membership entails mutual obligation. They supplied theory to a candidate indifferent to theory. The audience grew beyond anything they expected. Because several contributors worked in professions where association with Trump could end careers, the site went dark before the election, its authors explaining that a joke had outgrown its containment. Krein drew a different lesson from the traffic numbers. A readership existed for a serious journal on the questions Trump had forced open.

Trump won. Krein left finance. The first issue of American Affairs appeared in February 2017, and the Harvard Club filled with donors, apostates, and the curious. Krein told a reporter that evening that he and his collaborators had wanted to preserve the serious elements of the critique Trump raised, and then, to their surprise, the man won. The remark contained the whole future arc of his career: loyalty to the critique, detachment from the critic.

His own essay in that first issue, “James Burnham's Managerial Elite,” set the theoretical foundation. James Burnham (1905-1987) had argued in the 1940s that classical capitalism was giving way to a managerial society ruled by executives, administrators, and technicians. Krein updated the thesis for the neoliberal era. Conservative rhetoric still described a war between private markets and government bureaucracy. Power had migrated elsewhere, into a network of corporations, financial institutions, agencies, universities, foundations, and nonprofits whose managers circulate among them and share the same schooling and assumptions. Privatization does not shrink this class; it often shifts authority to contractors and consultants even less accountable to voters. The real questions are who controls an institution, what incentives govern it, and whether it owes anything to a political community. Unlike much of the populist right, Krein drew no fantasy of abolition from this analysis. Modern societies require engineers, administrators, and large organizations. The task is to bind managerial power to public purposes. His answer was a more capable state, and he has never wavered from it.

The association with Trump ended in August 2017. After the president's response to the white-nationalist rally and killing in Charlottesville, Krein published an op-ed in the New York Times under the headline “I Voted for Trump. And I Sorely Regret It.” He called the administration disgraceful and urged those who had supported Trump, as he had, to stop defending him. On NPR days later, he explained the reversal without excusing his earlier self. He and others had rationalized the campaign's inflammatory rhetoric as media provocation, a sideshow to the real concerns of trade, China, and industrial decline. Charlottesville convinced him the distinction could not hold. The repudiation cost him with the movement he had helped theorize and bought him nothing with the establishment he continued to attack. It also produced the distinction that has organized his work since: Trump as historically necessary destroyer of a dead consensus, and Trump as builder of nothing. The first campaign broke taboos. The first administration could not staff a government, coordinate a policy, or construct an institution.

Freed from the politician, the critique deepened. Krein's 2018 essay “The Three Fusions” described the post-Cold War order as a set of unstable syntheses. The first fused global integration with national interest: the claim, which he called synthetic globalism, that open trade, free capital flows, and reduced national autonomy automatically serve every country, so that no conflict between universal aspiration and particular community need ever be faced. The second was the conservative fusion of market individualism with cultural traditionalism. Postwar conservatives assumed economic freedom would strengthen families, churches, and towns. Krein argued the record shows the reverse: labor mobility, consumerism, consolidation, and financialization dissolved the institutions social conservatives claimed to defend. A movement cannot fund the demolition of communities through economic policy and then demand social continuity through rhetoric. Obligations require material foundations. The third fusion joined progressive social liberation to economic egalitarianism. Progressive energy had drained from economic organization into professional activism, nonprofits, and identity-based moral campaigns, allowing the professional class to present its cultural preferences as everyone's liberation. Krein did not deny that discrimination exists. His point was symmetry: the interests of progressive professionals hide beneath universal moral language just as the interests of capital owners hide beneath the language of free markets.

His most discussed essay, “The Real Class War,” appeared in 2019 and complicated the standard populist picture of a unified elite facing a unified working class. The conflict with the most political consequence, he argued, was opening at the top: between owners of substantial capital, whose wealth tracks asset values and who benefit from loose money, financial globalization, and monopoly rents, and the professional-managerial upper-middle class, whose position depends on salaries, credentials, and access to expensive metropolitan regions. The working class had suffered the deepest losses but held the least organized power. Unions had collapsed, machines and churches and civic associations had thinned, and economic policy had passed to central banks, courts, and expert agencies. Workers could disrupt elections; they could elect Trump or vote Brexit; they could not convert grievance into a governing program. The professional class remained institutionally strong and increasingly anxious, squeezed by housing, tuition, credential inflation, and the widening gap between salaried comfort and asset-owning wealth. This framework explained why movements speaking for workers were led by graduates of expensive universities. Support for Bernie Sanders (b. 1941), Elizabeth Warren (b. 1949), and debt cancellation expressed real concern for the poor and also the fear of a professional class facing downward mobility. Culture mattered in this account, but as one force among interests, institutions, and geography, never as the sole explanation.

The financial critique grew more concrete in “Share Buybacks and the Contradictions of 'Shareholder Capitalism'” and, in 2021, “The Value of Nothing: Capital versus Growth.” The argument's core: America built a value-extraction economy that rewards firms for converting productive assets into liquid returns. Profits rose; investment did not rise with them. Defenders of buybacks answered that shareholders redeploy returned capital to better uses. Krein, who had sat inside the machine, described how the machine works instead. The activist who forces a buyback at one firm does not finance a manufacturing startup with the proceeds; his mandate forbids it. The pension manager rewarded for hugging benchmarks makes no bets on unfamiliar industrial processes. Passive index funds, now the largest shareholders in American companies, perform none of the capital reallocation that supposedly justifies shareholder control. Executives therefore answer to an ecosystem that prizes predictable margins, asset-light models, and liquid returns, and punishes large expenditures with distant payoffs. The rational response is to close plants, outsource, cut research, and buy back stock. He never claimed financialization alone caused deindustrialization; trade rules, tax policy, exchange rates, and foreign industrial strategies all contributed. His claim was narrower and sharper: the hollowing was not economic law. Policy and financial incentives favored liquid claims over physical production, and different policy might favor otherwise. From this followed his heresy against both libertarians and socialists. Private ownership is not the disease, and existing shareholders do not perform the entrepreneurial function assigned to them in theory. The survival of capitalism might require government to redirect capital toward production.

The intellectual lineage here runs to Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), Friedrich List (1789-1846), and the American School of economic nationalism, though Krein rarely presents his work as revival and the connection is better understood as inheritance than discipleship. Hamilton and List distinguished a nation's productive powers from the goods it can buy at a given moment. Cheap imports raise consumption today while eroding the capabilities on which wealth, military strength, and independence depend tomorrow. Krein applies the insight to semiconductors, machine tools, ships, and pharmaceuticals. A country can hold valuable financial claims while losing the ability to make the physical basis of its own economy, and such a country is not fully sovereign whatever its constitution says. His economic nationalism demands no autarky. It demands that trade policy be judged by its effect on industrial ecosystems, workforce skills, and resilience, and not by consumer prices alone. Readers have also heard Christopher Lasch (1932-1994) in his portraits of elites who mistake mobility for merit, though Lasch is a parallel voice; Krein's documented debts run through Burnham, Mansfield, finance, and development economics.

Under his editorship, American Affairs became one of the few American publications where nationalist conservatives, social democrats, Marxists, heterodox economists, and post-liberal philosophers shared a table of contents. The unity was never agreement. Contributors fought over unions, immigration, welfare, and God. They shared exhaustion with neoliberalism and a preference for institutional analysis over slogan. The journal ran conservative cases for industrial policy beside left-wing attacks on identity politics and financialization. Its style cut against its origin: born of populist revolt, it spoke in supply-chain logistics, procurement rules, and development finance, essay after essay of technical density. Krein never believed anger could govern. He wanted to connect democratic discontent to a class of people who know how institutions work. By the mid-2020s the press described American Affairs as a heterodox policy journal rather than an organ of Trumpism, and a 2025 Bloomberg profile presented it as the meeting ground where left and right converge on one question: what replaces neoliberalism? Its readership stayed small and placed: academics, congressional staff, financiers, technologists, the people who draft what politicians announce.

China anchors the argument's urgency. Krein reads China as more than a military rival or trade cheat; it is a rival model of political economy that treats factories, infrastructure, and supply chains as instruments of national power. The American establishment assumed the country could ship production abroad and keep the valuable work of design, finance, and branding. Krein argues the separation fails because production generates knowledge. Factories create engineering expertise, supplier networks, and the feedback between design and manufacturing from which the next innovation comes. When production leaves, the capacity to innovate follows it out the door. His 2022 essay “Where the Chips Fell” applied this to the CHIPS Act, which he treated as a real break with orthodoxy, the first admission in decades that semiconductor manufacturing is a legitimate object of national policy, and also as a cautionary case: a legislative process that favored incumbents and shrank the ambitions of earlier proposals. Support the imperfect departure; audit its capture. The pattern became his signature.

Toward the parties he has stayed programmatic and unsentimental. Republicans won the voters industrial decline created while keeping Reagan-era commitments to tax cuts, deregulation, and hostility to public investment, and much of the party's new generation substituted televised culture war for economic policy. Krein has described a large share of them as amateurish culture warriors, right about the unpopularity of progressive institutions and unequipped to run a government. Democrats hold the administrators and passed the industrial-policy legislation of the Biden years, and remain fused to professional-class moralism and institutions working-class voters distrust. In “The Other Realignment” he weighed whether the Democratic establishment might pair industrial strategy with retreat from its least popular cultural positions, and judged it possible and unlikely. He backs industrial policy from either party and criticizes its capture by either party's clients.

His religious life traced a quieter version of the same commitments. On the East Coast he found his way to Anglo-Catholic Episcopal parishes in New York and Boston, where the liturgy and music echoed the Lutheran worship of his childhood more than he expected. He concluded that communal observance and inherited practice carry more weight than he had understood, and the conclusion matches his politics point for point. Communities do not survive on stated beliefs. Institutions train desire, keep memory, and give people something to do together on a schedule. He has criticized the reduction of Christianity to a partisan identity on the same grounds: a religion that becomes a list of culture-war positions loses the practices that gave it authority. His interest in the old mainline is partly historical. Those churches once limited economic and political competition and taught elites to imagine obligations beyond advancement. Their collapse accompanied atomization. None of this made his journal religious; its subject stayed political economy. It explains why he rejects both radical individualism and bare coercion. Order lasts when institutions connect ambition to purposes outside the self.

The career's third act began on December 11, 2024, in Washington, with the launch of the New American Industrial Alliance, a multi-sector trade association for the reindustrialization movement. The founding group joined Krein with Austin Bishop, a Cleveland-born investor at Tamarack Global who spoke at the launch of watching the disinheritance of the heartland firsthand, and two manufacturing-startup CEOs, Chris Power of Hadrian and Aaron Slodov of Atomic Industries. The membership rolls tell the coalition's story better than any manifesto: Palantir, Anduril, Boeing, Siemens, Google, Meta, Y Combinator, a16z, General Catalyst, Oklo, dozens of defense and manufacturing startups, and regional development agencies, arranged under an advisory board spanning aerospace, AI, energy, critical minerals, industrial finance, and supply chains. Titles shifted in the early months; podcasts introduced Krein as chairman, a September 2025 Inc. profile called him president and head of policy, and the organization's current leadership page lists him as chief executive officer and head of policy, with Bishop as chairman. At the movement's Reindustrialize conferences, the culture is closer to a tent revival for machinists and venture capitalists than to a K Street reception, and NAIA advertises the difference, promising the force of a trade association without the graft and timidity of the consultant class. Oren Cass (b. 1983) of American Compass, working the same territory from a different angle, has praised the group as a force multiplier for everyone working on reindustrialization.

The role changes what Krein's ideas must survive. An editor identifies contradictions. A trade-association executive negotiates among firms whose interests diverge: incumbents who want subsidies and no competitors, financiers who want public risk absorption without public conditions, agencies without technical staff, procurement systems built to prevent scandal rather than produce weapons on time. His recent writing meets these problems at ground level. By 2025 he was advocating an American sovereign investment fund, a permanent institution able to provide equity, loans, and guarantees to strategic industries that private markets underserve: projects with enormous initial costs, long development periods, and returns below venture thresholds. Grants and tax credits help individual projects; they build no lasting expertise in structuring deals, monitoring investments, and reinvesting returns. A congressionally chartered fund with a portfolio approach could absorb failures, mobilize private capital beyond its appropriations, and escape annual spending fights. He noted the anomaly that America runs development-finance institutions for projects abroad while lacking a permanent development bank at home. When Trump's February 2025 executive order directed planning for a United States sovereign wealth fund, Krein supported the direction while insisting that design would decide whether the result became a development bank, a patronage vehicle, or one more subsidy channel for established firms. His September 2025 essay “Forging a Stronger Defense Industrial Base” ran the same analysis through procurement. The country struggles to produce artillery shells, ships, and drones at scale because military production rests on commercial shipyards, electronics suppliers, machine tools, and skilled labor that no longer exist in depth. New defense firms die in the gap between prototype and production contract. He backed the FoRGED and SPEED acquisition reforms and warned that procedure cannot substitute for capacity. A military cannot buy what the civilian economy has forgotten how to make.

His response to the second Trump administration has held the line drawn in 2017. In “The Lessons of Liberation Day,” published in April 2025 after the tariff announcements, he credited the administration for confronting the trade imbalance and refusing to govern by the stock ticker, and wrote that the rollout suffered from serious miscalculations. Tariffs can protect strategic sectors and create negotiating leverage; they can also raise costs, wreck manufacturers dependent on imported components, and punish industries before domestic alternatives exist. Success requires sequencing: identify sectors, consult producers, arrange financing, develop suppliers, and connect protection to procurement and investment. A tariff announced as theater commands attention and builds nothing. This is his mature relation to Trumpism in one essay. He accepts the indictment of neoliberal trade policy. He rejects loyalty to a man and improvisation as a method. Trump made forbidden questions unavoidable; answering them requires institutions Trumpism has rarely managed to build.

As a writer, Krein works at the intersection of political philosophy, financial analysis, and institutional detail, and he is most persuasive when showing how incentives inside an organization defeat its stated purpose. He spends little energy on whether individuals are good. He asks why a system keeps rewarding unproductive behavior, and his gallery of rational offenders includes fund managers hugging benchmarks, executives maximizing option value, bureaucrats avoiding risk, and politicians who prefer symbolic combat to administration. The prose can be caustic, especially toward free-market commentators who have never run a business and populists who mistake engagement metrics for power. The underlying disposition is constructive. He wants institutions that can act, which separates him from a dissident right skilled at denunciation and uninterested in operating a state, and from a left that wants intervention without confronting the weakness of the government that would intervene. Nationalist without being simply populist, statist without being socialist, pro-business and hostile to financialized governance: the combination fits no party and has influenced both.

He has published no book. The influence runs through essays, editing, convening, and now institution building, and it can be measured by what became sayable. When American Affairs launched, mainstream economists and Republican institutions filed industrial policy under protectionist error. A decade later, tariffs, semiconductor subsidies, development finance, domestic-content rules, and procurement reform sit at the center of national debate, advanced in different forms by both parties. Krein did not cause the shift alone; the financial crisis, the pandemic, supply-chain failures, the war in Ukraine, and China's trajectory forced the reconsideration. His journal built the intellectual infrastructure in which those shocks could be interpreted before the political class accepted their implications, and his career shows the stages by which an insurgency matures: a pseudonymous blog identifies the rupture, a journal turns rupture into argument, a trade association turns argument into constituency.

The hard stage is the current one. Declaring neoliberalism dead proved easier than building its successor. Industrial policy can be captured by incumbents. Public investment can become patronage. Protection can preserve firms that deserve to fail. Agencies can lack the knowledge to discipline the companies they fund. Krein has catalogued every one of these dangers in print, which sets the standard by which his own organization will be judged. If NAIA becomes an effective coalition of builders, investors, workers, and officials, he will have helped move economic nationalism from argument into governance. If it becomes another Washington group seeking subsidies for its members, it will reenact the interest-group behavior his essays spent a decade dissecting. His achievement so far is to have made productive power a serious subject of American political thought again: the argument that a nation's prosperity cannot be read off consumption, valuations, or import prices, and depends on what it can build, whether it can act in common, and whether its institutions can serve a future longer than the next quarter.

Notes

NAIA leadership page, modified July 14, 2026, lists Krein as Chief Executive Officer and Head of Policy, Bishop as Chairman and Co-Founder, Slodov and Power as Co-Founders. Member logos include Palantir, Anduril, Boeing, Siemens, Google, Meta, Y Combinator, a16z, General Catalyst, Oklo, Hadrian, Atomic Industries, JobsOhio.

Harvard Club launch scene: Kelefa Sanneh, “A New Trumpist Magazine Débuts at the Harvard Club,” The New Yorker, February 24, 2017, source of the Kristol quote and Krein’s “preserve the critique… and then he won” remark, which I paraphrased to stay within one quote per source. Attendee list, Tanenhaus, Mercer, Hertog, Lilla, Lind, Starobin, from “New Thinking on the Right,” The American Conservative.

“Whiz kid”: Eliana Johnson, “Meet the Whiz Kid Who Wants to Explain Trumpism,” Politico, January 3, 2017.

Eureka upbringing, parents Gary and Nancy, one sister, Eureka High 2004, Harvard 2008, Mansfield, Bank of America/Blackstone, Boston hedge fund during 2016, JAG as Plautus: Wikipedia and the Hidden Forces podcast bio. The Aberdeen American News hometown story is real: “Eureka native catching attention with conservative magazine in age of Trump,” January 28, 2017.

Charlottesville break: Julius Krein, “I Voted for Trump. And I Sorely Regret It,” New York Times, August 17, 2017; NPR interview with Ailsa Chang, August 21, 2017.

NAIA launch December 11, 2024, Bishop’s Cleveland quote, “graft and timidity of the consultant class”: PR Newswire release. Forbes launch coverage, Steinman, founding lineup.

Inc. profile calling Krein “president and head of policy,” September 2025, and the Oren Cass praise. I handled the title shift as a shift, since the record shows chairman, January 2025 podcasts, president, Inc., then CEO, current site.

“Suffered from serious miscalculations” on tariffs is Krein’s own published phrase from “The Lessons of Liberation Day,” quoted in the Inc. piece.

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Ryan Burge: The Numbers Man in the Empty Church

On the morning of July 21, 2024, about three dozen people gathered in the sanctuary of First Baptist Church in Mount Vernon, Illinois, a town of 14,000 an hour east of St. Louis. The building had been raised for a congregation of hundreds. In the 1960s the church counted more than 600 members. By the late 1990s it had about 170. When the pastor now standing at the pulpit arrived in 2006, a graduate student in his early twenties, it had about 50. On this Sunday, the last Sunday, membership stood below 20, and the extra faces in the pews belonged to former members, family, and a reporter from Religion News Service.

The pastor read from Ecclesiastes. “There is a time for everything.” A time for birth and a time for death. A time to build up and a time to tear down. He told the congregation that after 156 years as a fixture of Mount Vernon, First Baptist would soon cease to exist, and that its ending would change their lives in ways large and small. A few minutes after the benediction, the members held a brief congregational meeting and voted to close as of August 1. Then they ate cake in the fellowship hall. The building passed to a classical Christian school.

The man who delivered that benediction was Ryan P. Burge (b. 1982), and by the time his church died he had become the most visible interpreter of American religious data alive. He had written for the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. 60 Minutes had called him one of the country's leading data analysts on religion and politics. His charts on the decline of American Christianity circulated among pastors, journalists, atheist bloggers, and denominational executives. For nearly two decades he had led a double life: by week a political scientist documenting the collapse of institutional religion in national survey data, by Sunday a part-time pastor watching the same collapse from inside a building he could no longer afford to heat for the people who no longer came. The lines on his graphs ran through his own sanctuary.

Burge grew up in a Southern Baptist congregation in Salem, a small town in southern Illinois, during the 1980s and 1990s. Church structured his week. He was there several evenings out of seven, and he has described the evangelical world of his childhood as a cocoon, a closed and protective society that supplied answers about salvation, conduct, entertainment, dress, and friendship before a child thought to ask the questions.

When he was about fourteen, the cocoon gave him his first lesson in politics. The pastor of First Baptist Church of Salem had drifted toward Calvinism, and the shift caught the congregation off guard. Members who had never read Calvin found themselves conscripted into a war over predestination. The dispute came to a head at a congregational meeting where the members voted on whether to freeze the pastor's salary. The measure passed 49 to 48. A man's livelihood and a church's direction turned on one ballot. Burge later recalled his reaction: “It was like, holy cow — democracy in action.” A political scientist could ask for no better origin story, and Burge tells it as his.

He was a believer with a skeptic's temperament. He belonged to the church with his time and his friendships, yet he waited until fifteen to be baptized, and the confident declarations around him about Christianity's exclusive truth left him wondering how anyone could be so certain. That combination, attachment plus doubt, forecast the adult. He no longer calls himself an evangelical. He prefers “evangelical sympathetic,” a label that keeps his affection for the seriousness and community of the world that raised him while declining membership in its political project. He is neither an exvangelical settling scores with his childhood nor a defender of the tribe. He stands at the door, holding it open, taking notes.

Burge attended Greenville College, a small Christian school in the Free Methodist tradition, and graduated in 2004 with a degree in history and political science. Greenville widened the map. Southern Baptist Salem had presented Christianity as a settled matter; Greenville presented it as a family of traditions that disagreed about almost everything, and Burge found the disagreement congenial. He went on to Southern Illinois University Carbondale for graduate work in political science, finishing a master's thesis on religiosity and anxiety in 2007 and a doctoral dissertation on religion and political behavior in 2011 under J. Tobin Grant.

His ministerial career began as a summer job. After his sophomore year at Greenville he took what was supposed to be a three-month youth ministry internship at First Baptist Church in Centralia, Illinois, a congregation of the American Baptist Churches USA, the moderate northern cousin of the Southern Baptist Convention. The three months became three years. In 2006, still a graduate student, he accepted the pulpit of First Baptist Church of Mount Vernon. He was twenty-three or twenty-four. He explained the trajectory the way a man explains a mortgage he did not plan to take on: people kept asking, and he was bad at saying no. He stayed for seventeen and a half years and served in American Baptist ministry for more than twenty.

The arrangement made him a bivocational pastor, a category that covers a growing share of American clergy and appears in almost no journalism about religion. He preached on Sunday and graded papers on Monday. The church could pay only a part-time salary. Burge learned the material culture of small-church survival: the boiler, the roof, the budget meeting, the shrinking pool of people willing to serve as trustee, the funeral lunches prepared by women in their eighties for the funerals of women in their nineties.

The congregation repaid him in kind. When Eastern Illinois University laid him off during budget cuts in 2016, the church paid his family's health insurance. The university later rehired him. He told this story in his last sermon as evidence for a claim that reversed the usual pastoral flattery: his friend had said First Baptist was lucky to have him, and his friend was wrong, because he and his family had received more than they gave.

The church was politically mixed and politically quiet. Burge has said he often did not know how his members voted. They disagreed about God and government and still served on committees together, visited the same hospital rooms, and buried one another. That fact sat in his memory for years before he understood it as data.

Burge joined Eastern Illinois University in 2012 and spent thirteen years there, rising to associate professor of political science and graduate coordinator. Eastern Illinois is a regional public university in Charleston, Illinois, with a heavy teaching load and no national profile. Burge built his career from that position, outside the elite research circuit, publishing more than thirty peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on the measurement of evangelical identity, political tolerance, survey response categories, and voting. His signature methodological concern was already visible in that work: small decisions about how a survey asks its questions can move the answers, and the categories that researchers treat as natural, Protestant, evangelical, none, are instruments with histories and defects.

The public career began with charts. Burge discovered that a graph posted to social media could do in an afternoon what a journal article could not do in two years: reach the pastors, journalists, and lay readers who wanted to know what was happening to American religion. His newsletter, Graphs About Religion, grew into the center of his output. By mid-2026 it had more than 33,000 free subscribers and drew millions of views a year. He publishes twice a week. The format rarely varies. He takes a popular claim, a revival among Gen Z, the death of the Black church, the flight of women from the pews, finds the relevant dataset, explains what the categories can and cannot show, and lets the lines on the graph do the arguing.

He credits the pulpit for the style. Seventeen years of sermon writing taught him to structure a large body of material for people who had not spent the week studying it, to introduce evidence in an order a tired listener could follow, and to land somewhere. He has called the public work mental scaffolding: a frame that lets people understand why their churches, children, and towns are changing.

Two datasets anchor the work. The General Social Survey supplies the long view, a consistent record of American belief and belonging back to the early 1970s, with a typical sample around 2,500. The Cooperative Election Study supplies the wide view: more than 60,000 respondents in election years, above 15,000 in off years. The size solves a problem that defeats ordinary polling. A national survey of 1,500 people catches a handful of Muslims, Orthodox Christians, or Jehovah's Witnesses, too few for analysis. A sample of 60,000 lets Burge cut small religious populations by age, race, education, and party and still have statistical footing. It cannot solve every problem. The CES runs through an online panel, leans on weighting, and depends on what people say about themselves. Its gift is power, and power is what the study of American religious minorities had lacked.

Burge's national reputation rests on his analysis of the religiously unaffiliated, the “nones,” the survey respondents who answer atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular. His first book, The Nones: Where They Came From, Who They Are, and Where They Are Going (2021), organized the argument that runs through everything he has written since: the nones are not one thing.

The division he draws is simple and has consequences. Atheists and agnostics carry explicit secular identities. They are more educated, more liberal, and more politically engaged than the general population. In Burge's reading of the 2022 CES, 51 percent of atheists held a bachelor's degree. The “nothing in particular” population, which outnumbers atheists and agnostics combined by roughly three to two, looks nothing like them. About 23 percent held a degree. Large majorities reported no conventional political participation, no volunteering, no meetings, no yard signs. If five nones sit in a room, one is an atheist, one is an agnostic, and three are nothing in particular, and the three are the story.

This finding embarrasses two narratives at once. Conservative Christians describe the nones as an army of militant atheists manufactured by hostile universities. Secular activists count them as a progressive bloc waiting for mobilization. Burge's data show a population split between a small, organized, ideological wing and a much larger mass whose defining trait is detachment, from church and from nearly every other institution. He calls many of them dropouts. They did not trade Christianity for humanism. They stopped showing up, to everything.

His account of how people become nones follows the same anti-dramatic logic. Few disaffiliations begin with an argument about God. A person moves for work, misses a month of Sundays, loses touch with church friends, and one year gives a different answer to a survey taker. Belief, behavior, and belonging move at different speeds, which explains a fact that puzzles both sides: many nones pray, and many believe in God. They have not left the faith. They have left the building.

The second Burge argument, and the one with the sharpest political edge, holds that the causal arrow between religion and politics runs both ways. Religion shapes votes. Votes also shape religion. In a widely discussed analysis, he showed that survey respondents who newly adopted the evangelical label between 2016 and 2020 held warmer views of Donald Trump (b. 1946) than those who did not, and that some self-identified evangelicals rarely attended church. “Evangelical” was drifting from a theological description toward a partisan one, a word that increasingly meant Republican with a religious inflection.

The sorting runs in the opposite direction too. Liberals shed the evangelical label because of its politics, and some eventually shed the Christian label with it. The result is a landscape that polarizes even when nobody changes what he believes, because the labels migrate while the beliefs sit still.

Burge extended this argument to the young in work that ran the week of this writing. In July 2026, he reported findings from a Billy Graham Center Research Institute survey of 2,365 Gen Z adults, led by Rick Richardson at Wheaton College: 48 percent agreed that Christian support for Trump had made them less likely to attend church, with the effect concentrated among Democrats. The number describes perception, and perception is the point. For a large share of young Americans, the church has acquired a party registration, and they respond to it as they respond to the party.

He has spent equal energy deflating the counter-narrative. Beginning in 2024 and 2025, viral conversions, crowded campus worship nights, and rising interest among young men fed claims of a Gen Z revival. Burge went to the data and found a generation still exceptional in its distance from organized religion. Then the data moved, and he moved with it. The 2025 CES put the nones at 31.8 percent, down from 36.2 percent in 2022, a statistically significant drop confirmed in direction by the General Social Survey. Burge called the finding what it was, a reversal he had not predicted, and drew the line he has held since: stabilization is real, and stabilization is not revival. Fewer people call themselves nonreligious. That is a fact about labels. Whether they sit in pews, accept doctrines, or rebuild institutions remains unproven. He has flagged one development as potentially large: among some younger cohorts, men now report attending church at rates equal to or above women, a reversal of a pattern that held for as long as anyone has measured.

Burge writes books the way he writes the newsletter, as organized attacks on comfortable stories. 20 Myths about Religion and Politics in America (2022) takes twenty intuitive claims, evangelicals are devout, Catholics vote as a bloc, nones are atheists, and tests each against national data. The Great Dechurching (2023), written with Jim Davis and Michael Graham on original surveys Burge designed with the political scientist Paul Djupe, examined the roughly 40 million Americans who once attended church and stopped, and found that most left through drift rather than injury, which meant the churches trying to win them back with apologetics were answering a question the dechurched had not asked. The American Religious Landscape (Oxford University Press, 2025) is his atlas, twelve religious traditions cut by race, age, region, education, and politics, with the recurring lesson that the broad categories conceal about as much as they reveal.

The Vanishing Church: How the Hollowing Out of Moderate Congregations Is Hurting Democracy, Faith, and Us (Brazos Press, January 13, 2026) is the personal book, and the one where the referee steps onto the field. Its subject is what Burge calls the great sorting. Conservative evangelicalism holds one flank of American religion. A growing, generally liberal secular population holds the other. The moderate middle, the mainline and centrist congregations that once contained Republicans and Democrats in the same pews, is disappearing, and Burge argues that the country loses something civic when it goes. Churches like First Baptist of Mount Vernon forced politically incompatible people into sustained cooperation. Members sat through budget meetings, organized funeral lunches, and maintained buildings alongside neighbors whose votes canceled theirs. They practiced the unglamorous disciplines of association: tolerating irritation, negotiating disagreement, staying connected to people they disliked. Those disciplines trained citizens, and the training grounds are closing.

The argument invites an objection Burge partly anticipates. Mainline decline began decades before the current polarization, driven by low birth rates, aging membership, and failure to keep the children, and moderation did nothing to stop it. Attributing civic virtue to institutions that could not reproduce risks nostalgia. His stronger claim survives the objection: whatever killed the moderate church, its replacements, the partisan congregation and the private screen, perform the bridging function worse. A dying bridge is still a bridge.

The closure of First Baptist gave Burge a strange new authority and a season of grief. National outlets covered the story of the church-decline scholar whose church declined to death; the Associated Press version ran in hundreds of papers, and because he worked for a state university, his email address was public, and the messages did not stop. Strangers diagnosed the corpse. The theology killed it, the moderation killed it, the pastor killed it. Burge, who had conducted more funerals than baptisms for years and knew the arithmetic better than anyone writing to him, stopped attending worship for about a month.

He wrote about the year that followed with the flatness of a man reporting from inside his own case study. “I was the guy standing at the pulpit delivering the last benediction,” he wrote near the first anniversary. He turned down most invitations to preach; after standing in a pulpit nearly every week from his early twenties to forty-two, he wanted to learn whether he missed preaching or only missed who he had been. The pastorate outlived the church. In the year after closure he buried two former members and administered last rites to one, and he concluded that he would remain pastor to the survivors until the last of them was gone.

He now attends a Methodist church near his home, where a few former First Baptist members sometimes sit together. He sits near the back and leaves quickly. He also goes to Mass with his wife, Jacqueline, and their two sons, who are Catholic. The Baptist minister's children are being raised in the Church of Rome, and Burge treats the arrangement without anxiety. His concern is that his sons stay connected to Christianity in some durable form. The denominational borders his childhood policed have stopped mattering to him, which may be the most representative fact about him: the scholar of American religious decategorization has decategorized.

On August 1, 2025, one year and ten days after the last service, Burge left Eastern Illinois for Washington University in St. Louis, joining the John C. Danforth Center on Religion and Politics as professor of practice. The Danforth Center, founded through the former senator John C. Danforth (b. 1936), an ordained Episcopal priest, exists for public engagement with religion and politics, which made the hire a recognition that Burge's charts had become part of the national infrastructure. The move carried its own status arithmetic. For thirteen years he had addressed a national audience from a regional teaching university, fitting the public work around a full load; now an elite private research university pays him to do the public work as the job. He took the position after a year of subtractions, the church, a retiring department chair who was a close friend, the family dog, and marked it as loss and providence at once: “A lot of things that were in my life 18 months ago are gone.”

Burge's strength is descriptive discipline. He compares datasets rather than crowning one, and when the CES surprises him he checks the GSS and Pew before he checks his priors. He treats question wording as substance: his published work includes research on whether offering “Christian” alongside “Protestant” as a survey option changes the measured size of American Protestantism, the kind of finding that never trends and quietly governs everything that does. He approaches religion as a political scientist, asking what identities predict and how they change, and leaves the judgment of theological coherence to others.

The limits are the limits of the instrument. Everything rests on self-report, and Americans overstate church attendance; studies that compare surveys against counted heads find the gap persistent. A Burge chart of weekly attendance looks harder than the measure underneath it, and the safe readings are comparative, this group above that group, this year against that year, rather than absolute. The work is also almost purely quantitative. A survey records that a woman stopped checking the Methodist box. It cannot recover the divorce, the hospital, the sermon that went one sentence too far, or the Sunday the car would not start and no one called. Burge counts the movements between categories better than anyone; the meaning of the movements lies outside his data, and he mostly has the discipline to say so. Causality resists him as it resists everyone: religion, politics, education, geography, and family shape one another in loops, and a chart shows the loop's shadow, one correlation at a time. And the medium exerts its pull. Substack and X reward the arresting difference, survey research produces the ambiguous one, and his shortest posts sometimes carry more certainty than the full methodological discussion would license.

His temperament is the referee's. He is neither a secular writer enjoying the funeral nor a church-growth consultant selling the resurrection. He tells atheist audiences that the nones are less educated and less engaged than they imagine, and Christian audiences that the revival is not in the data. He has said he takes it as a compliment when readers cannot tell whether he is a Republican or a Democrat. The neutrality has boundaries, and The Vanishing Church marks where they run. After twenty years of describing the sorting of American religion, he now argues against it, for institutions that can hold political difference, for participation over detachment, for the moderate middle he watched die from the pulpit. The commitments were always there. The book signs them.

The tension that organizes Burge's career runs between the graph and the funeral. His charts show long lines descending in slow arcs, and the arcs are accurate. His other life taught him what a data point weighs: a congregation founded three years after the Civil War, a woman who prepared funeral lunches for fifty years, a health insurance bill paid for a laid-off professor, a vote of 49 to 48, three dozen people and a cake. He measures the transformation of American religion from inside it, as participant, casualty, and recorder at once, and this position, more than any single finding, is his contribution. American religious statistics had partisans and it had technicians. In Burge it acquired a witness who could count.

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Emily Oster: The Economist in the Delivery Room

New Haven, 1981. A cassette recorder sits under a crib in the home of two Yale economists. The child in the crib is not yet two. After her parents leave the room, she talks. She reviews the day. She rehearses tomorrow. She works out who went where and why, in long monologues delivered to no one.

Her parents noticed the talking and mentioned it to the developmental psychologist Katherine Nelson (1930-2018). Nelson asked them to record it. Over fifteen months they taped 122 monologues, and Nelson assembled a team of scholars, including Jerome Bruner, to analyze them. The result, Narratives from the Crib (1989), became a classic case study in how children build language, memory, and a self. The child was identified only as Emily.

The child was Emily Oster (b. February 14, 1980). Harvard University Press reissued the book in 2006 with a foreword by the subject, who reflected on having been a research subject before she could consent or even understand. She noted that the toddler on the tapes already did what the adult does: took the raw confusion of experience and ordered it into an account of what happened, what would happen next, and what it meant. She has spent her career doing that for other people, in domains where the confusion is greater and the stakes are higher: sex ratios in Asia, HIV in Africa, pregnancy, parenthood, and a pandemic.

Oster is the JJE Goldman Sachs University Professor of Economics at Brown University, a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the founder and chief executive of ParentData, a subscription media company. Her four books, Expecting Better (2013), Cribsheet (2019), The Family Firm (2021), and The Unexpected (2024, with maternal-fetal medicine specialist Nathan Fox), have sold more than a million copies. She is often described as a data scientist or a medical researcher. She is neither. She is an applied economist trained in econometrics and causal inference, and her career is a long test of what that training can and cannot do when pointed at questions doctors, parents, and governors have to answer.

The household explains a lot. Her mother, Sharon Oster (1948-2022), taught competitive strategy at the Yale School of Management and became its first female dean. Her father, Ray Fair (b. 1942), built one of the best-known macroeconometric models of the American economy and a famous equation predicting presidential elections from economic conditions. Emily was one of three children in a home where incentives, scarcity, and opportunity cost were table talk. The family story she tells most often concerns groceries. She asked her mother why their family had food delivered instead of shopping like other families. Her mother explained that her time had a high opportunity cost. Emily found the answer satisfying. In that house, a choice was never just a taste. It was a price paid in forgone alternatives.

She went to Choate Rosemary Hall, graduated in 1998, then to Harvard College, graduating magna cum laude in economics in 2002. She stayed for the doctorate, finishing in 2006. At Harvard she met Jesse Shapiro, an economist who would become known for work on media markets and political polarization. They married in 2006, later joined the Brown faculty together, and have two children, who appear throughout her books as illustrations of her decision process, never as templates for anyone else's.

Her early research was bold to the point of recklessness, and the pattern of that boldness set the terms of everything after.

The first target was the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Her 2005 paper in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, “Sexually Transmitted Infections, Sexual Behavior, and the HIV/AIDS Epidemic,” argued against the dominant explanation for Africa's catastrophic prevalence rates. The conventional account emphasized behavior. Oster argued that untreated bacterial sexually transmitted infections raised the biological probability of HIV transmission per sexual encounter, so that similar behavior produced far higher prevalence in Africa than in the United States. The policy implication followed: treating other infections might do more than campaigns for restraint. In later work she asked why sexual behavior in Africa responded so weakly to HIV risk, and her answer was an economist's answer. Prevention is an investment in future life. People facing poverty, violence, and high mortality from other causes have less future life to invest in, and her data showed the behavioral response concentrated among the richer and the safer. A third paper, “Routes of Infection,” connected export booms to spikes in new infections along trucking and trade routes, and suggested that Uganda's celebrated decline in HIV owed something to declining exports, complicating the story that education campaigns had done it alone.

Then came the missing women. Amartya Sen (b. 1933) had estimated that roughly a hundred million women were missing from the populations of Asia, victims of sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and unequal food and medicine. In 2005, in the Journal of Political Economy, Oster proposed that a large share of them had never been discriminated against at all. Medical literature suggested that mothers carrying hepatitis B bore unusually high proportions of sons. Hepatitis B was endemic in the countries with skewed sex ratios. Run the numbers and perhaps half the missing women dissolved into virology. The paper grew out of work she had begun as an undergraduate, and it made her famous in the profession before she had defended her dissertation. It also carried an enormous moral payload. If a virus explained the imbalance, the indictment of Asian son-preference shrank.

The claim was wrong. When Oster and collaborators obtained individual-level data from a hepatitis vaccination program in China, covering thousands of mothers whose infection status was known, carrier mothers did not bear more sons. In 2008 she published the finding under a title that left no exit: “Hepatitis B Does Not Explain Male-Biased Sex Ratios in China.” She has said since that the honest move was cheap for her and would be cheap for science if it were normal, and that the interesting question is why it is rare. The episode became as central to her reputation as the original paper. Admirers cite it as a model of how a scholar should behave when the evidence turns. It is that. It is also a record of how far an elegant argument can travel on aggregate correlations and a shaky medical premise before anyone checks, and of how much attention a young researcher can earn by overturning a morally charged consensus. The attention came first. The check came later. Both facts belong in the account.

Her development work continued in the same contrarian register with better luck. “The Power of TV” (2009), in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, tracked the arrival of cable television in rural Indian villages and found it associated with reduced acceptance of wife-beating, reduced son preference, lower fertility, and greater female autonomy. Soap operas set in cities showed village women employed heroines, small families, and marriages run on different terms, and the villages moved toward what they watched. The paper became a staple of development economics, and later replication work questioned how much of the effect survives scrutiny, which is the normal afterlife of a famous natural experiment. A randomized trial in Nepal pointed the other way: distributing menstrual cups to schoolgirls did not raise attendance, because menstruation caused far less absence than the aid narrative assumed. She has been as willing to publish the null as the sensation, and the Nepal paper is the proof.

A second strand of her research asks how people handle threatening medical information, and it may be the deepest thing she has done. With E. Ray Dorsey and Ira Shoulson she studied Americans at risk for Huntington disease, a fatal inherited neurological disorder for which a definitive genetic test exists. Most at-risk people refuse the test. The untested plan their lives, their retirements, their childbearing, as if they do not carry the mutation, while those who test positive change course: they retire earlier, complete less education, invest less in futures they will not have. Oster's interpretation ran through a model of optimal expectations. Information has value, and so does hope, and a person may rationally decline knowledge whose emotional price exceeds its planning benefit. The finding cuts against the assumption beneath her entire public career, that people want the data and are better off with it, and she published it anyway. Related work found that households cut calories only modestly after a diabetes diagnosis, and a paper with Heidi Williams traced America's excess infant mortality to the post-neonatal months, concentrated among poorer families, pointing at inequality and conditions after the hospital rather than at American neonatal medicine.

Inside the profession, her most cited contribution is a method. Applied economists had long argued for their results by showing that adding control variables did not move the coefficient. Oster formalized when that argument works, incorporating movement in both the coefficient and the regression's explanatory power, and produced a sensitivity statistic now called Oster's delta: how strong would selection on unobservables have to be, relative to selection on observables, to erase the result? The method spread through empirical economics, acquired its own critical literature identifying where it misleads, and made her name a common noun in seminar rooms. A companion paper, “Health Recommendations and Selection in Health Behaviors” (2020), described a trap that explains much of nutritional science. Once a behavior is recommended, health-conscious people adopt it, and later observational studies find the behavior associated with good outcomes because of who adopted it. The recommendation manufactures its own confirmation. Anyone who has watched eggs, coffee, or red wine cycle from poison to elixir and back has seen the machine she described.

The University of Chicago, where she taught from 2006, did not give her tenure. She has speculated that the time she spent writing a trade book weakened her file, an interpretation the university has never confirmed. Brown hired her with tenure in 2015, promoted her to full professor in 2016, and has since given her a university professorship, a term chairing its tenure and promotions committee, and associate editorships at The Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of Health Economics. The institution that penalized the hybrid career lost her to one that rewarded it.

The trade book that may have cost her Chicago began in a Chicago obstetrician's office. Pregnant with her first child around 2010, Oster met the standard American protocol: lists of forbidden foods, caffeine limits, weight targets, a testing schedule, all delivered as rules without denominators. She responded the way her mother's daughter would. She went home and pulled the studies. What she found was that the rules compressed a landscape of weak evidence, strong evidence, and value judgments into a single tone of command, and that a trained reader could take the landscape apart. Expecting Better (2013) did the taking apart in public: caffeine, sushi, deli meat, bed rest, prenatal testing, epidurals, induction. Its argument was procedural. Evidence estimates consequences. It cannot weigh them, because the weights are the woman's own, and two women reading the same numbers can decide differently without either being wrong.

One chapter made the book. Reviewing the observational literature on light drinking, Oster concluded that it showed no demonstrated harm from an occasional glass of wine, particularly in later trimesters, once studies accounted for the differences between light drinkers and everyone else. The medical establishment's position, held by the CDC and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, is that no amount of alcohol in pregnancy is known to be safe. The two statements are about different things. Oster's is a claim about what studies show. The CDC's is a population rule built for a world of varying susceptibility, imperfect self-knowledge, and the impossibility of a randomized trial. Pediatricians who treat fetal alcohol spectrum disorders denounced the chapter, and hundreds of thousands of women bought the book, many of them saying some version of the same sentence: someone finally treated me like an adult. The fight has never resolved because it cannot. It is a fight about who bears the risk of nuance, and the answer depends on where you sit.

Cribsheet extended the method through infancy: breastfeeding, sleep training, co-sleeping, screens, daycare. Its recurring finding was deflationary. Choices marketed as destiny mostly wash out. The celebrated associations between breastfeeding and IQ shrink toward zero in sibling comparisons, where the same mother fed one child differently than another. Sleep training leaves no measurable scar. Vaccination stood out as a case where she found the evidence one-sided and said so. The book's real product was absolution with footnotes. Against a parenting culture that treats every decision as a referendum on the parent, Oster argued that outcomes ride on genes, money, schools, and accumulated years, and that most individual choices operate inside a wide zone where several answers are fine. This made her a guru whose doctrine is the overthrow of gurus, a position with its own ironies, since a million buyers now take her word on when to disregard expert words.

The Family Firm carried the project into the school years and hit the limit of the data. There are no randomized trials of whether your ten-year-old should play travel soccer. So the book shifted from evidence to procedure, proposing that families make big decisions the way well-run organizations do: state the priorities, gather the facts, meet, decide, revisit. Reviewers mocked the mission statements, and the mockery missed the target. Her point was that families drift into their largest conflicts through a thousand rushed weekday negotiations, assuming love guarantees agreement, and that an hour of explicit planning surfaces the disagreement before it hardens into resentment.

Then the pandemic made her a political figure.

In the spring of 2020 American schools closed, and no federal agency built a system to track what happened when they reopened. Oster did, assembling the COVID-19 School Response Dashboard with Qualtrics and school associations, collecting infection data from districts that volunteered it. In October 2020 she published “Schools Aren't Super-Spreaders” in The Atlantic, reporting low case rates among roughly 200,000 students and staff and arguing that the data, imperfect as it was, should be weighed against the mounting educational damage of closure. The title outran the evidence, as she partly conceded. Volunteering districts were not a random sample. They were disproportionately the schools with the resources and the confidence to open and count. Detection depended on testing. The data could not carry the headline's certainty, and she knew the alternative to imperfect data was not perfect data. It was decisions made on fear and anecdote.

Watch the reception from three seats. A mother in Brooklyn, a lawyer supervising a second-grader's Zoom kindergarten from her kitchen table while her own billable hours evaporate, reads the article and feels that someone with credentials has finally counted her child's losses as losses. A veteran teacher in Providence, fifty-eight years old, prediabetic, reads the same article and notes that the economist telling her the building is safe will not be standing in it, and that her union's dead are not in the dashboard. And in Tallahassee, Governor Ron DeSantis cites Oster's research while banning school mask mandates, at roughly the same time CDC Director Rochelle Walensky cites it to justify relaxing classroom distancing rules. Both parties in an otherwise total war reached for the same economist's numbers. Few other figures of the pandemic can say that, and the price was that both sides also learned to distrust her.

The later evidence delivered a split verdict. Her own co-authored national study found that reopening schools did not raise community case rates on average, with real variation: some regions and modes saw increases, especially where community transmission already ran high. Her test-score work across eleven states found that districts staying remote lost far more ground, with math worse than reading and the largest losses in districts serving more Black students, so that the closures adopted in the name of protecting the vulnerable widened the gaps the same institutions spend their days deploring. On the learning question she has been vindicated. On the transmission question the honest summary is that she was more right than her angriest critics and more confident than her data.

In October 2022 she wrote the essay that made her radioactive to both camps at once. “Let's Declare a Pandemic Amnesty,” in The Atlantic, opened with her own family hiking in cloth masks in April 2020, her masked children shrieking “SOCIAL DISTANCING!” at other kids who came too close, and argued that most people, herself included, had made their pandemic mistakes in genuine darkness, that Los Angeles closing its beaches made no more sense in hindsight than her masked hikes, and that the country should forgive the honest errors and get on with fixing the damage. The essay was ratioed into legend. The left read it as the school-reopener demanding her critics concede. The right read it as the laptop class requesting absolution before any accounting of who closed the schools, who lost the businesses, who was fired, and who was censored, and noting that amnesty is a thing the powerful grant, not a thing they request. Her stated motive was narrower: she had watched the vindicated turn vindictive on test scores and wanted off the carousel of recrimination. The word “amnesty” sank the argument. Amnesty follows a verdict. She was proposing to skip the trial, and a country that had buried a million people and locked its children out of school for a year was not ready to skip it.

Her fourth book stepped back from the wars. The Unexpected (2024), written with Nathan Fox, an obstetrician specializing in high-risk pregnancy, addresses the third or so of pregnancies that go wrong: miscarriage, preeclampsia, preterm birth, gestational diabetes, hyperemesis, postpartum depression. The question organizing the book is recurrence. A woman who has been through one of these wants to know the odds of going through it again and what can change them, and her twenty-minute appointment rarely tells her. The collaboration also answered, structurally, the oldest criticism of her franchise. The economist reads the studies; the physician who has managed thousands of these pregnancies says what the studies miss. It is the book of hers that medicine has received most warmly, and the least like economics: recurrence tables interleaved with scripts for asking your doctor why it happened and grief that no denominator absorbs.

Around the books she has built a company. ParentData, founded as a newsletter in 2020, now reaches hundreds of thousands of readers weekly with more than 1,100 articles, personalized editions keyed to a due date or a child's age, and an AI search tool, Petey, that answers questions from her archive, an AI librarian whose answers are as good as the shelf behind it. The masthead has grown past her to include obstetricians, endocrinologists, and psychologists, diluting the founding tension of an economist interpreting clinical literature for the masses without dissolving it. In February 2026 she extended the franchise past parenting entirely, launching Wellness, Actually, a weekly iHeart podcast with F. Perry Wilson, a Yale physician, working through the claims of the wellness economy: GLP-1s, colostrum, red-light therapy, microplastics, continuous glucose monitors, full-body scans. The premise of the show is the premise of her career, that the gap between what a study shows and what an influencer says it shows is wide enough to build a life in.

The commercial turn changes the epistemics, and she knows it. A referee lets a paper end in “we cannot distinguish these hypotheses.” A subscription business cannot publish that sentence three times a week. Her academic work taught that people sometimes rationally refuse information and that recommendations corrupt the later evidence for themselves. Her company sells information and recommendations on a weekly schedule. Managing that contradiction, keeping uncertainty visible in a product people pay to have uncertainty removed, is the tightrope of her second act.

The criticisms of her worth taking seriously are four. Her framework prices choices for people who have them; a mother without paid leave does not need a better decision procedure about breastfeeding, and the books can make a structural constraint look like a personal optimization problem. Economists reading medical literature miss things clinicians catch, a gap she has narrowed by hiring the clinicians. The confidence that makes her readable erases, at the margin, the line between “the studies do not establish harm” and “this is safe,” and that margin is where fetal alcohol syndrome lives. And her politics of individual informed choice belongs to no coalition, which is why the left got to call her a DeSantis asset and the right got to call her a lockdown Karen in the same news cycle, sometimes about the same article.

One circulating credential should be retired. Online biographies state that Oster won the Elaine Bennett Research Prize in 2013. The American Economic Association's records do not list her among its recipients; Anna Mikusheva won in 2012 and Emi Nakamura won in 2014. Her real honors, the Time 100 listing in 2022 with a citation written by Steven Pinker (b. 1954), the named chairs, the publication record across the American Economic Review, the QJE, and the JPE, need no padding, and a writer whose brand is checking claims deserves to have her own claims checked.

What she has built, across the journal articles and the bestsellers and the dashboard and the podcast, is a single sustained argument about authority. Official guidance, she keeps showing, is rarely a direct translation of decisive science. It is evidence blended with precaution, liability, institutional habit, and someone else's values, presented as fact. Exposing the blend improves informed consent, and it corrodes trust, and the corrosion does not stop where she would like it to stop. A reader taught that the alcohol rule overstates the evidence may conclude the vaccine schedule does too, and she then spends a chapter arguing it does not, from an authority she has taught the reader to interrogate. She has no solution to this beyond doing the work in the open and correcting herself in public, which is more than most of her critics or her imitators offer.

The tapes under the crib caught a two-year-old ordering the day into a story so she could sleep. The adult does the same for an audience of millions who cannot sleep either: the pregnant woman with the glass of wine she cannot mention to her doctor, the parents at the kitchen table with the school reopening survey, the man holding a genetic test kit he may never open. She tells them what the numbers can say, where the numbers stop, and that past that line the decision is theirs. It is a modest doctrine that took an immodest career to establish, and its central risk has never changed since the hepatitis paper: the story is always cleaner than the data. She has been better than almost anyone at admitting it afterward. The harder discipline, the one her whole enterprise now depends on, is saying it at the time.

Notes

Scenes and their sourcing. The crib opening rests on the Harvard UP reissue of Narratives from the Crib: 122 monologues taped over fifteen months, Oster‘s 2006 foreword on having been a research subject without knowing it; retail listings confirm the details at AbeBooks. Jerome Bruner contributed to the volume; verify before publishing if you keep his name. The amnesty hiking scene comes from her own essay’s opening; a critical account describes her cloth-masked kids shouting “SOCIAL DISTANCING!” at other children on family hikes, The American Spectator; original at The Atlantic. The Brooklyn mother and Providence teacher are the kind of extrapolation I license: composite viewpoints, no named individuals, drawn from the documented class split in the reopening fight.

The both-parties detail. One critical profile notes that DeSantis cited her study when banning school mask mandates while CDC Director Walensky referenced her research before relaxing classroom distancing guidance, Substack, quoting a critical article about her influence.

Wellness, Actually. Verified: weekly iHeart podcast with Emily Oster and physician Perry Wilson, covering health news, listener questions, and wellness deep dives, launched February 2026; Apple Podcasts. Wilson is an associate professor of medicine and public health at Yale.

The Economist at the Border: Emily Oster Through Andrew Abbott

Chicago, around 2010. A pregnant economics professor sits in an obstetrician’s office and receives a list. No sushi, no deli meat, two hundred milligrams of caffeine, a weight target, a testing schedule. The list comes with the full weight of the white coat and none of the reasoning behind it. She goes home, opens the journals, and discovers that the reasoning is a mixed bag: some rules rest on strong evidence, some on weak studies of heavy exposure extrapolated downward, some on liability and habit. Three years later she publishes the reasoning, and a licensed profession finds a competitor standing on ground it had assumed was fenced.

Andrew Abbott's The System of Professions (1988) exists to explain that scene. Abbott argued that professions should be studied through their work, and their work through jurisdiction: the link a profession claims between itself and a set of tasks, defended against rivals in three arenas, the law, the workplace, and public opinion. Professions rise and fall through interprofessional competition over tasks, and the weapon of that competition is abstract knowledge. A profession holds its territory by showing that its abstractions diagnose, reason about, and treat a problem better than the abstractions next door. Jurisdictions are never safe. They are attacked when they weaken, and they weaken from within, when a profession reduces its work to rules a layman can inspect, and from without, when technology or organizations restructure the tasks.

Emily Oster is a jurisdictional dispute with a face. Read through Abbott, her career stops looking like a personal brand built on contrarian nerve and starts looking like a predictable border war between economics and medicine, fought over a strip of territory medicine held but had stopped defending.

Start with the task. Abbott decomposes professional work into diagnosis, inference, and treatment. Diagnosis takes information into the professional knowledge system; treatment brings instructions back out; inference connects them, and inference is where professions live or die, because pure inference is what cannot be routinized. Medicine’s jurisdiction over pregnancy is anchored at the treatment end. It holds delivery, surgery, prescription, and emergency by license, and no economist ever threatened any of it. The advisory task was different. Prenatal counsel had been compressed into rules: the list in the office, the pamphlet, the ban on wine and tuna, “What to Expect When You’re Expecting” as the delegated civilian arm. Abbott holds that a profession which reduces a task to codified rules invites invasion, because rules can be inspected, and inspected rules can be found wanting by anyone whose own abstractions handle the underlying problem. The underlying problem of prenatal advice is inference from observational data under confounding: what does a correlation between light drinking and child outcomes mean when light drinkers differ from abstainers in twenty other ways? That is an econometrics problem. Medicine had the treatment and had let the inference go slack. Oster attacked the slack. She never claimed the fortress. She claimed the flank the garrison had left to pamphlets.

Abbott would insist on the external conditions that opened the border, because in his system jurisdictions shift when the larger environment restructures tasks and audiences. Three changes mattered. PubMed and open repositories put the primary literature in front of laymen for the first time; the doctor’s monopoly on the studies dissolved a decade before Oster wrote. The audience changed with it: her readers are college-educated professional women trained to read evidence in their own fields and offended by instruction without justification, an audience that did not exist at scale in 1970. And the demand side changed, because obstetric practice had compressed counsel into the twelve-minute visit, leaving the advisory task effectively vacant during the six months of terror between appointments. Abbott’s rule is that vacant tasks get occupied. The question was never whether someone would occupy prenatal advice. The question was which knowledge system would get there first, and the candidates were wellness culture, religious tradition, the mommy internet, and applied economics. Medicine’s rivals for the territory were already inside it. Oster merely arrived with better artillery.

The artillery is abstraction, and Abbott has a doctrine about its caliber. Knowledge too concrete degrades into clerical work anyone can take; knowledge too abstract loses connection to the task and persuades no one. Jurisdiction goes to optimal abstraction, general enough to claim new problems, concrete enough to solve the one in front of the client. Oster’s package sits near the optimum. Confounding, selection, absolute versus relative risk, the difference between “no demonstrated harm” and “demonstrated no harm”: these are portable abstractions, which is why the same apparatus moved from sex ratios to pregnancy to sleep training to school closures to creatine without modification. And they cash out in a concrete instruction, the coffee is fine, the sushi from a decent restaurant is fine, the sleep training leaves no scar. Medicine’s competing product on this task was a rule without a denominator. Between an abstraction that explains and a rule that commands, the educated client chose the explanation, and Abbott would say the outcome was overdetermined.

Now the arenas, because Abbott’s sharpest tool is the observation that jurisdiction is claimed in three places at once and won in them separately. In the legal arena Oster claimed nothing and can claim nothing. She holds no license, prescribes nothing, and every book carries the disclaimer conceding medicine’s legal monopoly intact. In the workplace arena, the clinic, her presence is real but unofficial: she enters as the patient’s preparation, the printout, the question the obstetrician now has to answer with reasons instead of authority. Abbott notes that workplace jurisdiction always runs ahead of or behind formal jurisdiction, and the exam room where a patient cites Expecting Better to a physician is his example updated, an unlicensed competitor exercising influence the law does not recognize. Her real conquest came in the third arena, public opinion, where jurisdiction means the public’s belief about who legitimately speaks to a problem. A million books, the Time 100 listing, the newsletter audience in the hundreds of thousands: by the measure of public opinion, an economist now shares jurisdiction over the American pregnancy, and the sharing was won there and nowhere else, which is why it can be contested there and nowhere else.

The counterattack followed Abbott’s script for jurisdictional defense. A profession defending territory does not usually argue the technical point; it argues the client. The response to the alcohol chapter from pediatricians who treat fetal alcohol spectrum disorders, and the standing restatements from the CDC and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that no amount of alcohol is known to be safe, all took the same form: the population contains vulnerable members, nuance will be misread as permission, and the layman cannot handle the inference and must be given the rule. That argument is the oldest move in professional defense, the claim that the client’s incompetence requires the profession’s simplification, and Abbott treats it as the standard rhetoric by which professions justify holding inference away from the laity. What medicine could not do was answer her on the evidence, because on the evidence the observational literature is what she said it is. So the defense shifted from the studies to the audience, from what is true to what the public can safely be told, which conceded the inference and fought for the treatment relationship. The fight has never resolved because the two sides are defending different links in Abbott’s chain. She holds the inference. They hold the treatment. The client stands between.

Abbott catalogues the settlements available when neither side can expel the other: full jurisdiction, subordination, division of labor by task, advisory jurisdiction, division by clientele. Oster’s career has run through the catalogue in order. Expecting Better was a raid, a claim of advisory jurisdiction pressed unilaterally from outside. The pandemic dashboard was occupation of an abandoned task. And The Unexpected (2024), written with the maternal-fetal specialist Nathan Fox, is a signed treaty, a division of labor on the page itself: the economist reads the studies and prices the recurrence risks, the physician supplies what the studies miss and manages the patient, and the book’s structure concedes what twelve years of solo authorship had contested, that the advisory task splits into an inference component and a clinical component and the invader holds only one. ParentData’s masthead is the same treaty at industrial scale. The platform that began as one economist interpreting clinical literature now employs obstetricians, endocrinologists, and psychologists, which is to say it hired the profession it raided. Abbott would recognize the arc at once: an interloper who cannot win the legal arena stabilizes her workplace gains by incorporating the incumbents, and the settlement converts a border war into an org chart.

ParentData is also the part of the story Abbott’s 1988 apparatus strains to hold, and the strain is instructive about the present. Abbott’s professions institutionalize jurisdiction through associations, schools, and licenses. Oster institutionalized hers through a subscription company. The jurisdiction is real, a defined task, a knowledge system, a clientele, a payment stream, but it is held by a firm rather than a profession, transmitted by brand rather than credential, and heritable by no colleague group. There is no association of evidence-based parenting advisers, no examination, no ethics board, no successor. This is where Gil Eyal's The Crisis of Expertise (2019) extends the spine. Eyal distinguishes expertise, the task of making knowledge relevant to decisions, from the professions that historically packaged it, and argues that the crisis of our period is the unbundling of the two: expertise now circulates through networks, media, and markets that professions no longer control, generating the twin spectacle of collapsing trust in credentialed authority and insatiable demand for expert guidance. Oster is the unbundling with a newsletter. Her readers arrive because they distrust the official rule and stay because they crave an authoritative answer, and she supplies expertise stripped of profession, judgment without license, jurisdiction as a service. Eyal’s paradox, that attacks on experts coexist with dependence on them, is her business model stated as sociology.

The pandemic ran the whole cycle in fast motion and in public. In 2020 the task of counting infections in reopened schools belonged by rights to public health, which held the jurisdiction and abandoned the work; no federal system existed. Abbott’s vacancy rule operated within months. An economist with survey software occupied the task, and occupation of the task carried, as it always does, a claim on the inference: her data, therefore her reading of what schools did to transmission, therefore her standing in the reopening fight. The breadth of her public-arena jurisdiction at the peak can be measured by a single fact from the bio: a Republican governor cited her research while banning school mask mandates at roughly the same time the CDC director referenced it to relax distancing guidance. Warring authorities do not cite the same outsider unless the outsider holds the territory they both need to cross. And the amnesty essay of 2022 measured the limit of that kind of holding. A credentialed profession absorbs a member’s public misstep through the colleague group, the association, the shared jurisdiction that no single controversy can revoke. Oster’s jurisdiction was personal, held in the public arena alone, and the public arena is the one venue where standing is revocable overnight by the same opinion that granted it. Both coalitions burned her at once, and there was no guild to stand behind. Abbott’s system predicts the exposure: jurisdiction without institution is jurisdiction on a month-to-month lease.

One more of Abbott’s engines is already turning, and it points at her. Codified knowledge invites takeover; that was the vulnerability through which she entered medicine’s advisory territory, rules written down where a rival could read them. Her archive is now codified too, eleven hundred articles and four books compiled into Petey, a chatbot that answers the client’s question directly from the corpus. The tool that scales her jurisdiction also completes its codification, and Abbott’s logic does not exempt the victor: an advisory jurisdiction reduced to a searchable rulebook is open to the next system of abstraction that handles the inference better, whether that is a rival platform, a general-purpose model trained on the same literature, or medicine reclaiming the counsel it once delegated to pamphlets, this time with the denominators included. She took the territory because the incumbents held it as text. She now holds it as text.

What the frame settles, and what it prices, comes down to this. The Abbott reading dissolves the personality story. Oster’s rise required no unusual courage and her opponents no unusual bad faith; a weakly defended advisory task, a newly literate clientele, a portable abstraction, and a vacant inference produced the invasion, and the counterattack, the treaty, and the incorporation followed the standard sequence of jurisdictional conflict as written twenty-five years before she published. The frame also identifies the durable stakes under the alcohol quarrel, which was never about wine. It was about which profession’s chain of inference governs the space between the study and the patient, and that question outlives every particular rule. What the frame cannot price is the client’s own experience, the woman in the office with the list, for whom the border war is not sociology but the question of whether she is to be reasoned with or managed. Abbott’s system explains why she was managed, why an economist was the one who finally reasoned with her, and why the reasoning arrived as a product with a subscription price. It does not say whether she is better governed by the guild that held the treatment or the firm that took the inference. That verdict belongs to her, which is, as it happens, the invader’s doctrine too.

The Anthropologist at the Baby Shower: Emily Oster Through Mary Douglas

A restaurant in any American city. A woman in her second trimester orders a half glass of red with dinner. The waiter’s eyes drop to her belly and come back up. At the next table a stranger stops chewing. Someone will say something, or someone will hold herself back from saying something, and the woman knows it, which is why she almost ordered the sparkling water. She drove to the restaurant on the freeway, a risk to her pregnancy measurably larger than the wine, and no one at any table has ever stopped a pregnant woman in a parking garage to ask whether her trip was necessary.

Mary Douglas spent a career explaining that scene. Purity and Danger (1966) argued that pollution beliefs are never really about hygiene. Dirt is matter out of place, and a community’s rules about what defiles are a map of its categories, policing the points where the categories might blur. The abominations of Leviticus were her showpiece: the forbidden animals are the ones that straddle classes, water creatures without fins, land creatures that swarm, and the dietary law is a meditation on order, holiness as keeping kinds distinct. Among the Lele of the Kasai she found the inversion that proved the rule, the pangolin, a scaly, tree-climbing, fish-like mammal that bears its young singly as humans do, so anomalous that the Lele made it the object of a fertility cult. Anomaly draws power. What a classification system cannot place, a community must either abominate or venerate, and it cannot leave it alone.

Sixteen years later, in Risk and Culture (1982), Douglas and the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky carried the argument into the modern world that believed itself past all that. Every society faces more dangers than it can attend to, so every society selects, and the selection is social. Communities police the risks that reinforce their moral order and ignore the ones that don’t, then experience the selection as objective danger. The book scandalized readers by applying this to American environmentalism, arguing that the choice of industrial pollution as the master danger served the boundary needs of sectarian groups defining themselves against the center. The particular target has aged; the machinery has not. Risk, for Douglas, is the modern vocabulary of taboo, pollution belief conducted in the idiom of probability, and its function is what pollution’s function always was: to mark boundaries, bind members, and, when misfortune comes, to allocate blame.

Now set Emily Oster inside the machinery, because her entire public career is a collision with it, and the collision explains what her own vocabulary cannot: why she wins the arguments and loses the fights.

Begin where Douglas begins, with the anomalous body. The pregnant woman is the boundary case of the human classification system, two beings in one skin, a person who is also a vessel, neither one nor two, and Douglas noted in Purity and Danger that societies everywhere surround transitional beings, the initiate, the corpse, the unborn, with special danger and special rules. The pregnant body is a margin walking around in public, and margins are where pollution rules concentrate. Ingestion rules concentrate hardest of all, because eating is the act in which the outside world crosses the body’s boundary, and in pregnancy every crossing is double: what passes the mother’s boundary passes the child’s. Seen from this height, the American prenatal code, no sushi, no deli meat, no soft cheese, no wine, snaps into a familiar shape. It is a dietary law. Its items are not ranked by hazard; listeria from deli turkey, mercury from tuna, alcohol from a Tuesday glass, and caffeine sit side by side in the pamphlet as they never would in an actuarial table, because the list’s coherence is categorical rather than statistical. These are the substances that defile the vessel. Driving, which kills and injures more pregnant women than everything on the list combined, appears nowhere, because a car crash does not symbolize a boundary violation. Nothing crosses into the body. There is no defilement to police, so the community does not police it, and then, exactly as Douglas predicts, the community experiences its selection as science.

The tell is the enforcement. Medical advice is delivered by physicians in offices. Taboo is enforced by everyone, everywhere. The pregnant woman with the wine glass is corrected by waiters, mothers-in-law, and strangers, none of whom could state the relative risk within three orders of magnitude and none of whom needs to, because they are not making a risk claim. They are protecting a category. A visibly pregnant woman drinking in public is matter out of place, the vessel defiling itself, and the flash of anger she draws is the anger Douglas taught us to read: the emotion that guards the line between kinds. No one is angry at a pregnant woman merging onto the 405. Anger is reserved for pollution, and the distribution of anger, not the distribution of harm, maps the actual rule.

Into this walks an economist with a denominator. Expecting Better treated the prenatal code as a set of empirical claims about dose and response, went through the studies, and reported that the claims varied from solid to unsupported, with the occasional-glass-of-wine claim near the unsupported end. As analysis, this was competent and has never been seriously rebutted on its own terms. As anthropology, it was a category error of the purest kind, and Douglas would have seen the explosion coming from a mile off. The rule Oster tested was never a dose-response claim wearing plain clothes. Its form gives it away. “No amount of alcohol is known to be safe at any time in pregnancy” is not the shape of a statistical finding; findings come with magnitudes, intervals, and gradients. It is the shape of a taboo: absolute, unranked, admitting no degree, because taboos guard categories and a category is either intact or breached. You cannot be a little bit defiled. When Oster answered the rule with a coefficient, she was not correcting an error inside the system. She was denying the system’s kind, translating a boundary into a slope, and the fury that came back at her was not the irritation of experts contradicted on evidence. Experts contradicted on evidence write rebuttal letters about confounders. This was the other thing, the heat that greets sacrilege, the accusation not that she was wrong but that she was dangerous, that her book would license defilement, that women would hear permission. Douglas’s terms fit the reaction with almost embarrassing snugness: the priesthood did not defend the coefficient, it defended the boundary, and it defended it with the argument boundary-keepers always use, that the laity cannot be trusted with degrees.

Blame completes the circuit, and Douglas’s later work, Risk and Blame among it, put blame at the center of modern risk talk. Pollution beliefs earn their keep when misfortune strikes, by supplying a culprit and thereby reassuring the community that the moral order still governs events. A miscarriage, a birth defect, a diagnosis in childhood: these are the intolerable events, misfortune without meaning, and the prenatal code converts them into meaning by converting them into verdicts. She drank. She ate the cheese. She didn’t take the folate. The mother is the accused in waiting, and the code she followed or breached is the indictment pre-drafted. This is the cruelty Oster’s readers write to her about, the women who miscarried and spent months auditing their own coffee, and it is also the code’s deep function, which is why the code cannot be reformed by data. A community that gave up the taboo would have to sit with unexplained loss, and Douglas’s whole life’s work says communities would rather have blame than chaos. Oster offers the chaos with error bars. The relief her readers report, and it is the most consistent testimony in her reviews, is the relief of the absolved, women released from a purity regime they could never satisfy, and the fury she draws is its mirror, the reaction of those for whom the regime is load and meaning at once.

The frame keeps paying as the career widens. The pandemic was a pollution event on the Douglas scale, an invisible contaminant crossing every boundary at once, and the response ran on purity machinery from the first week: the six feet, the wiped groceries, the masks worn alone on trails, her own children shrieking “SOCIAL DISTANCING!” at strangers, lay enforcement again, children as taboo police, the surest sign a rule has left the domain of technique and entered the domain of defilement. Some measures worked and some did not, and the point of the Douglas reading is that their persistence tracked their symbolic yield as much as their epidemiological one; the beach closures she mocked in the amnesty essay are inexplicable as disease control and transparent as boundary display. Then the amnesty essay itself, read through Risk and Blame, becomes a study in predictable failure. Oster asked a wounded community to forgo blame for its misfortune, and blame, in Douglas’s account, is what a community’s risk beliefs exist to produce. She was proposing to decommission the machinery at the moment of its maximum use. Both moral communities refused, in identical form and opposite content: each side had its polluters, the reckless unmasked or the cruel closers, and each heard “amnesty” as the demand that defilement go unpurified. Communities purify. They do not amnesty. She keeps making the same offer, evidence in exchange for absolution-rights, and the offer keeps being refused because it asks people to trade the thing pollution beliefs are for.

There is a last turn, and honesty requires it, because Douglas never granted anyone an exemption, least of all the rational. Purity and Danger’s standing provocation was that the moderns who laugh at the Lele have their own pollutions and cannot see them. Oster’s tribe included. The evidence culture she comes from runs on an explicit purity hierarchy, and it talks like one: economists praise “clean identification,” worry about data “contamination,” treat selection as a corrupting influence that must be washed out, and rank the randomized trial as the immaculate design from which all observational work is a fall. The hierarchy of evidence is a hierarchy of ritual purity, and it has its own anomalies it cannot leave alone and its own defilements it polices with heat; sit in any seminar when someone presents a correlation as causal and watch the room enforce. This does not level the difference between the CDC’s rule and Oster’s coefficient; a purity system disciplined by prediction differs from one that answers only to the community, and the difference is most of what we mean by science. It does mean her position is a rival order rather than a view from outside all orders, a community of the clean-identified with its own boundaries, its own membership badges, and its own anger. Her readers convert to it as one converts to a lighter law, trading the taboo of the vessel for the taboo of the confounder, and finding the second easier to live under because it indicts studies instead of mothers.

That may be the fairest summary the frame allows. Oster has not led America’s parents out of pollution thinking, because there is no out; Douglas closed that exit in 1966. She has offered a migration between purity systems, from one that locates danger in the mother’s body and pays out in blame, to one that locates danger in bad inference and pays out in doubt. The first is older, harsher, and self-enforcing at every restaurant table. The second is kinder to the woman with the wine glass and harder on the human need to know why the bad thing happened. The migration is real, a million copies of it, and it remains a minority movement for the reason Douglas would name last and mean most: when the loss comes, doubt is thin, and blame, whatever it costs the accused, tells the community that the world still has rules.

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The Most Ridiculous Story Ever Told

Around 2013, a doctoral student took a marker to the wall of his mother's bedroom in a council house in Clapham, South London, and wrote out his ambitions. Jason Arday (b. 1985) was in his late twenties, studying part time, working odd jobs. One line read: “One day I will work at Oxford or Cambridge.”

A council estate is British public housing. The distance between a Clapham council flat and a named professorial chair at Cambridge runs the length of the English class system, and in February 2023 Cambridge announced that Arday had covered it. At thirty-seven he became Professor of Sociology of Education, holder of the 2002 Professorial Chair, the youngest Black person appointed to a professorship in the university's history. Pro-Vice-Chancellor Bhaskar Vira called him “an exceptional scholar of race, inequality and education.” Arday said he hoped Cambridge would give him leverage to “open doors” for people from disadvantaged backgrounds.

The press coverage wrote itself, because the biography was already polished. Born to Ghanaian parents, the second youngest of three boys, diagnosed at three with autism and global developmental delay. Nonverbal through childhood, taught sign language, first word at eleven. The word, in most tellings, was “hello.” Therapists predicted an assisted living facility. He could not read or write until eighteen, a claim Liverpool John Moores University, which awarded his PhD, repeated with pride in its own announcement. His mother, called Giff, carried him through, using music and song lyrics and sound to help him make sense of language. Arday himself gave the story its title when he asked an audience whether it would not be “the most ridiculous story ever told” if the boy who could not read at eighteen earned a PhD before thirty.

CBS filmed him at home in London. The BBC counted the Black professors at Cambridge and found five before him. The Guardian ran a long profile in July 2023. A Simon & Schuster speakers bureau took him on. A memoir deal followed.

On July 21, 2026, Nathan Cofnas, a philosopher whose research fellowship at Cambridge's Emmanuel College was terminated in 2024 over a blog post on race and affirmative action, published an article titled “DEI Fraud and Cover-Up at Cambridge.” It alleges that Arday's doctoral thesis and several of his papers contain extensive unattributed borrowing, that a participant quotation appears under two different demographic identities in two different studies, and that Cambridge administrators have known since June 2023 and declined to investigate. By the time Cofnas published, two journals had already issued formal corrections to Arday's articles. No university and no journal has found Arday guilty of research misconduct. The corrections are on the record. Everything else is contested.

The two facts of Arday's public life now sit side by side. He is the subject of an inspirational memoir arriving in American bookstores on August 11, 2026. He is also the subject of documentary comparisons that would normally end an academic career, and that his employer ignores.

Clapham to Twickenham to Liverpool

Arday's schooling ran through special education and speech therapy. He left secondary school with GCSE qualifications in physical education and textiles, vocational subjects taken in Britain at fifteen or sixteen. This detail has become a problem for the official chronology, because passing written examinations at sixteen sits awkwardly beside total illiteracy until eighteen. Accommodations exist; a reader and scribe can be arranged for disabled candidates. A more careful formulation may be that Arday reached his late teens with profound literacy difficulties and needed intensive help to build the reading and writing that higher education requires. Publicity for his forthcoming memoir edges toward this version, describing him as leaving school still barely able to read or write, which softens the harder claim that he could not read a word. No educational or clinical record detailed enough to settle the question is public.

The softer version diminishes nothing. A boy from special education who needed years of help to read, and who now holds a Cambridge chair, remains a remarkable case. But “could not read until eighteen” fit a headline, and the headline version is the one Cambridge, Liverpool John Moores, and the international press circulated.

After school came a sport and development programme at Merton College, where a lecturer named Sandro Sandri spent long hours on Arday's literacy and told him he could go further than vocational sport. Arday then took a BA in education studies and physical education and an MA in pedagogy at St Mary's University in Twickenham; Cambridge's profile lists the BA under the University of Surrey, which validated St Mary's degrees in that period. He trained as a physical education teacher. In 2015 Liverpool John Moores awarded him a PhD for a thesis on peer mentoring among student teachers, a study of four participants using interviews, workshops, questionnaires and reflective forms. He worked retail and service jobs on the side. He has said he entered academic publishing without a mentor who could explain how journals worked.

Along the way he ran. In 2010 he completed thirty marathons in thirty-five days to raise money for Shelter and the Shooting Star children's hospice, a challenge local media covered at the time, and his fundraising led to his selection as a torchbearer for the London 2012 Olympics. Later speaker biographies credit him with work for more than seventy charities, fundraising above £5 million, and three hundred miles run in three days. Some of the 2010 marathons have contemporaneous documentation. The aggregate figures and the extreme distance claims circulate from profile to profile without a consolidated public record behind them. Cofnas notes that Yiannis Kouros, described by peers as the greatest ultrarunner who ever lived, set a world record in 1984 with 359 miles in three days, which puts an amateur's claimed 300 in demanding company.

The ladder

Arday's first journal article appeared in 2018. That same year he became a senior lecturer at Roehampton. In 2019 Durham made him an associate professor of sociology. In 2021 Glasgow gave him a full chair in the sociology of education. In 2023 came Cambridge. Five years separate his first publication from a named Oxbridge chair. Most professors spend two decades or more on that climb.

His scholarly production over those five years falls into three categories. First, edited collections: Aiming Higher, a 2015 Runnymede Trust report on race in universities co-edited with Claire Alexander; Dismantling Race in Higher Education: Racism, Whiteness and Decolonising the Academy (2018), co-edited with Heidi Safia Mirza; Doing Equity and Diversity for Success in Higher Education: Redressing Structural Inequalities in the Academy, co-edited with Dave Thomas. These volumes assembled established researchers on admissions, curriculum, Islamophobia and academic employment, and they gave Arday a network and a profile before he had much of an individual publication record. Second, a short book, Cool Britannia and Multi-Ethnic Britain, which reads the 1990s of Britpop and New Labour against discriminatory policing and the 1993 murder of Stephen Lawrence (1974-1993). Third, journal articles built on interviews, focus groups, storytelling and autoethnography, with samples he describes as convenience samples, recruited through social media and personal networks, and with no statistical analysis. His recurring argument is that universities admit minority students and staff while keeping curricula, informal networks and standards formed around White, middle-class, neurotypical experience, so that formal access never becomes belonging.

Qualitative sociology of this kind is a legitimate tradition. Its credibility rests almost wholly on the researcher's trustworthiness, because no outsider can rerun a personal interview. That is the ground on which the current allegations stand.

The reader

David Harris is a retired professor of leisure and education at Plymouth Marjon University who runs a website of free teaching notes for students. He read Arday's papers intending to summarize them, the way he had summarized hundreds of others. He found what he called oddities, so frequent they dominated his reading: procedure paragraphs that recurred across papers about different studies, phrasing that tracked earlier publications by other authors, and one thing harder to explain, which came later. He emailed Arday with examples and asked for clarification.

Arday's reply survives in Cofnas's article. He asked Harris not to email him again, invited him to direct his resources elsewhere, and closed: “Anything further from you will be considered bullying and harassment.”

Harris and a colleague then wrote to journal editors and to Cambridge administrators. The first letters to Cambridge went out in June 2023, three months after Arday took up his chair.

Two corrections followed.

In December 2023, the journal Social Sciences amended Arday‘s 2018 paper “Understanding Mental Health: What Are the Issues for Black and Ethnic Minority Students at University?” The correction states that the original paper had disclosed its adaptation of a 2016 study by Anjum Memon and colleagues only in one section, while overlap ran through the abstract, introduction, methods, findings, discussion and conclusions. Citations to Memon and to Grey et al. were inserted across a dozen listed locations.

The journal kept the paper and recorded the author's statement that the scientific conclusions were unaffected.

In May 2024, Educational Philosophy and Theory corrected Arday‘s 2021 paper “Attempting to Break the Chain,” clarifying that its methodology tracked the 2018 paper, which in turn rested on Memon.

Citations went into four paragraphs of the methodology section and two references were added.

Journals reserve retraction for findings they no longer stand behind. A correction says the paper survives with repairs. Read together, though, these two notices establish something no one disputes: as originally published, two of Arday's papers did not tell readers how much of their language, structure and method came from earlier work by other people. Cofnas reads the first notice as an admission that the entire paper was plagiarized and then laundered by citation. The journals' language is more restrained. The gap between those readings is the gap a formal investigation exists to close, and none has occurred.

The thesis and the quotation

Cofnas ran Arday's 2015 dissertation through plagiarism-detection software and published side-by-side passages. The largest overlap he reports is with a 2009 Brunel University dissertation by Paula Zwozdiak-Myers, now a Reader in Education at Brunel, on the development of reflective practice among student teachers, a subject nearly identical to Arday's. Cofnas presents parallels beginning on the first page of Arday's introduction and running through the literature review and methodology, some passages reproduced with minimal editing, some retaining copy-editing errors from the source. He further reports passages resembling a 2011 article by Muhammad Athar Hussain and colleagues and a 2008 article by Peter Kahn and colleagues, neither cited anywhere in the dissertation.

The caveats are real. Similarity software establishes overlap, and overlap can have innocent causes; two education theses on reflective practice will both work through John Dewey (1859-1952) and Donald Schön (1930-1997). Uncited sources cannot be explained that way. A judgment requires the full texts, the citation conventions of the field, and Arday's answer, and the institution with authority to render it is Liverpool John Moores, which awarded the degree and has said nothing in public.

The heaviest allegation concerns evidence rather than words. Harris noticed, and Cofnas reproduces, that a participant quoted in Arday's 2018 student mental-health study, identified as an Asian undergraduate, speaks in nearly the same words as a participant in Arday's 2022 staff study, identified as a thirty-eight-year-old Latin American academic describing her struggle with English. Two studies, two populations, two demographic identities, one voice. When the 2018 paper was corrected, the phrase “and then heavily medicate me” disappeared from that quotation. The 2022 version kept it.

The published comparison cannot show what happened. A quotation may have been reused by error in drafting. Language may have been reconstructed in editing. Two people may have spoken alike, though the closeness strains that account. Or testimony may have been recycled or invented. Textual plagiarism concerns the ownership of words. This question concerns whether the empirical record of two studies is what it claims to be, and it can only be answered by the recordings, transcripts and consent forms, which no one outside has seen. Qualitative research asks readers to trust the interviewer. That is why this comparison, more than any passage from Zwozdiak-Myers, is the one an investigation would have to resolve.

Cofnas also went through the ten publications Arday's Cambridge webpage lists as principal and recent. By his account, three carry apparent unattributed borrowing, several are position pieces or introductions with no data, and two list Arday as a minor contributor on work led by others, including a protocol paper whose contributor note assigns him only comments on the final manuscript. The methods paragraph of a fourth paper, on precarious employment, repeats the procedure language descended from Memon, uncited. On this reading, the record supporting a Cambridge chair thins considerably. The reading comes from a hostile critic and has not been tested by any neutral party. Both statements are true at once.

The university

Cofnas publishes the correspondence between the 2023 tipster and Cambridge. Rhys Morgan, Cambridge's Head of Policy, Governance and Integrity, answered with jurisdiction: under UK Research Integrity Office guidance, an institution investigates research conducted in its name, the work in question predates Arday's arrival, and so, Morgan wrote, “we do not consider it within our remit.” Hilary Cremin, head of the Faculty of Education, wrote that she had met with Arday and her director of research, that Arday had chosen to take the 2018 article down and revise it, that during the meeting he spoke movingly of direct and indirect racism and of health problems and hard living conditions when the paper was written, and that “he has our full support.”

The jurisdictional point has a real basis. Cambridge cannot revoke a Liverpool John Moores degree or adjudicate work done at Roehampton, Durham or Glasgow. But jurisdiction over past conduct and responsibility for a current appointment are different things. Cambridge assessed Arday for its chair on the strength of that record. Whether the record is sound is a live Cambridge question no matter which institution owns the individual papers, and Morgan's letter does not reach it. Cremin's letter substitutes mitigation for inquiry. Racism and illness bear on intent and on compassion. They cannot determine whether words were copied or whether a quotation belonged to the person it was attributed to, and the meeting she describes examined neither.

Cofnas writes that multiple sources told him Arday or the university directed the libel firm Carter-Ruck at academics and journalists who raised questions, and that many Cambridge faculty have known the outline of the matter for over a year without a word of it reaching print. Those claims rest on unnamed sources and should be weighed as such. What can be verified is the silence. Between June 2023 and July 2026, the only public trace of the affair was a set of annotations on a retired professor's teaching website.

The messenger deserves the same scrutiny as the message. Cofnas writes as an avowed opponent of diversity policy and of what he regards as the taboo on race and IQ; Emmanuel College ended his fellowship over exactly that writing, and Vira, who praised Arday's appointment, took part in the proceedings against him. His article moves from the Arday documents to claims about Black intelligence distributions and the motives of everyone at Cambridge, none of which the documents require or support. A reader can discard that superstructure. The side-by-side passages, the journal notices and the administrative letters stand or fall on their own, and they are checkable.

What stands

Four things are established. Two of Arday's papers required corrections extensive enough to reach their abstracts, methods and conclusions. The published comparisons involving his dissertation are detailed enough that the awarding university has grounds for a formal review, which it has not announced. The duplicated participant quotation raises a data question that text comparison cannot settle and that only source materials can. And Cambridge's stated position answers a narrower question than the one before it.

What is not established: that Arday plagiarized his thesis, that he fabricated testimony, or that his biography is invented. Some of the 2010 marathons may have happened. The childhood diagnosis and the years of speech therapy are attested by his family's account and contradicted by nothing public. A man can be the real survivor of a hard childhood and an unreliable scholar; the first fact is the reason the second went unexamined for so long. Cambridge announced a symbol in 2023, and an institution that has staked its diversity commitments on a symbol pays a price to investigate him and a different price to refuse.

On August 11, 2026, 37 Ink, a Simon & Schuster imprint, publishes Great and Unfortunate Things, Arday’s memoir written with Eve Claxton, with a blurb from Chris Gardner comparing it to the power of a mother's love and the transformative force of grit. The publicity apparatus is rolling forward. The dissertation sits in the Liverpool John Moores repository, where anyone can read it against Zwozdiak-Myers, page by page. Between the two documents lies the question Cambridge has not asked.

Notes

The bedroom-wall goal and the “One day I will work at Oxford or Cambridge” quote: Guardian reporting, relayed at theGrio; the full Guardian profile is Charlie Brinkhurst-Cuff, “Jason Arday: he learned to talk at 11 and read at 18,” July 11, 2023.

LJMU announcement repeating “unable to read or write until the age of 18.”

St Mary’s Twickenham claiming his BA and MA; note the tension with the Cambridge profile listing the BA under Surrey. My reconciliation, St Mary’s degrees validated by Surrey in that era, is an inference; verify before publishing.

Mother “Giff,” music and song lyrics, CBS interview.

2010 marathons for Shelter and Shooting Star hospice, 2012 Olympic torchbearer: Wikipedia, worth chasing the underlying local press citations before leaning on it.

Memoir publication, 37 Ink, August 11, 2026, with Eve Claxton, Gardner blurb: Great and Unfortunate Things; UK edition August 27, 2026: Simon & Schuster UK.

Dave Harris’s Arday annotations; his site index: ARA site.

Reasonable extrapolations made without a link: council housing as British public housing; typical GCSE age of fifteen to sixteen; correction versus retraction conventions; the typical length of a climb to a chair; Carter-Ruck‘s reputation as a claimant libel firm.

DEI Fraud and Cover-Up at Cambridge (July 21, 2026)

Nathan Cofnas writes:

“Wouldn’t it be the most ridiculous story ever told, if the boy who couldn’t read and write at 18 gets a PhD before he’s 30?”

Those are the words of Jason Arday—the 2002 Professorial Chair in the Sociology of Education at Cambridge University. Indeed, the story of his metamorphosis from arguably the most disadvantaged person in the UK to elite scholar-athlete-philanthropist would make even Walt Disney raise an eyebrow.

At age three he was diagnosed with global development delay and autism. Therapists said he would be confined to an assisted living facility. Miraculously, at 11 years old, he spoke his first word (“hello”). When he was 18, he learned to read and write.

Under the influence of a white high school teacher who “gave [him] agency,” Arday pursued higher education. After receiving a PhD from Liverpool John Moores University, he rocketed up the academic ladder as a scholar of racism, education, and inequality. In three years he went from senior lecturer at Roehampton (2018) to associate professor at Durham (2019) to professor at Glasgow (2021). Ivy League universities (plural) tried to recruit him, but he had his heart set on Oxford or Cambridge. In 2023, at age 37, he became the youngest black full professor in the history of Cambridge. He is one of the youngest people of any race to ever hold a chair professorship at Oxbridge.

In his spare time, Arday ran 30 marathons in 35 days and 300 miles in three days.

As of 2023, he had worked with “more than 70” charities and raised more than £5 million.

Up until his appointment at Cambridge, Arday continued to face unspecified hardships. As reported by the Guardian in 2023, despite previously being a professor at Durham and Glasgow, “He has barely slept over the past 15 years…, working through most nights—often on his academic and charity work, but sometimes just to make ends meet.”

He has received “hundreds of thousands of letters and emails” from fans “all over the world.” This indicates a level of fame comparable to an upper-middle-tier household name celebrity.

But how much of “the most ridiculous story ever told” is true?

I was recently contacted by a faculty member at Cambridge (whose name I will not reveal) who alleges that Arday is a plagiarist and fabulist. My source claims that many if not most professors at Cambridge have known about this for more than a year. However, Arday and/or Cambridge’s administration are using intimidation and legal threats to squelch the story. As far as I am aware, the only mention of Arday’s alleged plagiarism that exists in the public domain is on the personal website of retired Plymouth Marjon University professor Dave Harris. (More on that later.)

Besides the plagiarism, there are serious questions about Arday’s biographical claims.

Developing normal speaking abilities after being nonverbal until age 11 is medically improbable.

Arday has repeatedly made unequivocal assertions that he could not read, write, or even spell his own name until he was 18. But he left secondary school with General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) qualifications in Physical Education and Textiles. Despite being in vocational subjects, these tests require literacy, and they are normally taken at age 15 or 16. Based on publicly available information, it is possible to recreate a timeline that places Arday’s test date before age 18. It is conceivable that he received “special arrangements” to allow him to take the test with help from a reader and scribe. However, a write-up of his forthcoming memoir says that he “left secondary school with two GCSEs to his name, still barely able to read or write.” So he may be backing away from his original story.

30 marathons in 35 days and 300 miles in three days are feats of dubious believability. Wikipedia lists running 50 marathons in 50 days as one of the highlights of professional ultramarathon runner Dean Karnazes’s career. 30 in 35 days is possible for an amateur, but only with intensive training and planning. 300 miles in three days is an even bigger stretch. For comparison, Yiannis Kouros, who has been described as “the greatest ultrarunner of all time,” set a world record in 1984 when he ran 359 miles in three days. Arday asserts that he was able to do all this because “If you have the will, it will always supersede skill”—a proposition that anyone with experience in athletics knows to be false.

However, it is impossible to prove or disprove Arday’s biographical claims without more direct evidence. Therefore, I will only address questions about his scholarship.

Here I present evidence that, starting with his PhD dissertation, Arday routinely passes off the words and ideas of others as his own. If one removes the apparently plagiarized material from his record, there is little or no real scholarship. I discuss the cover-up by senior administrators at Cambridge and the broader implications for free speech and DEI ideology…

Free Speech and DEI

There are more than a thousand black people in the UK with IQs over 140 who would be capable of doing serious work in the sociology of education. If Cambridge administrators wanted a black professor to serve as a role model for underrepresented minorities, they could have found someone qualified. Instead, they grabbed a random black person with an unvetted fairytale backstory and almost nothing that even resembles genuine scholarship. When evidence of the black person’s long history of plagiarism is brought to their attention, they excuse it on the basis that he was the victim of “direct and indirect racism.” In their view, he cannot be asked to follow the same rules that we expect schoolchildren to understand. I know it sounds silly to say that “leftists are the real racists.” But by hiring Jason Arday and refusing to investigate credible accusations against him, isn’t Cambridge making a statement that the only way to have black professors is to abandon all standards?

There is a conflict between what universities such as Cambridge call “DEI” and something else that they claim to value, namely, free speech. DEI demands that we accept the fiction that people like Jason Arday, who are hired because they tick certain identity and ideology boxes, are just as qualified as scholars selected on the basis of academic merit. But if people are allowed to speak freely, they might point out that this is false. The Cambridge administration resolves the dilemma by siding with DEI against free speech. Faculty know what is likely to happen to them if they speak about the Arday situation. That is why the administration has been able to bury the story for three years.

The upshot is that we lose both free speech and equality. Equality means treating people the same without regard to immutable characteristics like race, and that is not what is happening at Cambridge.

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